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SUMMARY
The objective of the proposed research is to develop methodologies, support algo-
rithms and software-hardware infrastructure for detection and diagnosis of parametric fail-
ures, transient soft errors and security attacks in linear and nonlinear circuits and systems
for sensing and control. This research is motivated by the proliferation of autonomous
sense-and-control real-time systems, such as intelligent robots and self-driven cars, that
must maintain a minimum level of performance in the presence of unavoidable electro-
mechanical degradation of system-level components in the field as well as external security
attacks. A key focus is on rapid recovery from the effects of such anomalies and impair-
ments with minimal impact on system performance while maintaining low implementation
overhead as opposed to traditional schemes for recovery that rely on duplication or tripli-
cation. Real-time detection and diagnosis techniques are investigated and rely on analysis
of state-space encoding based check signatures. For on-line error detection and diagnosis
in control systems, linear and nonlinear state space encodings of the system behavior are
analyzed in real-time. Recovery is initiated using guided reinforcement learning algorithms
that determine how best the system should be controlled in the presence of the diagnosed
performance impairments. For cyberphysical systems, these state-space encodings are used
to detect malicious security attacks and to diagnose the affected components swiftly. These
checks are utilized for fast recovery from such attacks while avoiding catastrophic sys-
tem failure. Further research in this area will pave the way for successful deployment of




In November 1971, Intel launched the first commercial microprocessor chip, the 4004
containing 2300 tiny transistors, thus ushering the world into a technological revolution
spanning decades. Since then, the expansion of computational capabilities fueled by the
self-fulfilling prophecy of Gordon Moore, Intel’s co-founder has enabled the integration of
computing in our daily life. Moore’s law predicts that processing power doubles roughly
every two years as smaller transistors are packed more tightly onto silicon wafers, boosting
performance and reducing costs. The attempt to satisfy this rule has achieved exponen-
tial progress in computing performance that is orders of magnitude superior than the 1971
processor. This type of meteoric advancement in technology is hitherto unobserved in any
domain of scientific development. A modern Intel Coffee Lake processor contains more
than 2 billion transistors and delivers 500,000 times as much computational capability as a
1971 processor. The abundance of computing power can be perceived from the fact that a
modern smartphone is more capable than a room-sized supercomputer in the 1980s. The
overwhelming march of computing progress has dramatically altered every phase of human
life with promises of sweeping improvement in the future days.
After almost five decades of relentless pursuit of Moore’s law, imminent signs of slow-
down of the exponential performance achievement are being observed [1–6] as shown in
Figure 1.1 while posing a question over the future of computing progress. Until the 2000s,
geometric scaling of transistor feature sizes were sufficient to maintain the doubling of tran-
sistor counts in a chip, thus reaping the obtained performance benefits. After the 2000s,
continuing further geometric scaling posed numerous problems and the semiconductor in-
dustry kept devising sophisticated technical measures to keep pace with the predictions
of Moore’s law [7] - at 90 nm, strained silicon was introduced; at 45 nm, new materials
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Figure 1.1: The slowing down of Moore’s law is evident from the decrease in the number
of transistors bought per $, thus indicating rising costs
(high-κ dielectric) to increase the capacitance of each transistor layered on the silicon were
introduced; at 22 nm, trigate transistors [8] maintained the scaling. At present, three major
problems hinder the progress of feature scaling along Moore’s law. Firstly, the photo-
lithography process used to transfer the chip patterns to the silicon wafer needs significant
technological advancement for enabling further feature scaling. Presently, light sources
with 193nm wavelength are used to generate feature sizes of 14 nm, adding extra complex-
ity and cost to the manufacturing process with each generation of ICs. Though extreme UV
[9] with 13nm wavelength is capable of solving this problem, production-ready EUV tech-
nology has proven difficult to engineer. Secondly the extent of feature size scaling possible
is unclear; at 2 nm transistors will be a few atoms wide and device physicists think it’s un-
likely that they will operate reliably at such a small scale. Thirdly, even if the modernization
of photo-lithography process is adopted along with resolving the question of scaling, the
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specter of power usage and energy dissipation looms large. As higher number of transistors
are tightly packed into an IC, dissipation of the generated heat becomes increasingly harder
creating power densities as high as values found in a rocket nozzle. A compounding of all
these factors has stopped the clock speeds of modern processors from increasing any fur-
ther and thwarted the benefits that workloads receive from ever-increasing core frequency.
Though researchers are exploring several alternatives to silicon based MOSFETs such as
carbon nanotubes [10–15], graphene [16–20], spin-based devices [21–25], none has been
declared a prominent solution. This has allowed the future of computing to be defined by
improvements in two different areas, beyond raw hardware performance.
1. Artificial Intelligence: Artificial intelligence (AI) is defined as a framework where
machines learn and make decisions in an intelligent, human-like way. The teaching
of computers to do complex tasks is enabled through machine learning that is hinged
on the basic idea that software can simulate the activity in layers of neurons in the
neocortex, the hub of complex decision-making in the human brain. Such an algo-
rithm learns to recognize patterns in digital representations of sounds, images, and
other data. One branch of AI has shown considerable promise in solving highly com-
plex tasks - ‘Deep Learning’. Deep learning is a class of machine learning algorithms
that use a cascade of multiple layers of nonlinear processing units for feature extrac-
tion and transformation of input data. One fascinating success of deep learning was
observed in early 2016 when AlphaGo, a Google’s deep-learning based computer
algorithm crushed the current world champion, Lee Sedol in a game of Go [26–28].
This phenomenal achievement can be put to context while discussing the complexity
of the above feat. In a game of Go, there are more possible board positions than
there are particles in the observable universe. As a result, an AI-enabled Go-playing
system cannot simply rely on computational brute force, provided by Moore’s law,
to prevail. The success of ‘deep learning’ technology demonstrates that huge perfor-
mance gains can be achieved through new algorithms. Slowing progress in hardware
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innovations will provide stronger incentives to develop better software as outlined
by the recent IEEE CS 2022 report [29] from the IEEE Computer Society. At the
foundation of the report is the understanding that by 2022, intelligence will become
seamless and ubiquitous in all forms of technology. Machine intelligence has already
started transforming every sphere from communications and computing to medicine,
manufacturing, and transportation and will increasingly integrate with our daily lives.
2. Computing Architectures: The second area of improvement lies in novel comput-
ing architectures that can create specialized chips optimized for specific jobs. As
computation becomes increasingly data centric and the scalability limits in terms of
performance and power are being reached, alternative computing paradigms different
from the conventional von Neumann architecture are being sought. Now, chips are
being designed specifically for cloud computing, neural-network processing, com-
puter vision and other tasks. Novel architecture paradigms are being explored for
achieving the performance boost obtained from Moore’s law scaling for so long.
Three different types of architectures have showed early promise:
i) In-memory Computing - Scientists have recently explored the concept of
‘in-memory computing’ [30] that is expected to yield 200x improvements in
computer speed and energy efficiency. Unlike the conventional von Neumann
architecture, this concept uses phase-change memory (PCM) for both storing and
processing data at the same physical location. Such co-existence of computation
and storage at the nanometer scale removes the bottleneck of constant data
communication between memory and the computing unit, thus paving the way for
building ultra-dense, low-power and massively-parallel computing systems.
ii) Quantum Computing - Unlike binary digital electronic computers where data is
encoded into binary states, quantum computing aims to exploit quantum-mechanical
phenomena such as superposition and entanglement to form quantum bits that can be
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superpositions of individual states. Such quantum effects enable the quantum bits or
“qubits” to occupy multiple states simultaneously, thus promising to tackle problems
that are impossible to solve by brute-force computations. The research community
[31] is heavily investing in exploring the physical implementation and numerical
capabilities of such quantum computers.
iii) Cognitive Computing - Cognitive computing [32] attempts to build computer
chips that use a network of “neurosynaptic cores” to manage information in a way
that resembles the functioning of neurons in a brain. Instead of using the sequential
programming based von Neumann architecture, these cognitive computers stores and
processes information in a distributed, parallel way, like the neurons and synapses in
a brain. Researchers are attempting to create computers that have about half the com-
plexity of human brain while consuming minimal power, in the orders of kilowatts.
With significant research efforts attempting to drive the growth of computing along dif-
ferent avenues, the semiconductor industry is currently predicting that artificial intelligence
and machine learning enabled applications will pervade all domains of human life. This
dissertation develops algorithms and methodologies for enabling the vision of such a future
as described next in the motivation.
1.1 Motivation
The motivations of this research stem from the efforts to tackle system malfunctions in
autonomous and cyber-physical systems due to errors induced by component failures or
malicious security attacks:
1.1.1 Autonomous Systems
The successful deployment and assimilation of the intelligent autonomous systems in hu-
man society depends on the trustworthiness of these systems. Unless these centralized and
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distributed autonomous systems [33–41] are dependable (reliable, fault-tolerant, available,
maintainable, safe and secure), such systems may never see fruition in the commercial
arena or be useful for critical operations. This is because many such emerging applications
can have life-threatening consequences if they malfunction in the field. Self-driven cars
are great examples of this paradigm. While proponents of such systems argue that automa-
tion will make self-driven cars safer than human-driven vehicles, they ignore the fact that
the controlling hardware and software itself may have bugs, that sensors and actuators can
degrade over time and that control principles will need to adapt in real-time to account
for electrical and mechanical wear-and-tear. For reliable and dependable vehicle operation,
transformational cross-layer (sensor, actuator and control) design methods need to be devel-
oped that deliver ultra-high levels of dependability (compared to the safety/dependability
of aircraft and space travel), on a per-vehicle basis to thousands of autonomous vehicles
for the technology to ever become commercially successful on a massive scale. A single
vehicle malfunction resulting in injury or loss of life can spell doom for the commercial-
ization of such technology in the future. In this context, the control operations of modern
autonomous systems are evolving towards electronics as opposed to mechanical/hydraulic
means of control as evident from the proliferation of “steer-by-wire” and “brake-by-wire”
[42–47] control systems. While this improves the reliability of the system due to use of
fewer mechanical components, the overall dependability of the system is now contingent
on error-free operation of the control electronics, sensors and actuators. Detection and mit-
igation of such control malfunction in real-time forms the core objective of this research.
1.1.2 Cyber-physical systems
Modern cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are complex combinations of physical processes,
computational resources and communication capabilities. These cyber-physical systems
are permeating every sphere of modern life in various domains such as energy produc-
tion, health care and telecommunications. Examples of cyber-physical systems include
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smart grid, chemical processes and medical monitoring. Critical infrastructure such as
water treatment plants, power generation systems and transportation networks are integrat-
ing cyber-technologies with physical processes to improve operational efficiency, resource
scalability and system autonomy. The geographical separation between sensing and actua-
tion in these systems enforces the use of network communication for effective control. At
the same time, the increased adoption of cyber-capabilities introduces vulnerabilities that
undermine the reliable operation of these systems. Real-world cyber-security incidents
such as the Queensland sewage treatment plant attack in 2000 [48, 49], US petrochemi-
cal process attack in 2003 [50], Daimler-Chrysler auto manufacturing plant attack in 2005
[51], Baku oil pipeline attack in 2008 [52], California pipeline attack in 2009 [53], Stuxnet
attack in Iranian uranium-enrichment plant in 2010 [54–56], German steel plant attack
in 2014 [57] and Ukrainian power grid attack in 2015 [58] demonstrate that these cyber-
physical systems are prone to failures due to attacks on the physical infrastructure and
communication management. These cyber-physical systems need to be dependable (reli-
able, fault-tolerant, available, maintainable and secure) for their ubiquitous deployment
across all domains of life. Hence, it is imperative to develop robust and effective real-time
attack monitoring and threat mitigation mechanisms.
The primary motivations of this dissertation are:
• To develop fundamental paradigms for ensuring the safety and dependability of au-
tonomous systems of the future that use linear and nonlinear control systems for
real-time operation (e.g. autonomous vehicles). Such paradigms will detect, diag-
nose and correct for the effects of transient errors or parametric deviations with low
latency while generating prognostics for off-line repair
• To develop fundamental security paradigms that can detect, diagnose and mitigate the
effects of external attacks on the operations of cyberphysical systems, while achiev-
ing very low attack detection latency and extremely high coverage of security attack
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mechanisms. It is assumed that attacks can be triggered through wireless interfaces
with the cloud or by direct wireless attack on the data transmissions
1.2 Prior Work
Dealing with failures has been a major concern even with the earliest electronic systems
[59, 60]. The use of checksums for failure tolerant matrix arithmetic and signal processing
algorithms was first investigated by Hua, Jou and Abraham in [61, 62] and led to the field
of algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) in the context of complex signal processing
algorithms. The underlying research focused on exact detection and correction of errors in
classes of widely used signal processing algorithms such as for matrix arithmetic and the
Fast Fourier Transform, among others. In [63], a methodology for soft error detection and
correction called algorithmic noise tolerance (ANT) was developed and further explored
in [64–66]. Here, the focus was on using reduced-precision duplication codes to detect and
correct errors with the understanding that not all errors need to be detected and corrected
precisely and that “perfect” error compensation is not always required for various classes of
signal processing algorithms such as for video compression. A class of codes called “real-
number checksums” for matrix-vector computations was developed by Nair and Abraham
in [67]. This class of codes was used by Chatterjee and d’Abreau in [68] to perform error
detection and correction in linear digital state variable systems. While error detection could
be performed with low overhead in [68], error correction incurred large overheads both in
area and time using the proposed algorithms. To resolve this, probabilistic and guided error
compensation schemes were proposed in [69–72]. In [73], continuous checksums were
used for the first time to detect and correct faults in linear analog state variable systems.
The state matrix was encoded using checksums and by tracking the system state variables,
any change in the analog transfer function of the system could be detected in real-time. The
continuous checking methodology was extended to use state estimation techniques in [74].
However, prior work primarily focused on concurrent error detection in analog and digital
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state variable systems and does not apply directly to control systems, as the latter consist
of plant and controller equations that must be combined together in a meaningful way to
allow detection of perturbations in the plant as well as its controller.
The problem of ensuring correct system operation under malfunctions and external dis-
turbances is typically tackled by the control community through robust control and fault-
tolerant control. Negative feedback control is inherently robust enough to suppress small
faults in the actuators or plant. However, even small faults or disturbances in the sensors of
a feedback control system lead to potentially disastrous consequences due to immediate de-
viation of the response trajectory from nominal behavior. Robust control methods address
this by explicitly designing mechanisms to deal with control uncertainty within specified
bounds. However, Wang and Zhang demonstrated the fundamental shortcomings of ro-
bust control methods such as H∞ loop shaping [75–78] and Lyapunov-based controllers
[79] in [80]. These methods are capable of handling limited parameter uncertainties and
suitable for slow-varying systems such as chemical processes. Robust controller design is
difficult for future complex cyber-physical systems operating in critical environments (such
as self-driven cars) where wide range of anomalies and system degradations are possible.
Fault tolerant control aims to avoid these system failures by implementing sophisticated
methodologies that can broadly be classified into 4 main categories:
1) Analytical Redundancy - This methodology implements a process model in software
[81] for constant comparison with the actual system data. The duplicated process model
is provided with same input signals as the original system at each time instant. The error
signal is formed from the comparison between process model output and actual system out-
put. In the presence of errors, this error signal is non-zero indicating faults in the system.
Though this approach has high fault coverage, it involves analytical duplication of the pro-
cess model that becomes infeasible for highly complex systems due to two main reasons -
i) accurate process model over the entire feasible state space may not be available for future
cyber-physical systems and ii) duplication of system resources is extremely expensive for
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large applications.
2) Limit Checking - Signal based fault detection methods [82] employ limit value
checking and plausibility ranges on measured signals for detection of errors and distur-
bances. Pre-computed thresholds are determined for each signal based on nominal fault-
free simulations. In the presence of errors, detection is accomplished if the measured sig-
nals cross the established bounds. Though this technique is easy to implement and has the
least overhead, the failure coverage is low for non-catastrophic causes such as component
degradation or transient errors that are essential for continuous prognosis in cyber-physical
systems.
3) Residual Generators - Residual generators are popular choices for fault detection in
the control community and these can be broadly classified into two main categories - i) ob-
server based approaches [83, 84] and parity-space-like approaches[85, 86]. In this scheme,
a specially designed residual filter is employed that generates a failure map from the system
measurements. For each fault, the failure map creates unique signatures that are zero in the
absence of any errors. This methodology has been proved to have high fault coverage and
diagnostic capabilities. However, the primary drawback of such a scheme is the assumption
of prior knowledge of failure modes that are utilized in the design of the residual generator.
Increase in the cardinality of feasible fault set results in such high computational overhead
that this approach is impractical for online implementation on embedded processors. Fur-
thermore, previous research has mostly focused on the application of residual generators to
linear systems [87, 88], weakly nonlinear systems and strongly nonlinear systems operat-
ing around an equilibrium point making these techniques unscalable for complex systems
operating with a high degree of nonlinearity.
4) PCA-based Detection - Principal component analysis (PCA) has previously been
used for fault detection in complex processes [89]. Under this scheme, the eigenstructure of
the covariance matrix of collected data is computed under fault-free operating conditions.
This allows the characterization of high-dimensional process data in a lower dimensional
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representation space, thus revealing linear relations among system states. The PCA model
projects the measurements into a residual space orthogonal to the model subspace, thus
enabling detection of parametric deviations. While PCA-based methodologies have been
effective for fault detection, it has been pointed out [90] that the underlying models suffer
from outlier sensitivity and the fault coverage varies widely due to model order truncation.
This dissertation addresses the insufficiency of the above methodologies for error de-
tection and correction in linear and nonlinear systems operating under arbitrary failure
mechanisms.
1.3 Contributions of Dissertation
The key contributions of this dissertation are summarized below:
1. State-space encoding based checking methodologies are developed for error detec-
tion in a wide class of linear and nonlinear control systems [91]. Typically, a non-
linear system switches across different operating points around which the system
behavior is weakly nonlinear [92]. Prior methods have focused on system operation
around fixed equilibrium points where the nonlinear behavior is limited and lineariza-
tion techniques can be applied. The proposed research in this dissertation makes no
such assumption and is applicable over a broad class of systems across all operating
modes - i) linear, ii) weakly nonlinear and iii) strongly nonlinear.
2. This research proposes a hybrid architecture where actor-critic reinforcement learn-
ing control is used as an augmentation to the classical control algorithms to enable
real-time adaptability with low latency. The state-space encoding methodologies are
exploited for efficient and rapid self-learning of the optimal control laws in pres-
ence of system malfunctions (sensors, actuators and electro-mechanical component
performance degradation) to restore system level performance as best as possible.
3. The diagnostic information extracted from the state encoding based error signal is
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utilized to significantly accelerate the self-learning process of the actor-critic rein-
forcement control through bootstrapping the learning process.
4. The proposed methodology is capable of detecting and correcting errors created due
to arbitrary failure mechanisms. Previous techniques assume pre-determined fault
models in the design of the detection algorithms. The proposed approach is not pred-
icated on any such assumption and can be applied to a nonlinear system amenable to
arbitrary failure mechanisms.
5. This research presents a cross-layer fault model for the first time in which environ-
mental anomalies, sensor/actuator malfunctions and soft errors in control program
execution are studied. The developed methodologies have high coverage in detection
of failures across different layers of abstraction.
6. Demonstration of the error detection and real-time control law adaptation capabilities
are shown on an actual self-balancing robot.
7. These state encoding based checking schemes are modified in a manner such that ma-
licious and engineered security attacks on distributed cyber-physical systems can be
identified. Under reasonable assumptions of resources and knowledge of an attacker,
it is shown that these methodologies are resilient to adversarial counter-attacks and
cannot be cracked easily. The distributed checking methodology is also exploited to
enable fast diagnosis of attacked sensors and actuators so that recovery from these
attacks can be achieved with low latency. Simulation results on a set of IEEE bench-
mark power systems as well as very large scale power grids are demonstrated to
emphasize the benefits of this research.
The research contributions of this dissertation are summarized in Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2: Research contributions of dissertation
1.4 Dissertation Overview
The primary objective of this dissertation is to develop methodologies and algorithms for
real-time detection and correction of parametric failures, transient soft errors and security
attacks in linear and nonlinear systems.
Chapter 2 introduces the foundational theory of system level state-space encoding for
detection of parametric failures and transient errors for linear control systems. It is also
demonstrated how such a linear encoding can be used for error correction with low latency.
Simulation results on a linear control system are presented to illustrate the detection and
correction capabilities.
Chapter 3 extends the encoding scheme for error detection and correction in circuits
with state-space representations. Real-time noise cancellation is demonstrated on linear
analog filters with two different learning-assisted adaptive schemes. Hardware experiments
on a prototype circuit are presented to show the real-time noise cancellation capabilities.
The encoding scheme is slightly modified for error detection in nonlinear filters and results
for a nonlinear Volterra filter are discussed.
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Chapter 4 proposes a real-time error detection methodology using machine learning as-
sisted state-space encodings for nonlinear control systems operating under arbitrary failure
mechanisms. For the first time, a cross-layer fault model in nonlinear control systems is
assumed where failures and anomalies are assumed to occur in any section of a real system
implementation. Fault injections on an FPGA and failure detection on a hardware plat-
form along with simulation results from microarchitectural experiments comprehensively
establish the benefits of the proposed detection methodology.
Chapter 5 proposes ALERA, an abbreviation for Accelerated Learning Enabled Rein-
forcement Architecture for real-time adaptability in nonlinear control systems. State-space
encodings are utilized to accelerate the real-time learning process for control adaptation in
presence of errors. Simulation results and hardware demonstration illustrate the promising
potential and viability of the proposed scheme.
Chapter 6 presents a unified framework for detection, diagnosis and correction of secu-
rity attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS). Electric power grids are studied as examples
of CPS along with sophisticated attack strategies. State-space encodings are redefined in a
hierarchical algorithm for attack diagnosability in distributed system. The resilience of the
proposed scheme is studied for adversarial counter-attack possibilities. Extensive simula-
tion data are presented on IEEE benchmark test cases along with very large power grids to
show the benefits compared to state-of-the-art methods.




CHECKSUMS IN LINEAR CONTROL SYSTEMS
This chapter introduces the theory of checksum encoding for detection and correction of
errors in linear control systems. Simulation results on a linear servo motor are presented to
illustrate the concepts.
2.1 Theory: System level checksum encoding
2.1.1 Error Detection
A generalized theory is developed for applying analog checksum codes [73] to real-time
control system checking. Consider the state transition and control laws for a linear control
system as shown in Figure 2.1. All the signals of Figure 2.1 represent vectors of elements
and the circles represent adders/subtractors. For linear time-invariant systems, the matrices
A, B, C, D, etc. are constant and time-invariant. The continuous time state differential
equation of the plant is ẋ(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + vp(t), where x(t) is the state of the plant
and u(t) is the input variable. The observed variable y(t) is given by y(t) = Cx(t)+vm(t).
The variables vp(t) and vm(t) represent noises (perturbations) in the state and measurement
vectors, respectively. The controlled variable is z(t) = Dx(t) and the reference variable
r(t) is a stochastic process of the same dimension as the controlled variable z(t). Consider
the case where the closed loop controller is a linear differential system with the reference
variable r(t) and the observed variable y(t) as inputs and the plant input u(t) as output.
The state differential equation of the closed loop controller is of the form q̇(t) = Lq(t) +
Krr(t)−Kfy(t), while the output equation of the controller is of the form u(t) = Fq(t) +
Hrr(t)−Hfy(t). The index r refers to the reference variable and the index f to feedback.
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Figure 2.1: Closed-loop linear control system
Figure 2.2: Complete System with Error Checking Block
Consider the vector V (t) =
x(t)
q(t)
 for a linear time-invariant system. The differential
equations for the agent and its controller are combined as follows:






 and M,N represent linear transformations of V (t) and the exter-
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nal input parameters w(t), respectively. Let the dimensions of V (t) be n × 1 and let the
dimensions of w(t) be m × 1. Then M is an n × n matrix and N is an n ×m matrix of
real numbers. Using some mathematical manipulation, the output equation z = Dx(t) can
be subsumed into the differential equation described above and errors in the same, without
loss of generality, can be covered by the discussion below.
The equation V̇ (t) = MV (t) + Nw(t) represents a linear state variable system, and
real number codes [67] can be used to encode the state vector V (t), using one or more
check variables. These check variables can be used for error detection and correction in
the operation and control of the plant [68, 69]. Each row i of the M and N matrices is
scaled using a real value of magnitude αi. Let the coding vector be the vector containing
the relevant weighting factors for the ith rows of M and N , i.e α =
[
α1 α2 . . . αn
]
.
Then S is defined as S = α × M . Similarly T is defined as T = α × N . Integrating
V̇ (t) = MV (t) + Nw(t) with respect to time on both the left and right hand sides, yields






w(t). A check variable c(t), corresponding to the coding vector
α is computed as c(t) = S
∫ t
0
V (t) + T
∫ t
0
w(t). In matrix form, the plant, controller and














From this representation it is easily shown that if there is no error in the system, then
c(t) = α.V (t). This leads us to the definition of error signal as
e(t) = c(t)− α.V (t) (2.3)
If a method is implemented to compute c(t) − α.V (t), then the output of this block e(t),
called the error checking block, is always zero under fault-free conditions. The implemen-
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tation of the complete system with the error checking block is shown in Figure 2.2. Note
that e(t) is zero in the absence of any error and is fed back to the integrator with a gain
of K for stability of the integrator in the error detection flow graph. In practice, a small
value of K is selected so that the frequency response of the error signal e(t) is not affected
significantly by the feedback path.
A key feature of the error checking scheme of Figure 2.2 is that its overhead is 1
n
since
only one additional state is computed to check the behavior of n states. This overhead
decreases as a percentage of the overall implementation cost as the complexity of the plant
(agent) increases. Any malfunction in the state equations of the agent as well as in the
state equations of the controller or the checking subsystem of Figure 2.2 is detected in real-
time using continuous-time sensing. This includes malfunctions in actuators, sensors and
measurement instrumentation. While the system of Figure 2.2 shows a single checksum-
based checker, it is possible to determine whether the error is in the agent/controller or the
checking subsystem using two checksum-based checkers (corresponding to a distance-3
checksum code) [73].
2.1.2 Error Compensation
It has been shown for analog circuits in [73] that if the error signal e(t) is fed back with
high enough gain into the erroneous state of the feedback system, the errors can be exactly
compensated. To demonstrate that, for the sake of simplicity, let us assume that there is
only 1 input to the system, i.e. w(s) is a scalar quantity and vm(s) and vp(s) are ignored
for this analysis. Hence, N is an n× 1 vector. The Laplace variable of s is dropped for the
purpose of legibility. Let’s assume that due to parametric errors in the system, state Vi of
the system is perturbed. To reflect the state perturbation, the corresponding entries of the
matricesM andN are modified as
Mij →Mij + θij ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n
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Ni → Ni + γi
Thus the new system matrixM ′ and the input matrixM ′ can be written as
M ′ = M + θ
N ′ = N + γ
where the perturbation matrices are given as
θ =

0 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0
...
... · · · ...
θi1 θi2 · · · θin
...
... · · · ...









































































Next it will be proved that if this error signal (output of checking circuit) is fed back to the
state Vi of the system with high enough gain, the state will be properly compensated.











Thus an accurate compensation scheme will exactly compensate for this error of the state
Vi by providing −∆Vi as feedback into state Vi. Let’s assume that the error signal e is fed










αjVj − αiVi − αiρe














where Mik and Ni are the elements of the matricesM andN .
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Rearranging,






































is equal to the
actual correct value of the state Vi, which is denoted by V̂i. Thus,
















Again, it has been mentioned earlier that the term c −
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
αjVj − αiV̂i is equal to zero.
So the expression can be simplified as
















or, ρe = −∆Vi
Thus it can be seen that the compensation signal ρe fed back into the state Vi is exactly
equal and opposite to the error in the state Vi and is thus exactly compensated for.
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2.1.3 State Detection
It has been shown that if the compensation signal is fed back to the corrupted state, the
effects of the fault in the state are properly compensated. However, it is necessary to de-
termine the corrupted state in order for failure compensation to work correctly. If the error
signal is fed back to the wrong (fault-free) state, additional errors are introduced into an
otherwise correct state. It can be easily shown from (2.6) that if the error signal is fed back





So, it is clear that lim
ρ→∞
eij = 0 and thus irrespective of the state in which the error is fed
back, the error line always settles to zero due to the way the error line is constructed. Thus,
a second error line is needed for detecting whether the compensation is performed correctly
or not. Let us assume the existence of a second error line ε = d − βV where the check
variable d is similarly constructed as c with a different set of coding vector β, yielding
d = 0 under non-faulty conditions. Let us assume that εij is the second error line value
when the first error line eij is fed back to state Vj with error in state Vi. So, if error is fed








βjVj − βi(∆Vi + ρeii)
= −βi(∆Vi + ρeii)
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Thus, for high enough gain lim
ρ→∞
εii = 0, and thus the second error line goes to zero for
correct compensation. However, it will be shown that for incorrect compensation to any
other state Vj , though the first error line eij still goes to zero, the second error line εij shows














ρ(βjαi − βiαj)− βi
1 + ραj
∆Vi







For incorrect compensation, the second error line εij shows a non-zero value and by ob-
serving εij , the correct state to compensate is determined. Ensuring that the expression in






 ∀k ∈ R, i, j ∈ [1, n] i 6= j (2.9)
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Once a coding vector α is selected, there are infinite choices of β satisfying (2.9). In
the next chapter, we explore two different schemes for diagnosis of corrupt states using a
real-time hardware-directed “learning” procedure.
2.2 Application: Position control by a servo motor
The proposed checking algorithm is demonstrated on a feedback control system that po-
sitions an inertial load using a servo motor. Starting from rest, the control problem is to
rotate the inertial load by an angle θ with maximum accuracy, in the least amount of time.
The control dynamics determines the overshoot of θ and settling time, etc. The inertia load
may have high moment of inertia as in a radar antenna, or it may be a small inertial load
such as a precision instrument. A simple model of a motor driving an inertial load [93] is
considered for the demonstration of the proposed real-time checking mechanism.
Under ideal circumstances, the torque τ developed at the shaft of an armature controlled
motor is proportional to the armature current i (since the field current if is kept constant)
and the induced emf/back-emf v is proportional to the angular speed of rotation ω.
τ = K1i (2.10)
v = K2ω (2.11)
The input voltage u is related to the induced emf v as
u− v = Ri (2.12)
where R is the electrical resistance of the motor armature, (the Ldi
dt
term for armature
inductance L is ignored, since it is common practice to assume the time constant of the
electrical circuit to be small compared to the time constant of the load dynamics in case of
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Combining (2.15) and (2.16), the state space representation of the dynamics of the motor













where α = −K1K2
JR




Let θref be the desired angular position of the inertial load starting with θ(0) = 0. Then
if θ(t) is the controlled variable, eθ(t) = θref − θ(t) is the error in the controlled variable
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Figure 2.3: Block Diagram for dynamics of the motor-load system
and the objective of the control procedure is to achieve eθ(t) = 0. The control law is
also modified to incorporate ω [93] in case of position control systems, since, unlike speed
control applications, the steady state speed should be ideally zero. Thus the control law for
negative feedback can be written as
u(t) = g1eθ(t)− g2ω(t) (2.18)
where g1 and g2 are the proportional gains that are defined according to the pole placement








where ā1 and ā2 are the coefficients of the desired characteristic polynomial for shaping
the dynamic response. In practice, the states θ and ω are sensed by an angular potentiome-
ter and a tachometer respectively. Thus the state space representation of the proportional





















In contrast to the proportional controller described above, a PID controller has a control
law of the form






where P , I andD are the proportional, integral and derivative gains respectively. However,
a pure derivative term is never used in practice as it allows noise to propagate through
the controller and affect its closed-loop performance. Hence the derivative term is used
in conjunction with a low-pass filter as shown in Figure 2.4 where the bandwidth of the
filter is carefully selected to trade off the speed of the controller response against its noise
performance. Thus the transfer function of a practical parallel PID controller is given by







where, the filter coefficient N sets the location of the pole of the derivative filter.
As discussed earlier in (2.18), u(t) = g1eθ(t) − g2ω(t) describes feedback control for
a proportional controller. For simplicity, the gain factor g1 for the error eθ is replaced by
a PID controller but proportional control is retained with gain g2 along the feedback path
of ω. The state space representation of the controller is given in observable canonical form
[93], since the error detection block operates directly on the controller states:
























+ (DN + P )eθ (2.25)
Thus the net control law is u = uPID − g2ω. Incorporating this into (2.17) and writing









0 1 0 0
−β(DN + P ) α− βg2 β 0
−(I −DN2) 0 −N 1
































This is of the similar format as in (2.1) by noting that
V̇PID = MPIDVPID +NPIDwPID (2.28)
2.3 Proposed Real-time Checking Mechanism
The checking circuit for the two control systems described in Section 2.2 can be constructed
according to the theory described in (2.2). The dimension of the coding vector CV is equal
to the number of states in the system state space representation.
2.3.1 Proportional Control





index P represents the coefficients for the case of P-control only. The matrices S and T as
defined in Section 2.1 are given by
SP =
[








The check variable c(t) is given by cP = α1θ + α2ω and the checksum error is defined
as
eP = cP − SP
∫ θ
ω
− TP ∫ θref (2.31)
29
The schematic of the motor/controller and the checking circuitry is shown in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Simulink Model for the proposed scheme using P-control
2.3.2 PID Control
For PID control, the coding vector is given as CVPID =
[
α1 α2 α3 α4
]
. The matrices
SPID and TPID in this case can be calculated similarly as in (2.29)(2.30) and are given by
SPID = CV.MPID and TPID = CV.NPID. Thus, the check variable in this case can be
written as cPID = α1θ+α2ω+α3(uPID− (DN +P )eθ) +α4(IN)
∫
eθ and the checksum
error is given by:














The schematic of the motor/PID controller and the checking circuitry is shown in Figure
2.6.
Figure 2.6: Simulink model for the proposed scheme using PID-control
For both proportional and PID control all the weights of the coding vector were chosen
to be 1. This is under the assumption that both θ and ω, the system states, are equally
important for the performance of the control system. In general, the αis should be weighted
relative to the impact of the state variable Vi(t) on system level performance. The overhead
for implementing the checking scheme is very small and consists of an external integrator
and summation modules.
2.4 Simulation Results - Detection
2.4.1 Fault Models
The following fault modes (a), (b) and (c) below are considered for both proportional and
PID control architectures:
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(a) Power Supply Transients: The effects of power supply transients are modeled by rep-
resenting the torque τ as
τ(t) = K1(t)i(t) (2.33)
where momentary degradation of the produced motor torque is modeled by instan-
taneous changes in the torque constant K1(t). In the event that the power shuts off
completely for a short interval of time, K1(t) = 0 for the interval of time that power is
shut off and returns to its normal value for all other times.
(b) Permanent change in torque constant: The torque-current relationship can be perma-





where,K ′1 = (K1+δK1), δK1 being the offset from the rated value of the motor torque
constant.
(c) Parameter Variation: Any nominal parameter variations in the plant and controller
modules of Figures 2.5 and 2.6 can be modeled as variations in the gain values of
the amplifiers in the figures. This models failures in the controller circuitry as well as
parametric deviations in the state equations of the servo motor itself.
2.4.2 Simulation Data
For simulation purposes, the following values are chosen for the parameters of the motor:
K1=0.057 N-m/A, K2=0.052 V-s/rad, J=900 x 10−3 kg-m2. The gain K for the integrator
in the feedback path of the error checking circuit is chosen to be K=0.001.
• Proportional Control The gains g1 and g2 in (2.19) are selected according to the de-
sired response. The desired characteristic polynomial is selected so that the damping
factor is 0.7 and natural frequency is 1 rad/s. The reference input is a unit step volt-
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age. The output plots and the checksum error plots are shown in Figures 2.7 and 2.8
respectively.
Figure 2.7: Output plots for P-control (solid line: reference input, dotted line : shaft po-
sition): a) Nominal case b) Power Supply Transients, c) Torque Constant change d) Con-
troller parameter variation
Note that for the fault free case, the error is zero but for each of the failure modes
(b-d), the error signal is non-zero. Also note that the presence of a failure is difficult
to deduce from direct examination of the servo motor response as shown in Figure
2.7. Figure 2.9 shows the control input voltage to the motor in the case of a power
supply transient, which, if undetected, can lead to motor/controller damage due to
the large transients produced. Hence, potential damage to the motor/controller can
be averted through the use of the proposed real time checking scheme.
• PID Control - The PID controller parameters are selected for closed-loop stability,
33
Figure 2.8: Checksum errors for P-control: a) Nominal case (zero error), b) Power supply
transient, c) Torque constant variation, d) Controller parameter variation
performance and robustness. Instead of directly using heuristic techniques such as
Zeigler-Nichols tuning or Cohen-Coon method [95], controller parameters are se-
lected using loop optimization software based on the open loop response of the lin-
earized model as this method gives consistent results. The PID controller parameters
are chosen to be P=20.0032, I= 0.138, D=0.049 and N=90.11. The output plots and
the checksum error plots are shown in Figures 2.10 and 2.11, respectively, for the
fault-free system and the failure modes (a-c) described earlier. This demonstrates the
correctness and efficiency of the proposed real-time checking scheme.
34
Figure 2.9: Control Input to Motor in case of power supply transient
2.5 Simulation Results - Compensation
During compensation, the error signal is fed back to the control input with a gain of
ρ = 100. The ability of error signal feedback as a compensation scheme is demonstrated
in Figures 2.12 and 2.13 where power supply transients and torque constant shift are con-
sidered respectively for the proportional control case. It is clearly seen that the error signal
has a high non-zero value when the error signal is not fed back to the control input as
compensation whereas, in the case of compensation, the error signal is almost zero demon-
strating almost perfect compensation. The small non-zero error signal is explained by the
fact that the error compensation is not perfectly accurate. The theory of analog checksums
and compensation mentions that accurate compensation should be performed to each state
where the affected state feeds back to. However, it can be seen in the signal flow graph
of Figure 2.3 that the feedback loop with gain β is inherently within the servo-motor and
is not externally accessible or controllable. Hence, the error compensation is not perfect,
resulting in the small non-zero error signal even after compensation as shown in Figures
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Figure 2.10: Output plots for PID-control (solid line: reference input, dotted line: shaft




This work illustrates how a real-time monitoring scheme for linear control systems can
be proposed with the concept of checksums. This error checking methodology is simple,
yet very powerful for detecting transient errors and permanent faults in the circuit in real-
time. The proposed approach is demonstrated on a servo-motor control system for the
first time and shows excellent failure coverage and detection performance. In addition,
it has also been shown [96] how the error signal can be intelligently exploited for failure
compensation in real-time with low latency. Two distinct effects of power supply transient
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Figure 2.11: Checksum errors for PID-control: a) Nominal case (zero error), b) Power
supply transient, c) Torque constant variation, d) Controller parameter variation
Figure 2.12: Error Signal Plots for Supply Transient Injection: Without and With Compen-
sation
and torque constant shift have been considered and it is seen that the proposed scheme
performs near-accurate compensation and excellent correction of induced errors. However,
one of the critical requirements for the implementation of correction is the diagnosis of
erroneous state. It has been shown in [97] how the linear checksums can directly be used
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Figure 2.13: Error Signal Plots for Torque Constant Shift: Without and With Compensation
to reconfigure the control law in real-time. In this chapter, it is assumed that accurate
knowledge of the erroneous state is available thus enabling us to provide feedback of the
error signal into the exact affected state. In the next chapter, extend the error detection
and compensation methodologies are extended for analog circuits and two novel diagnosis
schemes are introduced along with hardware demonstration.
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CHAPTER 3
ERROR CORRECTION IN CIRCUITS
3.1 Real-Time Noise Cancellation in Linear Analog Filters
Transient errors and noise induced by signal coupling, electromagnetic interference and
power supply/ground bounce are of major concern in analog circuits since these are dif-
ficult to simulate pre-silicon and very difficult to diagnose by current design verification
algorithms that are designed mostly for digital timing validation and property checking
[98, 99]. In this chapter, the previous methodology is extended for real-time detection
and correction of transient errors and induced noise in linear analog circuits. The key as-
sumption is that the noise statistics is stationary and noise injection is localized to within
a single state variable of the circuit (integrator and associated summation units). Less than
minimum distance checksum codes (distance-2, with low hardware overhear) are used for
error correction. The source of the noise and the appropriate correction strategy for noise
cancellation is “learned” over a period of real-time operation. The noise cancellation is
appropriate, for example, to cancel out localized signal coupling and power/ground bounce
and interference effects in deeply scaled and integrated SoCs. Another key benefit of the
checksum based error/noise cancellation approach is that it is independent of the kind of
noise that is injected, requiring no direct noise modeling or sensing.
3.1.1 State Space System Representation
Redundant States and Error Signal Definition
Consider an n-th order dynamic linear system with p inputs and q outputs. Steady state
operation and null initial conditions are assumed. It is well known from the literature
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[100]that it admits a state space representation in the frequency domain as,
sX = AX +BU (3.1)
Vector X represents the n states of the system and vector U corresponds to the vector
of p inputs. Matrix A is n× n while matrix B is n× p. The output is usually written as a
linear combination of the states and inputs as Y = CX + DU , where Y is the vector of q
outputs and C and D are matrices with dimensions q × n and q × p respectively.
Let α = [α1, . . . , αn] be a vector of n scalars representing the coding vector. The
new redundant state xr is defined by multiplying the coding vector by matrices A and B,














Here, for the sake of simplicity, the definition of one extra state has been considered,
but this can be generalized to any number of redundant states. In such a case, vector α is
replaced by a matrix of scalars [73]. This way of defining an extra state allows us to write
sxr = αAX + αBU = α(AX + BU) = αsX , or equivalently xr = αX . This proves
that state xr corresponds to a linear combination of the states in system (3.1). Under such
conditions, an analog error signal can be defined as the difference of αX and xr,
E = αX − xr (3.3)
This error signal is zero unless the system is perturbed by a transient error. Figure 3.1
depicts the signal flow graph of the state space system represented in Equation (3.2). The
generation of the redundant state xr and the analog error signal E are shown in Figure 3.1.
Since the the system defined in Equation (3.2) presents an open loop integrator, the system
is marginally unstable. In order to ensure stability, a feedback factor β is applied between
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the error signal and the node sxr. The sign of β should be properly chosen to ensure the
added pole remains in the left half s-plane.
Figure 3.1: Signal flow graph representing a state space system and the generation of the
extra state xr as defined in Equation (3.4). Error signal E is generated by subtracting xr
from αX . Feedback β is added for ensuring stability. Perturbations are indicated in red
while error/noise cancellation feedbacks are indicated in blue.
The feedback factor β added for stabilizing the system (3.2) modifies the state equa-
tions, consequently, the node sxr depends on the value of β and the newly created state xr.














where I represents the identity matrix of order n. It is easy to show again that the previous
definition of the error signal is still consistent and is zero in the absence of induced errors.
From Equation (3.4), it is clear that sxr = α(A+ βI)X − βxr +αBU . Rearranging terms
yields s(αX − xr) = −β(αX − xr). Recalling the previous definition for the error signal,
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E = αX − xr, it immediately follows that sE = −βE, what necessary implies E = 0,
under the assumption of null initial conditions and therefore αX = xr.
Feedback for Error/Noise Cancellation
Consider the system defined by Equation (3.1). Let us assume that the i-th state of the
system is perturbed by a noise signal n(t). Therefore the system under study is given by,
sX̃ = AX̃ +BU + δiN (3.5)
where N corresponds to the Laplace transform of the perturbing signal n(t) and δi is a
column vector in which all elements are zero with the exception of the element in position
i, which is 1. Vector X̃ indicates the modified states under the influence of a perturbing
signal. In the following it will be shown that feeding back the error signal to the i-th state
with a sufficiently large gain cancels the effect of the transient perturbation in the system.
Let k be the gain of this feedback, then the system becomes,
sX̃ = AX̃ +BU + δiN + δikE (3.6)
It is simple to obtain an expression for sE since, by definition, sE = sαX̃ − sx̃r.
Therefore, the first term of the difference is α(AX̃ +BU + δiN + δikE). The second term
can be computed according to Equation (3.4) as α(A+βI)X̃−βx̃r+αBU . Equating their
difference, some terms cancel out, therefore giving sE = αiN+αikE−β(αX̃−x̃r), where
αi is the i-th element of the coding vector α. Again, the difference αX̃ − x̃r corresponds
to the definition of the error signal, so sE = αiN + αikE − βE, or equivalently,
E =
αi
s+ β − αik
N (3.7)
The transfer function in Equation (3.7) corresponds to a first order linear system with a
single pole p = −(β − αik). As discussed previously, the sign of β should be positive and
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the sign of the feedback factor k should be negative in order to ensure that the system is
stable. Feedback factors β and k have a significant impact on system stability, so need to be
chosen accurately. Also, their signs depend on the sign of the integrators used to implement
the system. Computing the limit of expression (3.7) when |k| → ∞ follows that the error
signal tends to zero.
Considering Equation (3.6) and plugging the obtained transfer function for the error
signal obtained in Equation (3.7), and after grouping terms, immediately follows,
sX̃ = AX̃ +BU + δi
s+ β
s+ β − αik︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0 if |k|→∞
N (3.8)
As can be seen, the noise term tends to zero as |k| → ∞ and therefore the perturbed
system sX̃ = AX̃ + BU + δiN + δikE becomes sX = AX + BU , the error-free state
variable system.
3.1.2 Learning-Assisted Adaptive Error Cancellation
As evident from Equation (3.8), the ability to perform perfect error cancellation is indepen-
dent of the choice of αi for large values of the feedback coefficient k. Therefore on only
needs to determine which system state is impacted by the injected error and compensate
for the error by feeding back the error signal E to the affected state with a large value of
k. Since only a single checksum based error detection circuit is implemented, we have in
effect, a distance 2 checksum code which is good only for error detection, but not correc-
tion. To solve this problem, the proposal is to “learn” which state is impacted by the error
through real-time “self-learning” experiments under the assumption that the error statistics
is stationary and that the injected errors repeat over time (e.g. due to crosstalk). In practice,
the system can be programmed to “learn” in the field over a duration of time (specified by
the designer). Once the learning is complete, perfect error cancellation is achieved. Two
separate architectures are proposed for diagnosis [101–103] - one implements single error
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checksum requiring lower area and power at the cost of high latency of diagnosis while the
other implements two error checksums requiring more area and power with the quickest
diagnosis along with the enhanced capability of multiple fault compensation. For each of
the architecture, two separate learning schemes are proposed.
Single checksum architecture
Figure 3.2: Real-time transient error and induced noise cancellation scheme. A hardware-
directed search learns where to apply the cancellation signal in order to mitigate the effects
of transient error/noise perturbations.
In the first approach (Fig 3.2), the output of the error signal generator (checksum circuit)
is selectively fed back to each state in a time-multiplexed sequential manner. The error
signal is fed back to the i-th system state (with high gain k) for a predetermined amount
of time over which error data is collected (10s of ms, specified by the designer). The
control circuitry actuates a single switch from the row of switches below the state space
circuit of Fig 3.2, that determines the state to which the error signal is fed back. The
switches at the top of the state space circuit are all turned “on”, connecting the state space
circuit to the error signal generator. To diagnose the corrupted state variable of the filter,
it must be remembered that the output noise power of the filter is minimized when the
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error signal is fed back to the corrupted state (this achieves perfect noise compensation).
Conversely, the noise power of the signal is increased when the error signal is fed back to a
“good” (not corrupted) state variable. Since the output signal power is the sum of the signal
power and the noise power of the output signal y(t), the output power of the signal y(t)
of the analog filter (state space circuit in Fig 3.2) is computed for known (DC/sinusoidal)
input signal to the filter. The bottom switch of Fig 3.2 for which the output power of the
signal y(t) is minimized determines the state to which the error signal must be fed back
to achieve perfect transient error/noise compensation. An analog power detector [104]
connected to the filter output y(t) is typically used in combination with DC filter input
stimulus to facilitate this “learning” procedure. From (3.1), it is known that system output
xn is given as sxn = AnX+BnU , where An and Bn are the last rows of matrix A and B. It
is clear, that if the error is not compensated at the exact state which has been affected, the
noise shows up in the output. So, by monitoring the output for the noise power, the faulty
state is determined.
In the second approach, the error signal E is monitored without feeding it back to the
state space circuit (filter). The bottom row of switches of Fig 3.2 are all turned off, dis-
abling error signal feedback. The control circuitry selectively disconnects the i-th state
variable input to the error signal generator in a sequential time-multiplexed manner as be-
fore, setting the corresponding top row switch to zero (ground). It is easy to show that the
error signal is zero in the presence of injected errors/noise only when the corrupted state
is disconnected from the error signal generator. Here again a power detector connected
to the error signal generator output E is used to detect this condition and determine the
corrupted state. Subsequently, after the corrupted state is determined correctly, the correct
switch from the bottom row of switches of Fig 3.2 is activated to allow perfect injected
error/noise error compensation. From (3.3) and (3.2), it is seen that if the αi for the faulty
state is turned to zero, the contribution of the faulty state to the term αX and the checking
state xr is removed and hence the error signal for the rest of the correct states is zero by
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construction. Thus by monitoring the error line and switching the αis, the faulty state is
detected.
Double checksum architecture
It is assumed that for the linear state space system of Fig 3.3, two analog checksums are
implemented with error signals ε with coding vector α and E with coding vector β.
Figure 3.3: Real-time Fault Detection and Compensation scheme
Single Fault Compensation: Two self-learning schemes are proposed for error detection
and compensation. The top row switches marked SS1 and SS2 control the contribution of
the individual states to the error signals E and ε (by selecting the value of αs and βs to zero
or non-zero). The bottom row switches marked FS1 and FS2 control the feedback of the
error signals E and ε to the corresponding states.
In the first learning approach (Fig 3.3), the first error signal E is selectively fed back
to each system state in a time-multiplexed sequential manner. The control system selects
the state to which the error signal E is fed back by actuating a single switch from the row
of switches marked FS1 in Figure 3.3. Switches FS2 are all turned off for single fault
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compensation. The corrupted state variable of the filter is diagnosed by an analog power
detector monitoring the second error generator output ε. The state whose feedback switch
connection gives the lowest power for ε is determined as the corrupted state. Once the
faulty state is diagnosed, the corresponding feedback switch from FS1 is connected to the
error signal E by the control circuit and all other switches from FS1 are disconnected,
thereby providing precise compensation to the faulty state. However, after compensation,
if one of the error signals is zero whereas the other one is non-zero, then the state space
circuit is not faulty and no correction is necessary.
In the second learning approach, the bottom row of switches FS1 and FS2 are all
turned off providing no feedback compensation during the learning phase and the error
signal ε is monitored. The control system selectively disconnects the j-th switch from
the set SS1 and SS2, thereby disconnecting the j-th state input to the error signal E and
ε in a similar time-multiplexed manner. The error signals are zero only when the faulty
state is disconnected from the error generators. Thus, the faulty state is diagnosed and the
corresponding feedback switch from FS1 is “turned on” by the control circuitry for precise
compensation to the corrupted state.
Dual Fault Correction: The algorithm for dual fault compensation is presented here.
Let us assume that the two faulty states are xk and xl.
Detection - All the feedback switches FS1 and FS2 are disconnected, thus providing
no compensation. All the switches in SS1 are disconnected since only error ε is moni-
tored. The control circuitry selectively disconnects each of the switches from the set SS2.
Disconnection of any one good state implies contribution of the two faulty states to the
error line which shows a fixed non-zero value. However, if one of the two bad states is
disconnected, the error signal changes.
Compensation - Once the learning is over, the control circuitry disconnects k-th switch
from the set SS1, thereby zeroing out the contribution of error from xk and feeds back the
error E to the state xl by connecting the l-th switch from the set FS1. Similarly, for the
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other error signal generator ε, the l-th switch is disconnected from the set SS2 and connects
the k-th switch from the set FS2. Perfect compensation is achieved since the error signals
E and ε contain only the faulty signals from state Wl and Wk respectively.
3.1.3 Case Study: Band-Pass Butterworth Filter
Band-Pass Butterworth Filter State Space Representation
In order to demonstrate the viability of the proposal, the method has been applied to a
linear analog filter. A continuous time 6th order band-pass Butterworth filter [105] can be






















The filter has been tuned at f0 = 106.1 MHz, and Q = 1, therefore presenting a
bandwidth of BW = 106.1 MHz. The Butterworth filter can be described by the signal
flow graph depicted in Fig. 3.4. Some weights have been changed in sign to allow the use
of inverting integrators thus simplifying its hardware implementation.
Figure 3.4: Signal flow graph of the 6th order band-pass Butterworth filter. Some feed-
back weights have been changed in sign to allow the use of inverting integrators therefore
facilitating its hardware implementation.
According to the signal flow graph depicted in Figure 3.4, the state space representation
of the Butterworth filter can be easily derived. Its output, y(t), corresponds to state x6(t)
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In Figure 3.5, the hardware implementation of the 6th order band-pass Butterworth
filter using operational amplifiers and passive components can be observed. Second order
Sallen-Key stages could have been used as well, but the chosen topology targets to show up
the capabilities of the method on its simplest state space form. In the schematic, injected
perturbations are denoted as e1(t), . . . , e6(t).
Figure 3.5: Schematic of the 6th order band-pass Butterworth filter whose signal flow graph
is depicted in Figure 3.4. The filter has been tuned at ω0 = 100 MHz and Q = 1. States
variables correspond to integrator’s outputs, x1, . . . , xn. Inputs e1(t), . . . , e6(t) correspond
to the injected perturbations upsetting the states of the filter.
Extended System for Error/Noise Cancellation
According to the theory developed in Section 3.1.1, the state space representation of the
Butterworth filter is expanded with a redundant checksum state variable. Let us select
α = [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1] as the coding vector and a stabilizing feedback factor of β = −1.
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Note that since inverting integrators are being used the sign of β must be negative to ensure
stability. According to this selection, the resulting signal flow graph for generating the
redundant state xr and analog error signal E can be observed in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Signal flow graph of the analog error signal generator for the 6th order Butter-
worth filter shown in Equation (3.9). The used coding vector is α = [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1].
The resulting state space representation of the system after extending it with the redun-
dant state xr can be computed using Equation (3.4). This way, A6×6 matrix transforms into
Â7×7 and matrix B6×1 transforms into B̂7×1 as indicated below,
Â = −ω0

0 0 0 0 0 −1 0
1 0 0 0 0 2 0
0 1 0 0 0 −5 0
0 0 1 0 0 5 0
0 0 0 1 0 −5 0
0 0 0 0 1 2 0













As explained before, transient errors and induced noise cancellation is achieved by
feeding back the generated error signal. This feedback is achieved by connecting an ap-
propriate value resistor between the error signal and the virtual ground of the operational
amplifier that is affected by the perturbation. The corresponding resistor value determines
the ki feedback for the i-th state. Figure 3.7 shows an HSPICE transient simulation of the
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circuits shown in Figure 3.5 when a sine wave is applied to the input. After injection of
the perturbing signal as shown in Figure 3.7, the filter response gets corrupted as shown in
Figure 3.8. However, the compensated filter response, after the error is fed back with gain
k3 = 10, again returns back to the nominal value as shown in Figure 3.9. The error signal,
with and without compensation is shown in Figure 3.9. It is seen that without compensa-
tion, the error signal resembles the inverted perturbation whereas with compensation, the
error signal returns back to almost zero.
Figure 3.7: Transient simulation of the Butterworth filter showing the fault free filter re-
sponse and the injected perturbation in state x3
The effectiveness of the compensation with the frequency and feedback factor k3 is
shown in Figure 3.10. The SNR of output is computed as the ratio of the output’s power due
to a unitary input sine wave and the output’s power due to a unitary sine wave perturbation
applied to e3(t). Figure 3.10 shows the obtained results of the SNR of the filter output for
perturbations in state x3 (similar results are obtained in other states). It is seen that the SNR
values in the pass-band approximately correspond to the applied gain in the compensation
feedback.
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Figure 3.8: Corrupted Filter Response under injected Perturbation and Compensated Filter
Response after feedback of the error to state x3
Figure 3.9: Without compensation, the error signal has high non-zero value, whereas after
compensation the erro signal almost goes to zero
3.1.4 Experimental Results
In order to validate the proposal a PCB is being built to demonstrate the idea. However, as
proof of concept, an experimental test-bench has been built using commercial off-the-shelf
components, operating at a lower frequency. Figure 3.11 corresponds to a picture of the
constructed test-bench in solderless breadboard using operational amplifiers and passive
components. It is important to note the low area overhead with respect to the 6th order
52
Figure 3.10: Simulation of SNR values at the output of the Butterworth filter for perturba-
tion e3(t) as a function of the applied compensation gain k3. Similar values are obtained
for perturbations affecting the other states.
band-pass Butterworth filter. The filter uses 7 operational amplifiers as seen in Figure 3.5
while the error generation circuit can be implemented with only 2 op amps. Further this
overhead remains constant irrespective of the size of the filter being checked. The overhead
can be shown to be O(1/n), with n being the number of states in the system.
Figure 3.12 shows the output of the filter when a sine wave is applied to its input and a
perturbing pulse is applied to e3(t) with no compensation. Sine wave is 1 V peak-to-peak
and about 88 kHz. The perturbing signal is 2 V peak-to-peak and has a high frequency
component of about 200 kHz. As can be observed, the output signal gets considerably
affected by such perturbation.
On the contrary, consider the oscilloscope capture depicted in Figure 3.13 where an
error/noise compensation with gain 10 has been applied. It can be seen how the perturbation
effects in filter’s output have been strongly mitigated, therefore assessing the viability of
the error/noise compensation strategy. Experimental results match those encountered using
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Figure 3.11: Experimental test-bench built using commercial off-the-shelf components.
Note the area requirements for the error/noise cancellation circuit and the 6th order Butter-
worth filter.
Figure 3.12: Oscilloscope capture when a sine wave is applied to the input and a perturbing
noise signal is applied to e3(t) and no error/noise cancellation is applied. As can be seen,
the output of the filter is greatly affected.
HSPICE simulations.
3.1.5 Summary
In this work, the concept of analog checksums proposed in the previous chapter has been
extended for linear analog systems for transient error detection and active noise cancella-
tion in analog circuits. The introduced novel approach is based on the use of state space
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Figure 3.13: Same situation as in Figure 3.12 but feeding back the error signal with gain
k3 = 10. It can observed how the compensation strongly mitigates the effects of the per-
turbation in filter’s output.
representations of analog filters and is a significant advancement over prior research that
addressed only hard parametric deviations. A key innovation has been the use of less than
minimum distance checksum codes for error detection and correction using real-time learn-
ing of the likely source of transient errors and noise within the analog circuit. By running a
simple hardware-directed search algorithm, the circuit is able to “learn” how best to com-
pensate for the signal disturbances with low overhead under the assumption that the source
of the injected errors/noise and the error/noise statistics is stationary over time. Successful
simulations and preliminary experimental results conclusively demonstrate almost com-
plete compensation of injected noise, therefore validating the proposal. Next it will be
discussed how these methodologies can be further developed for concurrent error detection
in nonlinear digital filters.
3.2 Concurrent Error Detection in Nonlinear Digital Filters
3.2.1 Introduction
Till now, the focus has mostly been on error resilience of linear control systems and linear
circuit operations. However, there is an increasing need to address the same for nonlin-
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ear systems used in emerging applications for sensing and control. Due to the increase in
complexity of deep sub-micron high speed digital circuits, they have become more suscep-
tible to soft errors[106–108]. These errors have become more dominant in scaled digital
circuits due to feature-size reduction, almost near-doubling of operating frequency and sup-
ply voltage/threshold voltage scaling [66, 109]. With each technology generation, the node
capacitance values further scale down, thus allowing soft errors to cause erroneous digital
logic transitions at these nodes. Such intermittent and permanent failures are of particular
concern in digital signal processing, control and communication applications. Lower sup-
ply voltage further increases the susceptibility of these circuits to external noise sources
due to reduced noise margin. In systems with concurrently operating on-chip digital logic,
analog/RF circuitry and mixed signal blocks such as data converters, noise can get cou-
pled through the substrate as well as the power supply and ground planes, causing periodic
logic upsets. Present architectural trends with shorter pipelines with reduced slack and
higher clock rates make circuits more vulnerable to soft errors.
Of increasing concern, in this context, are nonlinear digital filters that are extensively
and routinely used in signal processing, communication and control applications where
reliability and dependability are critical issues. Traditional methods for error detection
and correction rely on hardware duplication/triplication [63–65, 110]. Error detection in
non-linear systems generally involves partitioning of the circuit into linear and nonlinear
components. Checksum codes are applied to the linear components for error detection
whereas hardware and/or software redundancy is applied for error detection in the non-
linear modules. However, the high overhead in terms of power and area associated with
these methods makes them relatively expensive in general applications. A more elegant
error detection technique for non-linear systems was proposed in [71] based on time-freeze
linearization which models a nonlinear digital filter using a time-varying linearized repre-
sentation. The checksum circuit generates a time-varying checksum code for each single
time frame by freezing the system dynamics between two adjacent time frames and lin-
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earizing the circuit behavior between the two frames. However, the method can result in
duplication of all the nonlinear functions in the worst case and further requires that the
wordlength precision of the checking circuitry be the same as that of the circuit under test
(CUT). This incurs higher cost in terms of both complexity, area and power.
In this chapter, a low cost error detection technique for non-linear digital filters us-
ing linearized checksum codes and linear predictive coding (LPC) algorithms is presented.
First, a least squares linear fit to the nonlinear system is derived and checksum codes are
applied to the derived best-fit linear model. When the circuit non-linearities are not ex-
cited by the input stimulus (such as for small-signal inputs), the checksum error is ideally
zero. In the absence of soft errors, for large input signals, the checksum error carries the
non-zero time-varying values which are proportional to the degree of circuit nonlinearity
excitation by the stimulus applied. Linear predictive codes are applied to this time-varying
error signal to detect soft errors using forward error prediction.
3.2.2 Nonlinear Digital Circuits: Brief Discussion
A generic data flow graph of a nonlinear digital circuit is indicated in Figure 3.14. The non-
linear state variable system implements a nonlinear transformation of the the elements of
input vector u(t) and previous system states s(t). For example, a possible nonlinear func-
tion may be s(i)k or a product of integer powers of input elements. A general representation
of a linear time-varying state-space system (a particular class of nonlinear systems) will be
given as,
s(t+ 1) = A(t)s(t) + B(t)u(t)
y(t+ 1) = C(t)s(t) + D(t)u(t)
(3.12)
where all the matrices contain non-linear combinations of system states and inputs and are
hence represented as time-varying. The usual method of implementing linear checksum
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in this system fails due to the constantly varying system matrices. This necessitates the
development of nonlinear error detection techniques with reduced redundancy.
Figure 3.14: General structure of a nonlinear state variable system
3.2.3 Time-Freeze Linearization: A Brief Review
The brute force method to concurrent error detection in nonlinear digital circuits is to dupli-
cate and compare the outputs between the duplicate circuit and the circuit under test. This
approach is expensive and introduces very high hardware overhead. To reduce the cost
of error checking, one possible approach is time-freeze linearization [71]. In time-freeze
linearization method, the nonlinear digital circuit is modeled as a linear digital circuit in
each time frame by freezing the values at circuit nodes corresponding to specified inputs of
nonlinear circuit functions. The term freezing refers to treating the respective node values
as constants over the width of a single time frame, even though these values change from
one time frame to another. This facilitates the use of checksum codes, traditionally used
in linear digital circuits for, concurrent error detection in non-linear digital circuits. The
checking circuitry is economically designed, using tapped subfunctions from specific in-
ternal nodes of the non linear digital circuit. In a nonlinear system, the matrices A(t) and
B(t) are constantly varying, thereby making the computation of matrices X and Y also
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time-varying in the checksum circuitry. Time-freeze linearization allows one to design the
checksum circuitry in a way such that at each time instant the matrices X and Y are com-
puted by using tapped subfunctions of system states. Although, this approach is followed
to reduce error detection cost by avoiding hardware and/or software redundancy, this com-
plicates the design of the checksum circuitry. This is the prime motivation for a simpler
solution that will be able to perform concurrent error detection in nonlinear digital systems
at further reduced cost.
3.2.4 Linearized Checksum and Residue Prediction
The basic idea of the proposed approach is to separate the linear and nonlinear dynamics
of the system. It has been mentioned in Chapter 2 that under fault-free conditions, the
checksum error is ideally zero. However, if a checksum error signal for a nonlinear system
is generated based on a least-squares linear estimate of the same system, it will be non-
zero even under fault free conditions, since there will be estimation mismatch between
linear and nonlinear system dynamics. This non-zero error, in fact, stems solely from
the excitation of non-linearities in the circuit. A prediction mechanism predicts the next
checksum value based on a history of past error samples. In presence of fault(s) in the
system, the predictor cannot predict the irregularity experienced on the checksum error
signal. Thus, the diagnosis is performed by continually comparing the predictor output and
the actual linearized checksum circuit output and the residue between the two signals is the
actual error signal.
Linearized Checksum Generation
The least squares linear estimate of a nonlinear system involves the generation of sufficient
number of training pair of input-output samples. Let us consider the general nonlinear
system in (3.12). We apply r different sets of input vectors u1(t),u2(t), · · · ,ur(t) to the
nonlinear system, one at a time. For each input vector ui,∀1 ≤ i ≤ r, the nonlinear system
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is simulated for a fixed number of samples, say k samples starting from an initial system
state. At each sampling time instant, the input to the system are m-dimensional input
vector ui(t) and n-dimensional previous system states s(t) to generate the n-dimensional
new system states s(t + 1). This can be perceived as a system with (n + m)-dimensional
input vector p(t) = [sui(t)
ᵀ ui(t)
ᵀ] and n-dimensional output vector q(t) = sui(t + 1)
where the subscript ui denotes the system state with input ui. Hence, for each input vector
ui, k pairs of input-output samples p and q are generated. Across r different sets of input
vectors, a total of r × k = b (say) pairs of input-output samples are generated.
The nonlinear state space equation in (3.12) can be differently expressed as
s(t+ 1) = M(t)z(t) (3.13)
where M(t) = [A B] and z(t) = [s(t)ᵀ u(t)ᵀ]. Now, the linear least squares problem is
posed as:
Given b sets of input-output pairs pj and qj , ∀1 ≤ j ≤ b, determine M̂, a linear
estimate of M, such that with the linear estimate q̂ = M̂p, the total error
∑b
j=1 ||q̂j−qj||2
is minimized. Once M̂ is determined, it can be decomposed to obtain Â and B̂, the linear
estimates of the system matrix A and the input matrix B. The algorithm to obtain M̂ is
given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Linear Least Squares
1: procedure LINEAR ESTIMATE
2: H = [p1,p2, · · · ,pb]ᵀ
3: Perform SVD of H = UΣV∗
4: Create Moore-Penrose Pseudo-Inverse G = VΣ−1U∗
5: for do j = 1 to n
6: Create vector d = [q1(j),q2(j), · · · ,qb(j)]ᵀ
7: Generate jth row of M̂ as G.d
Once M̂ is determined, Â and B̂ are separated out blockwise in the same manner as M
is formed. The proposed approach is depicted in the block diagram of Figure 3.15. One of
the primary advantages of the proposed approach is that the least squares computation is a
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one-time design stage procedure to determine the linearized checksum. Hence, this saves
considerable amount of computational overhead in comparison to time-freeze linearization
where some of the nonlinear functions need to be replicated in hardware.
Figure 3.15: Block Diagram of the Linear Estimation Method
The selection of input vectors ui,∀1 ≤ i ≤ r needs to be made carefully. For gener-
ation of training samples, the input vectors should be chosen from an input set which are
expected to be applied to the nonlinear system during actual deployment. The least squares
linear estimate of the system changes with the choice of input vectors. The reason for this
behavior can be explained by the fact that different input vectors excite the nonlinearities
of the system in different ways. A least squares estimate tries to fit a linear state-space
trajectory of the system to the actual nonlinear trajectory that the circuit goes through. De-
pending on the choice of input vector, specific nonlinearities of the circuit can be activated
and the nonlinear trajectory will be different. The choice of number of input vectors is
guided by the tradeoff between nonlinearity coverage and linear overfitting. A very small
set of input vectors will be insufficient to excite all nonlinearities and create an accurate lin-
ear estimate of the system while a large set of input vectors requires higher computational
resources and may result in linear model overfitting. The same tradeoff dictates the choice
of k - the number of samples generated from simulation with each input vector.
Once Â and B̂ are determined, the linear checksum module computes a linear check-
sum by selecting X̂ = CV.Â and Ŷ = CV.B̂. The check variable is computed as
ĉ(t + 1) = X̂s(t) + Ŷu(t), thus generating the checksum error signal by subtracting this
check signal from CV.s(t + 1). Unlike linear case, this difference will not be zero since
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the state checksum computation is based on the linear estimate of the system. This nonzero
error signal is fed into the linear predictive coding (LPC) unit for further processing.
Residue Prediction
Linear predictive coding (LPC) is a powerful predictive tool widely used in digital signal
processing domain, mostly in speech and audio signal processing [111–114]. It denotes
a mathematical operation where future values of a discrete-time signal are estimated as a
linear function of previous samples. The most general representation is, given a discrete-





where x̂(n) is the predicted signal, x(n − i) the previous samples of the signal and ai
the coefficients of the predictor (FIR filter). The sample history used for the prediction
is controlled by the parameter p. The objective is to minimize the estimate error ε(n) =
x̂(n) − x(n). This problem is well-studied in the field of linear algebra where the most
common choice in optimization of parameters ai is to solve the Yule-Walker autocorrelation
(AR) equations derived by minimizing the expected value of the squared error E[ε2(n)].
We use the well known Levinson-Durbin recursion method [115] to solve the Yule Walker
equations.
Figure 3.16: Block Diagram of Linearized Checksum and Residue Prediction Methodology
The linearized checksum error signal e is fed to the LPC unit as shown in Figure 3.16.
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The LPC unit solves the Yule-Walker AR equations to obtain the FIR filter coefficients
which are then used to predict the next checksum error signal ê. The actual checksum error
signal in the next instant is compared with the predicted checksum error signal through a
comparator and the difference between the two is referred to as predictor residue. This
residue signal is used for error detection. In a fault-free system, the linearized checksum
signal e is non-zero due to the mismatch between actual nonlinear system dynamics and
linear estimation. Now, this non-zero error signal is predicted through LPC in successive
time instants using past values of the checksum error. The difference between the predicted
checksum and the actual checksum will again be non-zero due to prediction mismatch of
the predictor. This prediction mismatch is controlled by the filter order of the LPC predic-
tor and the sample history considered. However, in fault-free conditions, this prediction
mismatch lies within a distinct threshold. In presence of fault(s) in the system, the actual
checksum error shows a distinct discrepancy from the usual trend at the instant of fault
occurrence and the predictor is unable to predict this unusual signal behavior from its past
history. Therefore, the difference between two signals is higher than the chosen threshold
in absolute magnitude and the fault is detected. Depending on the predictor parameters (fil-
ter taps and signal history length), the threshold changes. A higher filter order and longer
signal history will lower the threshold by reducing prediction mismatch and improve per-
formance at the cost of resource overhead.
It can be argued that linear predictive codes can directly be applied to the sum of all
the states of a digital system to remove the computational cost of system linearization.
Under error-free conditions, the sum of system states follows a definite trajectory which
can similarly be predicted by LPC. In presence of errors, the sum of the states deviate from
the usual trend and the predictor residue will detect the error. However, this scheme will
suffer from practical drawbacks. The sum of system states results in very large dynamic
range of signals and hence the checking circuit needs to have higher dynamic range adding
to the hardware resource cost. On the other hand, the predictor residue in our proposed
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approach has a small value which can be resolved using circuits with lower precision.
3.2.5 Simulation Results
We perform simulation experiments on a nonlinear Volterra filter consisting of 13 multi-
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where F02(t) = −0.971s1(t) + 0.946s2(t) + 0.552u(t) and F12(t) = 0.183s1(t) +
0.072s2(t) + 0.298u(t). Thus the system matrix of this filter contains polynomial functions
of the states and input signal and continuously varies over time.
One of the primary uses of a Volterra filter is in the field of digital telecommunication
where it is used as a predistorter to compensate for intermodulation distortion in devices
like power amplifiers and frequency mixers. Hence, in our experiments we applied orthogo-
nal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) signals as input u(t) to the system. We chose
64-QAM modulation scheme with a carrier frequency of 1 GHz to generate an OFDM input
signal. We chose a total of r = 4 different digital bit sequences to generate different OFDM
stimuli which are then used as inputs to the Volterra filter of (4.9) to generate the data pair
p and q. The simulation with each input is performed over 1000 time samples. Using these
data, we generate the least-squares linear fit to the system in (4.9) by the SVD linearization
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method mentioned in Section 3.2.4. The linear estimate of the system is obtained as,
M̂ =

0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0
0.1824 −0.9158 0.2062 −0.3389 0.1086
0 0 1 0 0

(3.16)
We use this matrix to compute the linearized checksum signal of SCC. The nominal
coding vector chosen in this simulation is CV = [0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25]. It is useful to
select CV in a way such that the constraint
∑n
i=1 |CV(i)| ≤ 1 is satisfied to avoid overflow
errors[68]. However, it should be mentioned that fault coverage changes with the choice of
coding vector which we demonstrate later. The optimal choice of coding vector is a topic
of future research and is beyond the scope of this paper.
For fault injection, we study two kinds of faults: those that cause single data bits of state
output data word to be different from their correct values and those that cause multiple data
bits to be incorrect. The first is commonly referred as a bit error and the latter is called a
word error. We discretize each output state with a word size of W bits with 1 bit reserved
for signed number representation. Among the (W − 1) bits, W
2
bits are used to represent
the decimal portion of the number. Bit errors are injected into the system by selecting a
state at random (with equal probability) and then by complementing any one bit chosen
at random where each bit has equal probability of being complemented. Similarly, word
errors are injected by either complementing or not complementing each bit of the data word
randomly selected from the n states, the probability of bit complementation being 0.5.
A nominal fault-free simulation is performed using the linearized checksum. The pre-
dictor selected for our simulation has a filter order of 4 and uses a past history of 8 samples.
As mentioned in Section 3.2.4, an error is detected only if the difference between LPC pre-
dictor output and the linearized checksum signal is above a fixed threshold. This threshold
is due to three main reasons: 1) Estimate mismatch between actual nonlinear dynamics and
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linearized checksum, 2) Prediction mismatch between LPC predictor and the checksum
error signal, and 3) Quantization noise due to finite precision arithmetic. From nominal
simulations, the linearized checksum signal is seen to be less than 0.05 in magnitude with-
out any injected errors and hence this threshold level of 0.05 was chosen to be the error
detection threshold during actual error injection. If a different nonlinear system is consid-
ered, this threshold will be different and needs to be determined from nominal fault-free
simulations.
In a linear time-invariant system, errors can be injected every alternate time frame,
since the errors do not accumulate over time as far as linear check variables are concerned.
Though finite precision arithmetic errors and injected soft errors accumulate between times
t and t + 1, both the state checksum and the data checksum circuitry operate on the same
data at next instant t + 1. However, in a nonlinear time-varying system, the effects of an
injected soft error take a few clock cycles to decay and determined by the effective time-
constant of the excited non-linearities. We determined this time-constant to be 15 cycles
in our simulation setup under the mentioned conditions. Hence, both bit errors and word
errors are injected every 15 clock cycles. The number of least significant bits affected
during an error injection is referred to as the injection range. We conducted experiments







bits, respectively. The same experiments are also run using time-
freeze linearization method. The results of our experiment with different word sizes for
both bit errors and word errors are shown in Figures 3.17 and 3.18.
In figures 3.17 and 3.18, a lower value of ratio between injection range and data word
length indicates error injection in LSBs whereas a higher value indicates error injection
in bits of higher significance. From the results, it is clearly seen that bit errors in the
least significant bits are harder to detect in both the proposed approach and time-freeze
linearization. However, we demonstrate that our proposed approach is superior in detection
of bit errors whereas it performs on a similar scale for word errors. Since word errors, in
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Figure 3.17: Fault Coverage vs Injection Range for Bit Errors
Figure 3.18: Fault Coverage vs Injection Range for Word Errors
general, have multiple bit errors, these are easier to detect than bit errors. The coverage
increases as the word length is increased since it allows better resolution for faults to get
detected. The predictor residue signal in the nominal system and with single error injection
are shown in Figure 3.19. The low value of the signal allows us to use checking circuit with
reduced precision and we use a precision of W/2 bits for a word length of W bits.
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Figure 3.19: Comparison of Predictor Residue without and with Error Injection
Table 3.1 indicates the variation of error coverage with different choices of coding vec-
tors with a word length of 8 bits. The 2 coding vectors CV1 and CV2 are given as, CV1 =
[0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25] and CV2 = [0.15 0.15 -0.4 0.25]. The results clearly show that future
research is needed to optimize the choice of coding vector. Different sets of coding vectors
control the sensitivity of the contribution of system states to the checksum error line.
Table 3.1: Error Coverage with different Coding Vectors
Injection Range
Bit Error Coverage Word Error Coverage
CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2
1 bit 0.0166 0.0182 0.0082 0.0155
2 bits 0.05 0.0524 0.0421 0.0791
4 bits 0.44 0.32 0.7015 0.68
8 bits 0.57 0.62 0.8566 0.79
3.2.6 Summary
In this chapter, a new methodology is described for detection of soft errors in nonlinear
digital state variable systems. The proposed technique generates a least-squares linear fit
to the nonlinear system with the aid of singular value decomposition (SVD). Linearized
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checksum codes are derived from the linear system estimate which are then used to predict
the error signal using linear predictive codes. It is demonstrated that the predictor residue
signal can be used for fine-grained error detection through a simulation of a nonlinear
digital Volterra filter. It is further shown that this methodology outperforms time-freeze
linearization in terms of error detection capability at reduced overhead, since the latter
needs duplication of the system in the worst case. The experimental analysis for both
single bit errors and multiple bit errors illustrate the efficacy of the proposed approach.
The presented results indicate the effectiveness of the proposed technique in dealing with
soft errors in nonlinear digital state variable filters.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCURRENT ERROR DETECTION IN NONLINEAR CONTROL SYSTEMS
This chapter proposes a machine learning assisted methodology for error detection in non-
linear control systems operating under arbitrary failure mechanisms.
4.1 Proposed Error Detection Methodology
4.1.1 Nonlinear Control System
Figure 4.1: Representation of a nonlinear state space control system
A nonlinear system architecture is illustrated in the block diagram of Figure 4.1. The
nonlinear plant encapsulates the dynamical equations of the system behavior. The sensors
measure the outputs of the plant that are certain combinations of the system states. The
controller is implemented on a digital processor core along with appropriate mixed-signal
interfaces. The controller performs its algorithmic computations based on the digitized
sensor measurements and external reference input. The digital control signal is applied to
the actuators through DACs, that impart the necessary action to the plant. Uncorrelated
noise sources are considered in sensor readings and actuation signals.
The nonlinear dynamics of the plant is expressed by the differential equation:
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ẋ(t) = f(x(t),u(t)) (4.1)
where x(t) ∈ <n and u(t) ∈ <m represent the n× 1 state vector and m× 1 control vector
respectively. The vector valued function f(x,u) = [f1(x,u), f2(x,u), · · · , fn(x,u)] de-
notes the nonlinear relationship between plant states and control inputs. The measurement
equation of the plant is expressed as:
y(t) = h(x(t)) + σy(t) (4.2)
where y(t) ∈ <p represents the p × 1 output vector of the system. The function h(x) =
[h1(x), h2(x), · · · , hp(x)] denotes a general nonlinear combination of the system states that
form the measurements. The measurement noise is represented by the p× 1 vector σy(t).
The controller computes the appropriate control signal based on the reference input r(t)
and observed measurements y(t) as:
u(t) = g(y(t), r(t)) + σu(t) (4.3)
where g(.) implements the nonlinear control law and σu(t) is the actuator noise. Typically,
the control laws require state values that are estimated from the observed measurements
using state estimation techniques such as extended Kalman filter. Here it is assumed that
the controller implementation g(.) incorporates such state estimation techniques.
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4.1.2 State Encoding Based Detection Methodology
The proposed approach implements a sliding temporal window over past system measure-
ments and control inputs to predict an encoded check state that is compared with informa-
tion obtained from present system data to detect any anomalies. In our methodology, an
additional state known as mapped predictive check state (MPCS) is computed at any point
of time t from known system data at times t, t − 1, t − 2, · · · using a nonlinear prediction
function Fc(.). At time t + 1, a different nonlinear function Fm(.) is used to predict the
MPCS from the latest system data. The state computed using Fm(.) is called mapped infor-
mation state (MIS). The functions Fc(.) and Fm(.) are optimized in such a way that there is
minimal difference between the MPCS and MIS in fault-free nominal operation while any
abnormal behavior causes this difference to exceed a pre-defined threshold.
Mathematically, let the reference r(t), measurement y(t) and the control input u(t) are













After observing the system data at time t, the MPCS for instant t + 1 is formed by the
nonlinear mapping Fc(.) of data over Tp time samples, that define the predictive horizon,
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as:
sc(t+ 1) = Fc(s(t), s(t− 1), · · · , s(t− Tp + 1)) (4.6)
Similarly the MIS is generated at instant t + 1 from the system data z(t + 1) by the
other nonlinear mapping as:
sm(t+ 1) = Fm(z(t+ 1)) (4.7)
The error signal e(t+1) is computed as the difference between the MPCS sc(t+1) and
the MIS sm(t+ 1) as:
e(t+ 1) = sc(t+ 1)− sm(t+ 1) (4.8)
Equations (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8) demonstrate that the error signal depends on the predic-
tion functions Fc(.) and Fm(.) and the predictive time horizon Tp that indicate the number
of data samples considered while computing the MPCS sc(t). The mapping functions Fc(.)
and Fm(.) are implemented in a way such that e(t) lies below a certain threshold for fault-
free systems. The block diagram of the proposed scheme is shown in Figure 4.2. Next,
we study the selection of the optimal value of Tp and investigate the choice of prediction
functions Fc(.) and Fm(.).
4.1.3 Predictive Time Horizon Selection
The discussion about predictive time horizon stems from the Markov properties of sys-
tems. In a Markov Decision Process (MDP), only the current state affects the next state, or
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Figure 4.2: Real-time error detection methodology using nonlinear mapping functions over
a time horizon of Tp samples - the error signal e(t+ 1) is formed as the difference between
the MPCS sc(t+ 1) and MIS sm(t+ 1)
in other words, the future is conditionally independent of the past given the present state.
This means that the evolution of x(t) is based solely on the previous state x(t − 1) and
the action taken u(t − 1). Although this assumption seems theoretically valid from (4.1),
it is somewhat unrealistic, as the accurate computation of u(t − 1) requires the states to
be fully observable that is seldom true in practical systems. A generalization of MDPs are
partially observable MDPs (POMDPs), in which the present observation y(t) is dependent
on the current state x(t) and the previous action applied. Additional noise sources in the
measurement process further invalidate the perfect MDP assumption in control systems.
POMDPs are typically tackled using information integration over time, where the true dy-
namics of the system is not directly revealed from a single observation, but gradually form
over multiple observations at different time instants. Since, full system observability is not
assumed, the temporal mapping needs past samples to represent the memory effect and
actual nonlinearity in the system. A low value of Tp does not capture enough information
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about the state trajectory to accurately represent the system dynamics. In addition, it is not
robust towards noise as reliance on a few data samples results in the assimilation of cor-
rupted information. However, a low value of Tp reduces the computational overhead while
computing the check state sc(t). On the contrary, a high value of Tp has high robustness
towards noise and external disturbances at the cost of increased computational burden. This
requires a careful analysis of the optimum choice of Tp.
The primary objective of mapping over a temporal window is to learn the system dy-
namics from consecutive observations. This is tantamount to solving a nonlinear system
of equations for the unknown system model parameters and the number of observations
required is equal to the number of variables to be determined. It has been mentioned in
Section 4.1.2 that a separate function Fc(.) is used to learn the nonlinear dynamics. Hence,
it is important to choose the maximum degree of equivalent polynomial nonlinearity that
can best represent the system dynamics while training the mapping function Fc(.). Let the
maximum degree of equivalent polynomial nonlinearity that needs to be captured is d. It
is known from mathematical approximation theory [116] that for well-behaved functions,
there exists an dth degree optimal polynomial that can interpolate (d + 1) points with the
corresponding error curve oscillating between +ε and −ε for a small finite ε ∈ <. In ad-
dition, due to partial state observability from n states to p measurements where (p ≤ n),
there is a subspace projection from <n → <p, thus increasing the number of parameters to




this discussion in mind we make the following proposition:
Proposition I: To map out a maximum degree of nonlinearity equivalent to a dth degree
polynomial, the least number of observations required with a state reduction factor of fn→p
is Tp(min) = fn→p × (d+ 1).
This proposition excludes the effects of noise on the observed measurements. In pres-
ence of sensor and actuator noise, the observations are corrupted and the extent of unre-
liability depends on the noise variance. Hence, for practical purposes the actual value of
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Tp is increased considering the noise corruption factor. Thus, the final choice of optimal
temporal window length is Tp = Tp(min)×fnoise where fnoise ≥ 1 takes into account the un-
certainty present in observations due to noise sources and selected based on the knowledge
of noise statistic of the system.
4.1.4 Mapping Function Choices
Possible choices of prediction functions explored in this work are divided into 3 categories:
i) Volterra series, ii) Machine Learning algorithms and iii) Analytical functions.
i) Volterra series: In [117], Boyd and Chua demonstrated that any general nonlinear
system behavior exhibiting fading memory can be approximated to arbitrary accuracy using









hr[k1, · · · , kr]x[n− k1] · · ·x[n− kr] (4.9)
where hr[k1, k2, · · · , kr] is the rth order Volterra kernel, N represents the maximum order
of the Volterra series, M denotes the memory for each of the kernel, x[n] and y[n] are
the input and output of the truncated Volterra series. It is well known [118] that kernel
estimation is an ill-posed problem and the number of parameters representing the kernels
increases geometrically with the kernel order. This leads to truncation of Volterra series to
N = 4 where higher terms are rarely used in practice. In our case, the memory of each
kernel M is synonymous to the temporal observation window Tp. In the pre-deployment
design stage, the Volterra series is presented with a shifting data set of Tp past observations
as x[n]s and another shifting data set of present observations as y[n]s for kernel estimation.
Once the Volterra kernel is learned using the design stage training data set, it is deployed
as the mapping function Fc(.) for error detection.
ii) Machine Learning algorithms: Two possible machine learning algorithms are appro-
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priate for this purpose - a) regression functions and b) neural networks. In this work, we
explore Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines (MARS) as the regression function. This





where cis are model coefficients andBi(x)s are basis functions. The MARS model building
process performs the learning of the coefficients and the basis functions when presented
with a training data set formed in a similar fashion as in the Volterra series training.
For neural network implementation, we choose Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART)-
a neural network model developed on the aspect of how the brain processes information.
Based on past observed data, an ART model is built up whose output known as ‘expec-
tation’ is compared with the present observation known as ‘sensation’. The difference
between sensation and expectation is minimized such that it does not exceed a set thresh-
old called the ‘vigilance’ parameter. Typically the basic ART algorithm is an unsupervised
learning model. In this work, we use ARTMAP [119] that combines two slightly modified
ART-1 (accepting only binary inputs) and ART-2 (accepting continuous inputs) units into
a supervised learning structure. Using ART as possible neural network model provides
an additional benefit of continuous post-deployment learning of the prediction functions
since all possible scenarios encountered by a cyber-physical system cannot be envisaged in
pre-deployment design simulation stage.
iii) Analytical functions: Finally, analytical expressions can be derived from the system
models (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) to compute the MPCS. Though this approach appears to be
computationally favorable since it doesn’t require any training phase, calculating such an
analytical function for representing the system dynamics is often an infeasible task for
highly complex systems and has not been explored in this work.
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4.1.5 Implementation
In the pre-deployment design and analysis phase, the learning/training of the prediction
functions is achieved. However, simulation of all possible input conditions and estimating
all foreseeable environmental scenarios are implausible in real life. Hence, in the initial
phase of post-deployment period further learning and calibration of these prediction func-
tions can be conducted before real-time error detection can be performed more accurately.
The proposed methodology is implemented in software, typically on an embedded digital
processor that also contains the control algorithm for a control system. Thus, the power
consumption of the proposed scheme is determined by the clock cycles and memory over-
head requirement that are reported in the results.
Figure 4.3: Implementation of proposed checking methodology in a cross-layer hierarchy
along with scope of considered faults
The implementation of the proposed checking mechanism across different abstraction
levels is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The physical layer consists of the actual nonlinear con-
tinuous time system interacting with the real environment. The mixed-signal interface
layer contains the sensors and actuators interacting with the physical system along with
the appropriate transducers, converters and signal conditioning circuit. The signals from
this layer interface with the underlying embedded digital processor core where the control
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algorithms are typically implemented. The proposed checking methodology also runs as
an additional software program on the digital core. The fault models considered in this
work, discussed in detail in Section 4.2, expose the mixed-signal layer and the digital core
to errors. The sensors and actuators are amenable to physical malfunctions or extraneous
signal coupling resulting in compromise of their nominal operation while the processor
core is subject to soft errors in the form of transient bit-flips due to particle strikes. Since
the proposed checker also runs on the same core, the detection is vulnerable to these soft
errors and its accuracy can deteriorate due to computation mistakes. Implementation of
one checker instance can result in false positives (triggering of error detection without any
actual controller fault). Hence, we implement two checker instances and compare the error
signals of these two checkers to generate a final error signal. The probability of bit flips
affecting the two checkers identically and masking their individual detection is low, thus
rendering the implementation robust.
4.2 Fault Models
In this work, we study cross-layer failure mechanisms and deal with errors/anomalies in all
three layers - physical, interface and digital and investigate the detection capabilities of the
proposed methodology.
4.2.1 Physical Layer
The state equation in (4.1) describes how the system behaves when operating in a particular
environment. With change of operating environment, the system dynamics is altered that
is modeled by the change in the function f(x,u) in (4.1) as:
ẋ(t) = f ′(x(t),u(t)) (4.11)
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where f ′(.) is the modified system dynamics due to a change in operating environment.
Instead of arbitrarily changing the system model parameters from f(.) to f ′(.), the environ-
ment in which the plant operates is changed by appropriately modifying the state evolution
model. For example, the modeling of a braking event of a vehicle on a level slope is dif-
ferent than the braking on a downward/upward slope. We consider training the prediction
function on measurements from one system model and test the detection methodology on
a different system model mimicking a shift in the operating environment. In such cases,
instead of error detection the checking methodology performs detection of events that the
system is not trained to handle - henceforth referred to as ‘anomaly’. The choice of neural
network topology as the prediction function is particularly helpful since it can undergo fur-
ther on-field learning to incorporate the new data and learn about unmodeled situations for
improved detection capabilities.
4.2.2 Interface Layer
Among the blocks in the interface layer that interact with the physical plant, we consider
failures in sensors and actuators. The sensor/actuator malfunctions are modeled as i) addi-
tive signals and ii) parametric perturbations. Any control action computed based on untrust-
worthy sensor data is erroneous and negatively impacts the plant performance. Similarly, a
malfunctioning actuator degrades the plant behavior by imparting incorrect control force.
The sensor/actuator fault model is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
i) Additive signals: These are extraneous signals that alter the output of a
sensor/actuator. This is modeled by an additive signal ∆z(t) to the output z(t) of a
sensor/actuator that corrupts the sensed data or alters the applied control action. In this
work, such an effect is represented either as a step signal for modeling of permanent DC
offsets or persistent signal coupling. These additive signals are different from the noise
signals σu(t) and σy(t) with known statistics.
ii) Parametric perturbations: Field degradation of sensors and actuators are modeled as
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parametric perturbations from the nominal r-dimensional parameter set {w1, w2, · · · , wr}
to the modified set {w̃1, w̃2, · · · , w̃r}. This parametric modification alters the transfer func-
tion of sensors/actuators in a way that is not well modeled by additive signals alone.
Figure 4.4: Fault model of sensor and actuators include parametric perturbations and injec-
tion of corrupting signals
4.2.3 Digital Layer
The fault model in the digital processor core shown in Figure 4.3 involves injection of soft
errors in the form of bit-flips in the different blocks of the processor on which the control
algorithm is implemented. In this work, we study soft errors in both software and hardware
implementation.
i) Software Error Model: Fault injection experiments on flip-flops (FFs) in the RTL
implementation of a processor core provide the best evaluation of effects of bit-flips on
high level program execution. However, in comparison with lower level approaches, fault
injection on microarchitectural structures modeled in performance simulators, is orders of
magnitude faster and proves to be an effective method for fault detection analysis. Among
the publicly available full system simulators, we chose Gem5 [120] as the system simula-
tor for two primary reasons - i) it is cycle-accurate, thus providing per cycle granularity of
fault injection, ii) it includes all key microarchitectural components that model the hard-
ware arrays on which faults of any duration and severity can be injected. The simulator
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configuration that is chosen is shown in Table 4.1.
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The soft error fault model is classified into two types - i) transient where a storage
element’s bit value is flipped in one clock cycle of the program execution and ii) permanent
where a storage element’s bit value is permanently fixed at either ‘0’ or ‘1’ representing a
stuck-at fault. These bit flips are further subdivided into bit error - single bit-flips and word
error - simultaneous multiple bit flips. The fault effects that are explored in this work are
categorized into 4 classes:
1. Masked - The fault injection does not affect the program execution and the fault-
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injected result is identical to the nominal fault-free simulation data.
2. Silent Data Corruption (SDC) - In this fault injection, the program execution com-
pletes normally but the output data is corrupted and differ from fault-free results.
3. Timeout - This includes situations where the program flow is trapped due to fault
injection and is unable to commit any further instructions and the program terminates
after a pre-configured execution timeout limit.
4. Crash - This represents situations where the fault insertion results in an unrecover-
able situation and hence the simulated program crashes and terminates abruptly.
Figure 4.5: Fault injection infrastructure for simulation of soft errors in computation
As illustrated in Figure 4.5, the application code contains an iterative programming
construct that represents receiving sensor data, applying the control algorithm to compute
optimal control signals and imparting the desired action to the plant through the actua-
tor model at each iteration. The plant equations are invoked to simulate plant behavior
and fault-checking is performed by two checkers. As shown in Figure 4.3, only the con-
trol algorithm and the fault detection methodologies are executed on the digital processor
since the rest of the algorithm mimics the actual physical behavior of the system. Hence,
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caution is exercised while injecting errors such that it only affects the execution of the con-
trol algorithm and checkers while keeping execution of rest of the program (representing
plant operation) fault-free. For this purpose, we use a dynamic binary instrumentation tool
called Pin [121] developed and supported by Intel and supplied free for non-commercial
use. Using this tool, the trace analysis of an executable program is performed so that exact
instructions pertaining to the control and the checker algorithms can be identified in the
entire instruction set of the program trace. This tool is further used for isolating the com-
putation overhead of the proposed checking mechanism from the entire program’s resource
requirement by inserting Pintool instrumentation routines. The fault injection mechanism
is adopted from [122] where a fault mask is used for fault insertion. A fault mask specifies
the following:
1. the processor core in which the fault is to be injected
2. the microarchitectural structure on which the fault is injected
3. bit position(s) of fault injection
4. exact instruction(s) of fault injection
5. the fault type that determines whether it is a transient or a permanent fault
The microarchitectural structures that are injected with faults are load/store queue, issue
queue, int and FP register file and tag and data portion of both L1 and L2 caches. The
compiled application is executed on the x86 core through the Gem5 simulator along with
the appropriate fault mask configuration and the results are analyzed to identify detection
performance of the proposed checking methodology.
ii) Hardware Error Model: A hardware model for a soft error is one that implements a
bit flip in the Register Transfer Level (RTL) or gate level design. In this work we use a soft
error injection infrastructure for ARM AMBER processor [123]. The AMBER core is a
5-stage ARM pipeline synthesized to an FPGA and runs at 40 MHz frequency without any
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Figure 4.6: Modified Flops in ARM core
fault injection. After fault injection, the frequency is reduced to 30 MHz to avoid timing
errors. To accommodate fault injection mechanism, each flop in the RTL of the ARM core
is edited as shown in Figure 4.6. The original flop U1 is replicated into a copy U4 and
stitched in a scan chain. The value in U4 along with inj override determine whether fault
is injected in output of U1. INJ injects stuck-at faults in the design and Inv inj determines
whether the output signal is to be flipped. The inj override signal is to disable fault injection
after specified number of cycles. The flop for fault injection is selected if scan in is set to
‘1’ for that flop. A system level fault controller, consisting of counters and a state machine
for operating the scan, is responsible for handling the fault injection. To represent real
scenarios of programs running on top of an operating system, a basic version of Linux
(since ARM AMBER does not have virtual memory management, full version of Linux
cannot be run) is used and programs are executed in this Linux environment. The fault
controller specifies the following during injection:
1. Fault-injection type (stuck-at or transient)
2. Number of scan flops
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3. Flop ID for injection
4. Time of fault injection
5. Fault injection control signals
Having defined the fault models, we now describe the test cases considered in this work
for demonstration of detection performance.
4.3 Test Case 1: Inverted Pendulum System
4.3.1 System Description
Figure 4.7: Inverted pendulum system mounted on a cart
As the first test case, the classical nonlinear control problem of cart-pole balancing is
considered. Figure 5.9 shows the block diagram of the test case. The ‘plant’ consists of a
single pendulum mounted on a movable horizontal cart and the control objective is to opti-
mally move the cart such that the pendulum is balanced in an upright position. An extended
Kalman filter (EKF) is used to predict unobserved states from noisy sensor measurements.
A linear servo motor acts as the actuator to impart motion to the cart and a hybrid (with
linear and nonlinear components) energy based controller is used. The differential equation



















fθ1(θ, θ̇, u) =
ucos(θ)− (M +m)gsin(θ) +mlcos(θ)sin(θ)θ̇2
mlcos2(θ)− (M +m)l
fθ2(θ, θ̇, u) =
u+mlsin(θ)θ̇2 −mgcos(θ)sin(θ)
M +m−mcos2(θ)
and M is the mass of the cart, m is the mass of the pendulum’s bob, θ is the angle between
the pendulum and the vertical axis pointing upward, x is the position of the cart, l is the
length of the pendulum (assumed mass-less), g is the acceleration due to gravity and u is
the motor force applied to the cart to control its motion. The energy-based hybrid controller
in [124] is implemented with the proposed detection scheme. Starting with the pendulum
hanging vertically downwards the nonlinear energy-based controller is designed such that
the mechanical energy of the pendulum-cart system is gradually increased by imparting
energy at the correct instant to the pendulum. As the pendulum starts swinging higher and
moves closer to the upright position, a negative state feedback controller takes over control
to achieve the upright balance. The nonlinear control action of the energy-based controller,
as derived in [124] is given as,
uc = (M +msin2(θ)){g1(xd − x)− g2ẋ}+ (4.13)
mgcos(θ)sin(θ) +mlθ̇2sin(θ)
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where the term xd represents a sinusoidal reference input constructed from (θ, θ̇) at each
time instant and is designed to gradually increase the energy of the cart-balance system.
g1 and g2 represent parameters of a second order transfer function from the reference input
xd to the actual cart position x. As the pendulum angle θ approaches the upright position,
the linear negative state feedback controller takes over after |θ| ≤ θth, where θth is the
switching angle from one controller to the other. The linear control law is of the form
uc = −K.x (4.14)
where K is the feedback gain matrix and x is the system state vector. The gain K is
determined from desired closed loop pole placements to meet specifications such as settling
time and overshoot.
The angular position θ of the pendulum and the cart displacement x are measured as
observations and modeled in the output vector y = gc(x, η) as
y =
1 0 0 0












where η = [η1 η2]ᵀ represent two Gaussian distributed measurement noise components.
Equations (4.12-4.15) directly fit into the model described in (4.1-4.3). The linear servo
motor used for position control applications in [125] is employed as the actuator generating
the motion for the horizontal cart. The sensor, EKF, actuator and controller implementation
for this test case are well studied topics in the literature and are not described in details here.
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4.3.2 Simulation Results
All simulation experiments are conducted in Matlab on a Windows PC with 3.10 GHz
processor. The pendulum-cart system is simulated with parameter values of M = 3 kg,
m = 0.2 kg, l = 0.31 m and g = 9.81 m/s2. The hybrid controller is designed such that
the nonlinear controller switches over to the state feedback controller within a range of
θ = ±30◦ where θ = 0◦ is the vertically upright position. For the linear feedback controller
design, 20% maximum overshoot and a 2% settling time of 2 seconds are chosen. The
resulting feedback gain K in (4.14) is determined using Ackermann’s formula for pole
placement. The measurement noise is modeled by a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and
standard deviation of 0.1. In order to compute the prediction functions, the cart-pendulum
system is simulated with 100 different initial angles ranging between θ = 180◦ and θ = 10◦
over 20 seconds of simulation. To compute the optimal value of Tp, a 4th degree polynomial
is selected to represent the nonlinear dynamics in (4.12) - thus ignoring the higher degree
terms in the equivalent Taylor expansion of the sinusoidal dynamics in (4.12). The state
reduction factor fn→p is equal to 2 since two out of four system states are measured. From
proposition I, this defines a minimum value Tp(min) = 2× (4+1) = 10. With an additional
chosen fnoise = 1.2, the sliding temporal window length is fixed at Tp = 12. The unified




. The function Fm(.) is selected as a
linear function as Fc(s) = y1 +y2 +uc. The objective is then to train the prediction function
Fc(.) such that the sum of the present unified variable s(t) is predicted from the past 12
observations. Two different choices of prediction functions are trained - i) a 3rd order
truncated Volterra series by RLS adaptation with memory M = 12 and ii) a MARS model
with 9 basis functions. After training the prediction functions, the error signal is generated
as the difference between the two mapping function outputs. If the error signal lies above a
certain threshold (pre-computed as |enom| = 0.05 for the noise statistic assumed), an error
detection event is flagged.
Figure 4.8 shows a balancing operation where the inverted pendulum is hanging verti-
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Figure 4.8: Plot of inverted pendulum angle with time in case of fault-free balancing
cally down initially with an angle of θ = 0◦. The nonlinear controller gradually increases
the energy of the cart-pendulum system by periodically moving the cart in opposite di-
rection resulting in gradual increase of the inverted pendulum angle towards the vertically
upright position. As the pendulum approaches the vertically upright position, the effective
control law is switched from the nonlinear control to negative feedback control for final
balancing of the pendulum around θ = 150◦ (since the critical switching angle is ±30◦).
The switching of the controller from nonlinear to linear control is seen in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9: Switching of the nonlinear control to linear negative state feedback controller
is demonstrated
The effectiveness of the proposed error detection scheme is heavily dependent on the
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appropriate choice of the sliding window length Tp. If the appropriate choice of Tp is
not adopted, the representative nonlinearity and memory effect of the system will not be
sufficiently captured by the nonlinear mapping functions, resulting in higher magnitude of
the error threshold enom. This is seen in Figure 4.10 where the MPCS error signal e(t) for
7 different choices of Tp are plotted. It is seen that with increase of Tp from 1 to 12, the
range of nominal excursion of the error signal decreases, thus reducing the error detection
threshold enom. The optimum choice of Tp as mentioned in the previous section is 12 for
this test case. However, if the choice of Tp is further increased, the error threshold doesn’t
reduce any further thus failing to provide any additional benefit albeit at a higher cost of
computational effort and memory requirements.
Figure 4.10: Plot of error signals with 7 different choices of temporal sliding window length
Tp demonstrates the importance of selecting Tp properly
Figure 4.11 shows an illustrative scenario where soft errors, actuator disturbances and
sensor perturbations are injected consecutively within a short time span for demonstration
of detection performance. The y-axis in Figure 4.11 indicates the error magnitude value.
The thresholding scheme performs limit value checking on the measurements and control
signal for fault detection. The error signal in the thresholding scheme is generated by ap-
propriate scaling of the vector s(t) for normalized comparing against the proposed scheme.
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Figure 4.11: Error signal for proposed methodology using Volterra series as prediction
functions (in solid red) and nominal fault-free response (dotted blue) is shown. The thresh-
olding scheme is also depicted (in dotted black)
Figure 4.12: Comparison of fault coverage across sensor and actuator malfunctions
The cart position is constrained within a finite length platform, thus restricting the nominal
range of x between +5 to −5. Similarly, the maximum control force that can be applied to
the servo motor is restricted as |uc|max = 3. To map the nominal thresholding error within
the same range of |enom| = 0.05, the thresholding error is generated as,
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eth = 0.005× x+ 0.0083× uc (4.16)
The scaling in (4.16) generates a single error signal within the same threshold for the pur-
pose of limit value checking. The arbitrary choice of scaling in (4.16) is selected only
to enforce same threshold between the MPCS methodology and limit value checking for
easy illustrative comparison. Between t = 6.75s and t = 10.8s, soft errors in the form of
single bit flips in the cache memories and physical register files are injected. The actuator
disturbance is injected as 20% step decrease in the actuator output between t = 11.2s and
t = 13s. Finally, the hard sensor perturbation is injected at t = 15s as scaling of the sensor
values by a factor of 0.8, thus providing a 20% degradation. It is seen that sensor malfunc-
tions create catastrophic effects and are detectable by both the methods - thresholding and
mapped prediction. However, the soft computation errors and the actuator disturbance fail
to generate perceptible changes in the system behavior that violate the established safety
limits, thus evading detection by thresholding. The proposed mechanism quickly detect
such errors and it is seen that the error signal crosses the nominal threshold. This is partic-
ularly helpful in early prognosis of system health before component degradation and aging
effects cause noticeable change in system response. In all three fault injection methods, the
error is instantaneously detected by the proposed approach, thus achieving low detection
latency.
Figure 4.12 shows the fault coverage metrics for sensor and actuator fault injections.
The fault coverage is defined as Coverage = # of faults detected# of faults injected . A fault is detected if the er-
ror signal for that corresponding fault crosses the nominal threshold. The Volterra and
the MARS based checker implements two Volterra kernel and MARS regression based
schemes as illustrated in Figure 4.3 and compare the two outputs for the final error sig-
nal. For sensor and actuator disturbances, 100 step signals with step height distributed
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uniformly between +20% to -20% of the actual signal are injected across the entire range
of initial starting angles. Similarly, for parametric perturbations, 50 faults are created for
both sensor and actuator with a Gaussian distributed parameter set of 3−σ equal to 25% of
nominal value. Figure 4.12 illustrates that the proposed scheme with both Volterra kernel
and MARS regression perform well in error detection with high fault coverage for all fault
types. The proposed approach has 100% fault coverage for sensor faults and ≈ 80% fault
coverage for actuator faults. Actuator errors are typically difficult to detect and yet the
mapped prediction checking has considerably higher fault coverage than the thresholding
scheme.
Figure 4.13: Error plots for 10% and 50% actuator faults with MARS and ARTMAP as
prediction functions along with fault-free error signals
Figure 4.13 illustrates the detection of actuator errors using the MPCS approach with
two different prediction functions - MARS and ARTMAP. Actuator faults are inserted as
step disturbances with magnitude 10% and 50% of the nominal values. The two mapping
functions are trained using nominal fault-free data from the 100 simulations mentioned pre-
viously. It is seen that both the mapping function choices are capable of detecting actuator
faults. The 10% and 50% actuator faults are injected at t = 15 and t = 7.5s such that
the error signals are distinctly identified. It is seen that the 50% actuator fault generates
higher error magnitude than the 10% fault which suggests that the error signal magnitude
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Figure 4.14: Error plots for 10% and 50% sensor faults with MARS and ARTMAP as
prediction functions along with fault-free error signals
is indicative of the fault severity. The error detection in the presence of similar injected
sensor faults are shown in Figure 4.14.
Figure 4.15: Application level fault effects due to different types of injected faults
Figure 4.15 demonstrates the functional behavior at the application level of pendulum
balancing due to fault injection. Four different types of fault effects are classified - delay in
balancing by 0-50% of the nominal time to balance, 50-100% delay, equilibrium vibration
where the pendulum sways around the equilibrium position while attempting to balance
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and failure to balance when the pendulum doesn’t balance after twice the nominal time to
balance. The equilibrium vibration fault effect is selected when the settling time specifica-
tion is not satisfied. It is seen that sensor errors are most catastrophic since the pendulum
fails to balance in 91% cases with injected sensor faults. Actuator errors mostly delay the
balancing due to the imparting of incorrect actuation. Transient errors are rarely catas-
trophic and mostly delays the balancing or affects the balancing around the equilibrium
position. Finally, injection of permanent errors (stuck-at faults at the micro-architecture
level) fails to balance in 52% of the cases and delays the balancing in rest of the cases.
The data reported on transient and permanent errors are from the subset of injected faults
that cause SDC (Silent Data Corruption). The distribution of the different fault effects are
tabulated in Table 4.3 and discussed later.
Table 4.2: Fault Coverage for Soft Errors in Simulation
Computational Data MPCS-Volterra MPCS-MARS
Computational
Overhead 21% 19.5%
Memory Overhead 26% 22.3%












Table 4.2 provides the implementation overhead along with the fault coverage metrics
for different types of soft errors. Fault injection experiments are run 10 times with 5000
bit errors in each experiment. Similarly 2000 word errors are injected in each of 10 sepa-
rate experiments. For bit errors, the microarchitectural block and the bit position of error
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injection is chosen randomly. The instruction trace analysis from Pintool is exploited to
carefully insert errors in the execution of controller and the checkers only. For word errors,
50% of the 32-bit word length are randomly selected for error injection. The computa-
tional and memory overhead is expressed as a proportion of the total cycles that represent
the digital processor operation of control algorithms along with the checkers. This over-
head varies with the controller choice and the reported data represents the overhead for the
particular pendulum controller mentioned above. Among the 50000 bit errors injected, half
of these errors are transient bit flips while the other half is permanent stuck-at faults (the
same proportion is implemented for word errors). A 73% fault coverage implies that 27%
of the injected fault effects are masked and don’t cause any detectable data corruption. It
is seen that transient word errors are easier to detect since multiple bit flips seldom result
in masked fault effects. In the simulation framework, timeouts and crash are not explicitly
detected by the transient error waveform. Such events are typically identified with a watch-
dog timer in actual systems. Thus the fault coverage reported in Table 4.2 is achieved by
the proposed MPCS scheme along with an watchdog timer implementation.
Table 4.3: Fault effect distribution for different error types


























Table 4.3 shows the fault effect distribution due to injection of bit and word errors
for the proposed scheme with Volterra kernel and MARS as prediction functions. From
the emphasized data in Table 4.3, it is seen that only 1.37% of the injected transient bit
errors result in a crash of program execution in the Gem5 simulator whereas 60.79% of the
permanent word errors cause crash of the program execution. Permanent stuck-at faults in
multiple bits of the microarchitectural blocks are catastrophic in nature and prevent normal
program execution.
4.4 Test Case 2: Brake-by-Wire System
4.4.1 System Description
Modern vehicles equipped with antilock braking systems (ABS) are examples of brake-by-
wire (BBW) adoption for improving the operational safety and system reliability. BBW
systems integrate electromechanical actuators with electronic controllers and sensors. The
primary objective of a BBW system is to limit the longitudinal slip in a braking event to
prevent wheel lock-up conditions. A characteristic BBW system for a rear-wheel drive
vehicle, as depicted in [126], is illustrated in Figure 5.19.
In a BBW system, the pressing of the brake pedal triggers the braking control algorithm
implemented on an embedded microprocessor. Wheel-mounted sensors send speed and
acceleration data to the electronic controller that generates the appropriate braking torque
for application through electromagnetic brakes known as eddy-current brakes (ECBs). The
control algorithm modulates the applied braking torque to extract maximum traction from
the tire-road interface while avoiding wheel lock-up situations.
The BBW dynamics model described in [127] is utilized in this work. A straight-line
braking event is assumed without any lateral motion. The longitudinal velocity equation
and the rotational dynamics are:
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(−Tbi + µi(κi)FziR) (4.18)
where vx is vehicle longitudinal speed, M is total vehicle mass, ωi is angular speed of ith
wheel, Iwi is rotational inertia of ith wheel, R is the effective wheel rolling radius, Fzi is
normal frictional force at the interface of ith wheel and road surface and Tbi is the generated
brake torque at ith wheel. The tire-ground adhesion is determined by the wheel-slip ratio






The nonlinear function µi(κ) in (4.18) defining the friction coefficient as a function of
time-varying slip ratio κi(t) represents the nonlinearity in the BBW system. This func-
tion depends on surfaces (asphalt, snow, ice, etc.) and the friction coefficient curves vary
significantly across slip-ratio. In general, the maximum braking force is generated at the
peak friction coefficient for which the slip-ratio value ranges between 0.1-0.2. Equations
(4.17-4.19) represent the plant equations of the BBW test case.
Wheel lock-up is a condition in which one or more wheels start having higher rate
of angular deceleration than the equivalent linear deceleration of the vehicle, causing loss
of traction, slippage of wheel over road surface and eventually loss of vehicle control.
The primary objective of a BBW controller is to avoid such a situation by modulating the
applied braking torque Tb while maintaining the critical slip ratio. In this work, a sliding
mode nonlinear controller for ABS is implemented as derived in [126]. The ABS control
law is expressed as,















where the saturation function SAT(x
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The terms αsi, κth, η and φ are parameters of the sliding mode controller as defined in
[126]. A BBW-system operates completely in highly nonlinear mode and linearization is
not feasible around any particular equivalent point.
4.4.2 Simulation Results
The BBW test case is simulated with parameter values of M = 1300 kg, R = 0.3 m and
Iw = 0.6 kg/m2. The friction-slip curve for asphalt surface mentioned in [126] is utilized.
Similar to the cart-pendulum test case, an equivalent 4th degree polynomial is chosen to
model the system nonlinearity, thus defining a minimum value Tp(min) = (4 + 1) = 5
(the state reduction factor is 1 in this case since all states are assumed to be measured).
With the additional chosen noise corruption factor fnoise = 1.2, the sliding temporal length
is selected as Tp = 5 × 1.2 = 6. A 3rd-order truncated Volterra kernel is chosen as
the prediction function Fc and trained with braking data for 1000 different initial vehicle
speeds ranging from 50 mph to 100 mph. The function Fm is selected to generate the
sum of wheel-speeds. Gaussian distributed measurement noise with mean 0 and standard
deviation of 2 rad/s is assumed while measuring angular speed ωi of each wheel. Figure
4.17 illustrates the catastrophic effect of a soft error in the microcontroller of the BBW
system. Figure 4.17.(a) and (b) plot the angular speed of the left front wheel and the left
rear wheel respectively. The initial vehicle longitudinal speed is 60 mph with a uniform
angular speed of 88 rad/s across all four wheels, providing a slip ratio almost equal to 0 and
thus maintaining full contact with the road surface. At time t = 1s, full braking is initiated
for rapid deceleration of the vehicle resulting in uniform reduction of angular speed in both
front and rear wheels. A spurious bit flip is injected in the issue queue at t = 3s, resulting
in incorrect computation of the ABS control law. This causes a temporary wheel lock-
up of the front wheel and drastically reduces the angular speed thus losing traction. As
a result, the linear velocity suddenly increases due to wheel slippage as evident in Figure
4.17.(b) indicating a catastrophic situation. However, the robustness of the sliding mode
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ABS controller and the transient nature of the underlying error provides quick recovery of
traction and produces the appropriate retardation.
Figure 4.17: Plot of angular speed for a) rear wheel and b) front wheel for a braking event
operating with a soft error
Figure 4.18: Plot of error signal without errors and with soft computation errors
Figure 4.18 demonstrates the detection of the bit flip error with the MPCS-Volterra
scheme. The error signal clearly shows a prominent signature different from the nominal
error signal without any fault injection. The injected error is instantaneously detected with
low latency. For statistical fault injection experiments, 500 faults are injected by perturbing
the wheel sensor readings and the actuator (ECB) signals with step disturbances uniformly
distributed between +20% and -20% of the nominal signal values at different time instants.
10 fault injection experiments are executed with 5000 bit errors and 5000 word errors in
each fault injection experiment.
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Figure 4.19: Braking on a slope indicates a scenario for which the mapping functions are
not trained. It is clearly seen that due to change of system dynamics on a downward slope,
the mapping function is unable to predict the response trajectory, triggering the detection
of an environmental anomaly
Figure 4.19 illustrates an environmental anomaly situation as discussed in Section 4.2.1.
Similar to Figure 4.17, braking is initiated on a level road at t = 1s from a wheel rotation of
88 rad/s. At t = 5s, the road starts sloping downward at an angle of 5◦. This is simulated
by adding an extra weight component of Mgsin(θ) in (4.17) where θ is the downward
slope angle. The increased downward force slows down the braking effect at t = 5s as
seen in Figure 4.19. The slope ends at t = 8s and the same braking trajectory is restored
henceforth. The prediction functions are trained using braking data on a level slope as
mentioned previously and cannot predict the system dynamics on a downward slope. The
103
bottom subfigure demonstrates detection of such a scenario for which the MPCS is not
trained. This indicates that the proposed approach is not only suitable for fault detection
but is also capable of identifying environmental aberrations that change the plant dynamics
due to situational conditions.
Table 4.4 shows the fault coverage for the BBW system operating under different faults
and the computational overhead of the implemented scheme. Similar to the first test case,
the fault coverage is 100% on sensor errors as all injected faults are detected. The coverage
for soft errors and actuator faults is also high as shown in the Table. Compared to the
previous test case, the computational and memory overhead is lower since the controller
overhead is higher in this case.

























(241 out of 250
detectable faults)
4.5 Hardware Results
4.5.1 Fault Injection in FPGA Testbed
The hardware experiments are performed on the Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA SP605 board
shown in Figure 4.20. As described in Section 4.2.3, the 3012 flip-flops are modified for
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Figure 4.20: Xilinx Spartan-6 SP605 FPGA board for fault injection experiments
fault injection capabilities. After performing the RTL modifications, the design is synthe-
sized and mapped to the Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs) present in the FPGA. Each
CLB consists of 4 to 6 inputs, multiplexers and flip-flops. The muxes used in the modified
flip-flop in Figure 4.6 are already available in the CLBs and do not cost additional overhead.
Two ChipScope cores ICON and VIO are generated by Xilinx Coregen and inserted in the
design for fault control purposes. The VIO (Virtual Input/Output) core is used to provide
the command for system level fault control. The ICON (Integrated Controller) provides
communication between VIO and the host computer. For bit errors, the system clock is
gated off when the fault sequence is scanned in. The system clock is activated in the im-
mediate cycle following the bit flip. The entire system with the fault injected core, fault
controller cores and peripherals is synthesized in a bit file and downloaded to the FPGA for
fault injection experiments. A complete fault injection run is illustrated in Figure 4.21.
Each fault injection run involves programming the FPGA with the RTL-modified pro-
cessor and then issuing appropriate ChipScope commands as shown in Figure 4.21. The
flop ID and injection time are randomly chosen for fault injection. A basic Linux operating
system is next booted and the application under fault is loaded through the UART serial in-
terface from the host PC. After execution of the application on the fault-injected processor
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Figure 4.21: Test flow for a complete fault injection run involves the introduction of faults
from the system level fault controller and then booting a Linux kernel and executing an
application over UART serial interface
core, data is collected back for post-processing and fault effect analysis.
Figure 4.22: Execution of fault injection on control application test cases
Figure 4.22 shows the execution flow for fault injection on the test cases mentioned
previously. As discussed in Section 4.2.3, only the control algorithm and fault checkers are
implemented on a digital processor core. If the entire control program is executed on the
faulty core as shown in Figure 4.21, soft errors affect the operation of sensors, actuators
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and plant that does not mimic practical scenarios. Hence, the execution flow of Figure
4.22 is adopted, where each sampling time iteration of the test case is simulated with a
bidirectional data exchange between the host computer and the fault-injected ARM core.
At iteration 1, the plant is initialized and sensor model is simulated on the host PC and
the control algorithm with measured data as inputs is sent as a standalone application to
be executed on the FPGA core. The output from the controller is sent back to the host
PC where the actuator model and plant equations are simulated. Finally the fault checker
algorithm with the present and past measurements as input data is executed on the FPGA
core. This entire process is repeated over iterations to complete a full simulation of a test
case.
One program execution on the FPGA takes 80 seconds - the total time of injecting
the bit-flip in the ARM core, booting Linux on the faulty core and application execution.
Each of the temporal iterations of a control problem requires two FPGA executions as
shown in Figure 4.22 - one for the controller and another for the fault checkers. Thus
the simulation of 1 time sample of a control program requires 178 seconds - 160 seconds
for FPGA runs and 18 seconds for data exchange and PC simulation. The brake-by-wire
test case is simulated for a duration of 10 seconds with sampling time of 0.25 seconds
generating 40 temporal iterations thus requiring 40 injection runs on the FPGA. Hence
each experiment of the test case requires 40 × 178s ≈ 2 hours. In the FPGA execution of
each temporal iteration, a random flop is selected and a random bit flip is injected. Both
the control algorithm and the checker at each iteration runs on the same bit-flip injected
core. At the next iteration, a different soft error is injected and the process is repeated for
the entire 40 temporal iterations. After each iteration, the fault effect of the injected bit-flip
is classified as one of the four outcomes mentioned in Section 4.2.3 - masked if there is no
corruption of program data from fault-free values, SDC if the fault checker value crosses
the detection threshold, timeout if the program doesn’t complete even after running 5 times
longer than fault-free case and crash if Linux fails to load or program execution is fatally
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terminated. A total of 100 such experiments are performed over a time-span of 9 days. The
fault outcome distribution of the 100 experiments is shown in Figure 4.23.
Figure 4.23: Distribution of fault effects for 100 experiments of the brake-by-wire test case
on the FPGA
On average 93% of the injected bit flips are masked as these do not cause any percep-
tible corruption of the program data from stored fault-free values. Hence, the y-axis that
plots the fault effect rates start from 92% for aid of visual comparison. 4.5% of the injected
bit flips corrupt the controller algorithm or the fault checker evident from the error value
crossing the established threshold. The mean rates of timeout and crash are 0.2% and 2.3%
respectively. In a practical situation, soft errors do not strike at each time instant. However,
the primary reason that bit errors are injected at each iteration is explained from the masked
outcome rate in Figure 4.23. Unlike the Gem5 based fault injection experiments, no trace
analysis is available before fault injection. In addition, the mapping between individual
FPGA flip-flop and the high level operation it performs in the program execution including
running the operating system, is unknown. Thus, a bit error injection to target the specific
instruction of program execution is not possible. The masked effect is created when a bit
error affects a particular flip-flop in a way that does not affect the program execution in any
manner. The bit errors that cause crash and timeout affect the operating system or crucial
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system routines. Hence, to ensure an observable corruption of system data, bit flips are
injected at each time instant.
Figure 4.24: Comparison of application level effects between Gem5 fault injection and
FPGA-based flop level error insertion
Figure 4.24 illustrates the application level effects of transient bit error injections for the
BBW system and draws a comparison between Gem5-based fault injection scheme and the
FPGA-based flop error insertion mechanism. Three different classes of system level fault
effects are defined - i) < 20% reduction in deceleration, ii) > 20% reduction in decelera-
tion, and iii) brake lock-up. Injection of transient bit errors disrupts the correct computation
of braking torque by the sliding mode controller. A reduction in the applied braking torque
from the required value decreases the effective deceleration and fails to slow down the vehi-
cle sufficiently whereas an increase in the applied torque raises the slip ratio inadvertently,
causing wheel lock-up as shown in Figure 4.17. The data for the Gem5 plot is selected
from a subset (17598 out of 44321 detected bit errors) of the transient errors reported in
Table 4.4. The data for the hardware fault injection scheme is selected from the errors that
cause SDC shown in Figure 4.23. The critical percentage of deceleration reduction of 20%
is chosen based on simulation data where it is observed that if the deceleration decreases
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by more than 20%, the stopping distance criterion is not met. Figure 4.24 shows that due
to targeted fault injection in Gem5 based scheme, the fault effects are more catastrophic -
52% cases not satisfying stopping distance criterion and 18% causing wheel lock-up. With
the fault-injected ARM core, 63% of the cases are non-catastrophic with brake lock-up
occurring in only 2.9% of the cases.
4.5.2 Self-Balancing Robot
Description
To demonstrate the error detection performance on an actual system, the Balboa 32U4
[128] self-balancing robot is chosen. The controller, actuators and sensors are described
as:
i) Controller - The control board of the robot is integrated around a Atmel microcon-
troller, clocked by a 16 MHz crystal oscillator along with an Arduino-enabled bootloader
that makes the robot highly programmable.
ii) Actuator - Two on-board Texas Instruments DRV8838 motor drivers power two
micro-metal gear motors driving each of the two wheels separately. There are 4 actua-
tor signals used to control the motor drivers - rotational direction and speed for each motor.
The motor terminals are controlled by pulse width modulated (PWM) signals from the
drivers. Each of the two motors is a 6V, brushed DC motor with customizable gearbox (a
51.45:1 gear ratio is chosen in the setup). The motors have a no-load speed of 625 RPM
and 120 mA current at 6V. Each of the motors drives a wheel with 80 mm diameter.
iii) Sensor - Each drive motor on the robot has a quadrature encoder system consisting
of a magnetic disc attached to the extended motor shaft and a pair of Hall effect sensors
mounted on the control board. These encoders are used to track the rotational speed and
direction of the robot’s wheels. In addition, there are two on-board inertial sensor chips that
assist the robot to determine its own orientation by implementing an inertial measurement
unit (IMU). The first chip (ST LSM6DS33) combines a 3-axis digital linear accelerometer
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and 3-axis gyroscope into a single package. It provides 6 independent acceleration and
angular rate readings as a 6 DOF (degree of freedom) data. The second chip (ST LIS3MDL)
is a 3-axis digital magnetometer that provides the robot a sense of location with respect to
the magnetic field. These constitute 13 sensor measurements available for the controller -
4 quadrature encoder readings and 9 inertial measurements.
Balancing algorithm
Figure 4.25: Self-balancing Balboa robot
The self-balancing robot is shown in Figure 4.25.(a) in the lying-down position and in
4.25.(b) in the vertically upright position through dynamic balancing. Similar to the in-
verted pendulum test case, a hybrid controller combining both linear and nonlinear control
laws is used for balancing the robot. A nonlinear controller is used to make the robot get
up from a lying-down to a near-vertical position by providing quick maximum motor speed
signals in alternate directions. A phase space plot of the balancing algorithm is shown in
Figure 4.26.
The two axes in Figure 4.26 plot the angle of the robot with the vertical axis and the
angular rate of rotation. The vertically upright position is represented as the origin of the
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Figure 4.26: Phase plot of the balancing algorithm shows the balancing trajectory imple-
mented by the hybrid controller
phase space with angle and angular rate equal to zero. One of the diagonal trajectories
with +45◦ angle to the horizontal axis is unstable and indicate the falling of the robot,
either forward or backward. The robot is falling forward when both the angle and angular
rate of rotation is positive and increasing. Similarly when both angle and angular rate
is increasingly negative, the robot is falling backward. The second diagonal with -45◦
with the horizontal represents the desired trajectory for balancing where the angle and
angular rate is opposite in sign. The balancing algorithm starts with the robot lying down
with an angle of 110◦ and zero angular rate. The nonlinear controller aims to bring the
robot close to the balancing trajectory by fast switching of forward and backward motor
speeds. As shown in the phase plot, the nonlinear controller switches to a PID controller
once the robot’s orientation crosses the balancing trajectory. The PID controller generates
the required motor drive to reduce the error between the robot’s actual orientation and the
balancing trajectory and in the process, balances the robot in the vertically upright position.
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Results
Figure 4.27: Angular orientation of the robot along with the MPCS error signal without
any fault injection
To compute the prediction function Fc, 100 experiments of the robot balancing are per-
formed and temporal data from the sensors and the motor drive speed are recorded. Since
the Atmel micro-controller has only 32 KB of flash memory, temporal data of t = 8s can
be recorded at a stretch. So, 8s time snippets of data are recorded for 100 experiments to
build the mapping function Fc. The balancing algorithm operates on 10 sensor measure-
ments - 6 DOF data from the accelerometer and the gyroscope and 4 quadrature encoder
readings. The two motor drive currents form the actuation signals. The sampling time of
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the data is 1ms. The sliding window length is selected as Tp = 6 samples. The function
Fm is chosen to form the normalized sum of 12 signals - 10 sensor measurements and 2
actuation currents at each instant. A MARS model is built to predict this value from the
past data over 6 samples. A nominal balancing experiment with the fault-free error signal
is shown in Figure 4.27.
Figure 4.28: Angular orientation of the robot along with the MPCS error signal without
any fault injection
Figure 4.27 shows the angular orientation of the balancing robot in the top subfigure.
The robot starts from a lying-down position of 110◦ and the nonlinear controller swings
up the robot for balancing and the angle of the robot stays within ±5◦ while it is balanced
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Figure 4.29: With a sensor fault injected, the robot swings around the equilibrium and fails
to perfectly balance itself producing a high error signal
upright. The step-like response shown in the inset illustrates the PWM drive of the motors.
In the bottom subfigure, it is seen that the error signal is close to 0 for a nominal balancing
indicating the absence of any faults and anomalies. The error detection threshold is chosen
as eth = 0.1 from the nominal data collected from 100 experiments.
Figure 4.28 shows the response of the robot while attempting to balance with a sensor
error of 20%. The accelerometer reading from the sensor is altered artificially with a bias
of 20%. The angle and the MPCS error signal are shown where it is seen that as the robot
attempts to stand up from the lying down position, it vibrates around the vertical equilib-
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rium position of θ = 0◦ and sways the other way. The robot makes multiple attempts to
stand up but fails completely to achieve the desired functionality as seen in the top subfig-
ure. The error plot clearly shows that the error magnitude crosses the detection threshold
of 0.6 indicating presence of errors in the system.
Figure 4.29 illustrates a fault injected balancing experiment with a sensor fault of 5%.
This destabilizes the balancing algorithm resulting in oscillations of the robot around the
equilibrium point as seen in the top subfigure. The bottom subfigure demonstrates that the
error signal is significantly higher than the chosen threshold of eth = 0.6 indicating prompt
detection of a system fault without complete failure. This is particularly helpful for detec-
tion of early degradation of sensors and actuators before catastrophic failure occurs. The
experimental data from a real autonomous system proves the effectiveness of the proposed
methodology.
4.6 Summary
The presented simulation results and hardware data demonstrate the effectiveness and prac-
tical feasibility of the proposed methodology for error detection in nonlinear state space
control systems operating under arbitrary failure mechanisms. Computational overhead




ALERA: ACCELERATED LEARNING ENABLED REINFORCEMENT
ARCHITECTURE FOR ERROR CORRECTION IN NONLINEAR CONTROL
SYSTEMS
Adaptive dynamic programming (ADP), proposed by Werbos [129] approximates the per-
formance index function forward-in-time and generates an intelligent method of approxi-
mate optimal control for nonlinear systems [130, 131]. Reinforcement learning (RL) [132]
is such a framework in which a controller optimizes its behavior by interacting with its en-
vironment. After taking an action, known as policy, the controller receives a scalar reward
from the environment, that provides an evaluation of the quality of that action. The user
sets a certain goal by specifying a suitable reward function for the RL controller, and the RL
controller then learns to maximize the cumulative reward received over time, known as the
value function in order to reach that goal. A typical RL controller starts learning without
any knowledge, initially reacting to external stimulus in non-optimal ways through trial-
and-error, while learning through such experiences to develop an optimal control policy.
This leads to a long period of unpredictable and potentially damaging behavior. The learn-
ing rate needs to be considerably accelerated for RL controllers to be useful in practical
nonlinear control systems.
Actor-critic methods are a class of RL algorithms that learn a critic function as the value
function approximator and a separate actor function as the policy approximator. Such actor-
critic methods have recently been used as optimal controllers in a variety of nonlinear con-
trol problems [133–136]. However, no previous research has focused on using actor-critic
networks as self-learning controllers in the presence of parametric failures and malfunction
in the system. Prior works have emphasized acceleration of the learning rate for a nom-
inal system [137, 138]. In this chapter, the error detection methodology described in the
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previous chapter is exploited to enable the usage of RL controllers as augmentation to a
nonlinear controller and significantly speed up the self-learning capabilities of actor-critic
methods for quick recovery of system performance in real-time.
5.1 Preliminaries
This section discusses the framework of RL for deterministic Markov decision process
(MDP) and introduces the actor-critic methods as approximate RL algorithms.
5.1.1 Reinforcement Learning
In general, a RL problem is described as a stochastic MDP modeled by the tuple
M(X,U, f, ρ) where X is the state space, U is the action space, f : X ×U ×X 7→ [0,∞)
is the transition probability function and ρ : X × U × X 7→ < is the reward function.
In this work, the RL is used in a deterministic framework and hence we redefine the
MDP tuple as M(X,U, f̄ , ρ̄) where X is the state space of the control system, U is the
space of control inputs, f̄ : X × U 7→ X is the state transition function that describes
the system dynamics and ρ̄ : X × U 7→ < provides the reward function, assumed to be
bounded. At each time step t, the controller takes an action u(t) ∈ U depending on the
system state x(t) ∈ X from a separate control policy π : X 7→ U . The next system state
x(t+ 1) is determined by the state transition function f̄(x(t),u(t)). After the transition to
x(t + 1), the controller receives a scalar reward r(t + 1) according to the reward function
ρ̄ : r(t+ 1) = ρ̄(x(t+ 1),u(t+ 1)). The objective of a RL algorithm is to find an optimal
policy that maximizes the cumulative future rewards over an infinite horizon of time. The
discounted sum of such rewards is known as return and defined as the continuous value








for any initial state x(t) and τ is the time constant for discounting future rewards. The
fading exponential function puts reducing emphasis on future rewards by weighing present
rewards at higher value. The value function at any state provides a quantitative measure of
how ‘good’ the present state is for maximizing the future return. According to the principle
of optimality, the condition for the optimal value function at time t is given as
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where (5.2) denotes the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for infinite-horizon, dis-
counted reward problems (derivation shown in appendix A and originally explored in
[139]). The optimal policy π∗(x(t)) in a RL problem is determined by the action that
maximizes the right-hand side of (5.2) as









Applying an action according to the policy determined in (5.3) ensures that the return for
the particular choice of reward function ρ̄ is maximum along the entire trajectory x(t) ∀t.
Thus, the primary goals of a RL algorithm are: i) estimate the value function V (x) based
on the received rewards after taking actions drawn from the policy π(x) and ii) updating
the policy π(x) according to the current estimate of the value function V (x). Actor-critic
methods are popular schemes for implementing a RL framework and chosen as our methods
in this work.
5.1.2 Actor-Critic Methods
Actor-critic algorithms [140] contain two distinct learning units - a critic that tries to learn
the value function of the policy and an actor that provides the action according to a certain
policy. Popular critic-only methods such as Q-learning [141–143] and SARSA [144, 145]
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implement a state-action value function Q(x,u) as a critic and no explicit actor policy.
The value function Q evaluates the quality of choosing a particular action in a particu-
lar state with respect to the net return. The optimal deterministic policy is computed by
performing an optimization procedure on the learned value function. Such methods do
not ensure the near-optimality of the resulting policy when learning in an online setting
that weakens the prospect of using such techniques for real-time control. On the contrary,
actor-only methods such as the stochastic real-valued (SRV) [146] and REINFORCE [147]
algorithms do not explicitly estimate a value function and use policy gradient methods for
computing the best action. Such parametrized policies are updated by performing opti-
mization of the return defined in (5.1) directly over the parameter space of the policy. The
two major advantages of actor-only methods are that the parametric optimization allows
generation of actions in the complete continuous action space, thus exploring a wide range
of action choices in a control system and the gradient descent methods enforce strong con-
vergence with appropriate choices of learning rates [145, 148]. The major drawback of
these approaches are that every gradient is computed without utilizing knowledge of prior
estimates [149, 150] that elongates the learning process due to repetitive exploration of the
action space and makes these methods unsuitable for implementation in control systems.
Actor-critic techniques introduced in [151] and henceforth investigated in [149, 152,
153] combine the advantages of actor-only and critic-only methods, thus making them
attractive candidates for implementation as controllers. These methods are capable of gen-
erating continuous actions like actor-only methods, while the policy gradients are assisted
by the evaluation of the critic enabling fast convergence. The critic evaluates the current
actor policy and updates the value function estimate using data samples. The current value
function estimate is then utilized for improving the policy parameters in the direction of
performance improvement. A schematic structure of an actor-critic algorithm is illustrated
in Figure 5.1. The actor generates the policy action u depending on the current state x. The
critic receives the reward r for applying the current action and evaluates the quality of the
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present policy by updating the value function estimate. After a few policy evaluation steps
by the critic, the actor is updated using gradient descent on the parameter space.
Figure 5.1: Schematic overview of an actor-critic algorithm. The dashed line indicates the
updating of critic and actor by the critic output.
The actor-critic methods utilize the popular framework of temporal difference (TD)




V π(x(t))− r(t) (5.4)
that is valid for any policy (including the optimal policy of (5.3)). Any imperfect estimate
of the value function violates the consistency condition in (5.4) generating the TD error,
δ(t) ≡ r(t)− 1
τ
V (t) + V̇ (t) (5.5)
At each step of the learning algorithm, the value function estimate is adjusted to reduce
the TD error δ(t). Thus the magnitude of the TD error δ(t) provides a quantitative estimate
of how different the current value function estimate is from the actual value function. The
convergence of the value function and the policy to their optimal values is signified by the
TD error approaching zero. Hence the TD error is exploited for gradient descent update
121
[145] of the critic parameters. The learning is further accelerated by the use of eligibility
traces that introduce a notion of memory in the learning procedure. To define eligibility
traces, the TD error in (5.5) is expressed in its discretized form as
δt = rt + γVt − Vt−1 (5.6)
where γ = 1 − ∆t
τ
' e−∆tτ is the discretized discount factor with ∆t as the sampling
duration and the variable values are scaled as Vt = 1∆tV (t). Eligibility trace is an additional
memory variable zt(x) associated with each state x that evolves with time t. At each
learning step, the eligibility traces for all states decay by γλ and the eligibility trace for the
current state visited is incremented by 1 as
zt(x) =

γλzt−1(x), if x 6= xt
γλzt−1(x) + 1, if x = xt
(5.7)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the trace decay parameter. At any time, the eligibility traces record the
past history of recently visited states and indicate the degree to which each state is eligible
for undergoing learning changes. This evaluates the trajectory of system states instead of
each particular state in response to the current policy. This is due to the fact that the reward
rt is received as a result of a series of actions taken. Hence, eligibility traces are used to
assign credit to states visited several steps earlier and provides multiple-step backup for
distributing the reinforcement learning.
5.1.3 Function Approximators as Actor-Critic Units
The value function and the policy definitions in (5.1) and (5.3) assume exact continuous
representations over the state space that are not feasible in practical systems due to the
infinite size of continuous state or action spaces [154]. In practical implementations of RL
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algorithms, function approximators [145] such as linear coding, tile coding, radial basis
functions, Kanerva coding, etc. are used to represent an actor and a critic due to the infinite
size of continuous state or action spaces. In any function approximator, the value function
of the critic and the actor policy are parametrized by the respective parameter vectors θc ∈
<nc and θa ∈ <na as Vθc(x) and πθa(x). The TD error δt defined in (5.6) is utilized for





where ηc > 0 is the learning rate of the critic. Use of eligibility traces defined in (5.7)





where the eligibility trace is defined as a vector zt ∈ <nc instead of storing individual trace
history for each state. The eligibility trace update equation [149] is
zt = γλzt−1 +∇θcVθct (xt) (5.10)





where ηa > 0 is the learning rate of the actor. Though eligibility traces are popular in actor-
only methods, they are rarely used for policy update in actor-critic methods. Equations
(5.9-5.11) define the basic framework of RL for parametric function approximators.
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5.1.4 Normalized Gaussian network based AC methods
In this work, normalized Gaussian networks are used as function approximators [139] for










, ak(x) = e
−||sᵀk(x−ck)||
2
The vectors ck and sk define the center and the size of the kth Gaussian basis function.
The number of basis functions K denote the level of discretization of the continuous state
space and is a design choice. The TD error δt and eligibility trace zt are defined in (5.6)





The actor policy is also implemented as a normalized Gaussian network based approx-














where umax is the maximum action possible, n(t) is a stochastic term that is initially used
for exploration of the parametric space for evaluating new policies and gradually reduced to
zero with progress of learning and s(.) is a component-wise sigmoid function. The update
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The above equations demonstrate that an actor-critic network is completely defined by
its weight vectors wc and wa. Similar to other gradient descent algorithms, actor-critic
learning depends on the exploration term n(t) to evade out of local optima. The proposed
research in this work intends to reduce this exploration significantly by initializing the
actor-critic weight vectors to appropriate parameters, thus accelerating the self-learning
process and enabling fast system adaptation under faults or unforeseen situations. The full
implementation of the AC algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Gaussian Network based AC Methods
1: procedure AC ALGORITHM
2: Input: γ, λ, ηc, ηa, nc, na
3: K ← Number of basis functions
4: s(.)← Sigmoid function definition
5: for k = 1 to K do
6: sk ← Size of kth Gaussian basis function
7: ck ← Center of kth Gaussian basis function









11: z0 = 0
12: Apply random input u0
13: i← 1
14: while Objective not met do
15: Measure xi, ri















19: zi ← γλzi−1 +∇wcV (xi,wci−1)
20: wci ← wci−1 + ηcδizi
21: wai ← wai−1 + ηaδi∇waπ(xi,wai−1)
22: i← i+ 1
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Figure 5.2: ALERA: Accelerated Learning Enabled Reinforcement Architecture
5.2 ALERA: Accelerated Learning Enabled Reinforcement Architecture
The proposed architecture is illustrated in Figure 5.2. ALERA is used as an augmentation
to the nominal controller for fast reconfiguration of effective control law in erroneous sit-
uations. The nonlinear physical plant with system dynamics of ẋ = g(x, u) represents the
actual process to be controlled. The sensor measures the output y(t) and the state observer
(nonlinear observer or extended Kalman filter [155]) estimates the system states x(t) from
the measurement y(t). The predicted state x̂(t) is used along with the externally provided
reference input R(t) in the nominal controller uc(t) = h(x̂(t), R(t)) to generate the re-
quired input uc(t) that is applied to the plant through the actuators. The control law h(.)
is designed to meet certain specifications according to the design requirements. ALERA
augments the nominal controller by providing an additional control input ua(t), thus apply-
ing the composite action u(t) = uc(t) + ua(t). The nominal controller is designed to meet
the system specifications under the assumption that all physical components of the system
perform accurately. Under fault mechanisms, the nominal controller is sub-optimal and
cannot meet the system specifications and may even fail to achieve system functionality
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under critical errors. ALERA is designed to compensate for such effects in real-time with
low latency. The primary modules of ALERA are: i) error detection module, ii) learning
accelerator module, and iii) actor-critic based reinforcement learner.
5.2.1 Error Detection Module
The error detection is accomplished by the state-encoding based methodology described in
the previous chapter. It has been demonstrated in linear systems [156] that the transient
waveform of the error signal contains diagnostic information and critical system parame-
ters can be predicted with reasonable high accuracy. This diagnostic capability of the error
signal e(t) is exploited in the learning accelerator module for fast reconfiguration of con-
trol law in real-time. Before describing the learning accelerator module, the actor-critic
reinforcement learner is discussed next.
5.2.2 Actor-Critic based Reinforcement Learner
The actor-critic reinforcement learner is an augmentation to the nominal controller as
shown in Figure 5.2. The nominal controller with output uc(t)is designed for the physi-
cal plant to satisfy certain system specifications. The estimated state x̂(t) along with the
reference input R(t) is used to compute the reference tracking error eR(t) and the required
control input uc(t) to reduce the tracking error. In a nominal fault-free system, the re-
inforcement learner is initially trained online with the nominal controller present in the
control loop for improved closed-loop tracking performance [157]. The reward function
for the reinforcement learner is derived from the estimated state x̂(t) and the actor policy
ua(t) such that the actor-critic algorithm assumes the nominal controller as part of the en-
vironment with which it reacts and learns the actor-critic units appropriately. In a system
compromised by faults or in anomalous situations, the TD error δ(t) of the trained nominal
reinforcement learner becomes non-zero indicating exertion of sub-optimal control policy.
The learning algorithm of the actor-critic network is triggered by the non-zero TD error
127
to adapt to a different actor policy by reconfiguring the actor and critic weight vectors wa
and wc such that the return defined by the reward function is maximized in the altered
environment. However, due to the exploratory nature of the actor policy indicated by the
stochastic term nt in (5.14) and the episodic task based updates inherent in reinforcement
learning, the optimal policy can take significant time to converge. The learning accelerator
module is designed and trained to reinitialize the actor-critic weights to reduce the latency
of learning. The schematic of the actor-critic reinforcement learner module is shown in
Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Schematic of the actor-critic based reinforcement learner module
5.2.3 Learning Accelerator Module
The schematic of the learning accelerator module is shown in Figure 5.4. The primary
objective of the accelerator module is to predict actor and critic parameters from the error
signal e(t) along with the reference input R(t) (since the error signal e(t) depends on the
input stimulus to the system). This learning acceleration is accomplished by a pre-trained
probabilistic neural network (PNN) or a recurrent neural network (RNN) depending on
the pre-deployment simulation capabilities and training effort that can be afforded. The
tradeoffs between the two schemes are discussed later.
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Figure 5.4: Schematic of the learning accelerator module. It consists of either a PNN or a
RNN depending on the pre-deployment training cost required
Figure 5.5: Schematic diagram of a PNN
i) PNN - The schematic of a PNN architecture is shown in Figure 5.5. PNNs are func-
tionally similar to k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) models [insert citation] where the basic idea
is to assign a class to an input item depending on the learned classification of training vec-
tors. PNNs are used in this research because it is much faster to train a PNN than a typical
multilayer perceptron network and PNNs are relatively insensitive to outliers [insert cita-
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tion]. The input layer contains N neurons where N is the size of the input vector. After
standardizing the range of input values, the input neurons feed the values to the hidden layer
neurons. The number of neurons in the hidden layer is equal to the number of cases in the
training data set. Each of the neurons stores the input data from the training set along with
the target class. Presented with a new test vector from the input layer, each hidden neuron
computes the `2-norm of the test vector from the neuron’s data and applies a radial basis
function (RBF) to the distance to compute the weight of each training point with respect
to the test data. The next layer consists of one pattern neuron for each target class. The
weighted value from the hidden neuron is fed to the pattern neuron that corresponds to the
neuron’s category. All the class nodes add the values for the category they represent and
finally the decision layer compares the weighted votes for each target class accumulated in
the pattern layer and uses the largest vote to predict the target class for the input data.
Figure 5.6: Schematic diagram of a RNN
ii) RNN - The schematic of an RNN architecture is shown in Figure 5.6. The primary
idea behind RNNs are to exploit sequential information while mapping any functionality.
Unlike traditional feedforward neural networks, RNNs implement a recurrent connection
with a tap delay associated with it. This allows the network to have an infinite dynamic
response to time series input data and integrate ‘memory’ in the learning procedure. The
schematic of an RNN shown in Figure 5.6 shows that it is structurally similar to a feedfor-
ward neural network with an additional feedback of the hidden layer output to the input of
the hidden layer neurons. This enables the learning of nonlinear mapping from a temporal
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data sequence to a target vector associated with each sequence.
With this description of the different components of ALERA, we next focus on the pro-
posed methodology of real-time accelerated self-learning for systems operating in anoma-
lous situations or under arbitrary failure modes.
5.3 Proposed Methodology: Real-time Self-learning
The key idea of the real-time accelerated self-learning is to store pre-learned critic and
weight vectors for a variety of faulty situations and reinitialize the AC unit with the stored
data based on the error signal e(t), thus assisting the learning procedure and applying com-
pensating measures. The proposed methodology of real-time self-learning is categorized
into i) pre-deployment scheme where training of the regression methods in the error de-
tection module, neural networks in the accelerator block and the actor-critic unit in the
reinforcement learner are performed and ii) post-deployment scheme where real-time fast
reconfiguration of applied control is adopted.
5.3.1 Pre-deployment
The primary objective of pre-deployment simulations is to train the components of ALERA
to tackle scenarios with assumed failure mechanisms such that it adapts to unforeseen sit-
uations with low latency. The nominal controller is designed to meet system specifications
of a fault-free system and the reinforcement learner is trained with different inputs R(t)
for achieving tighter reference tracking and ensuring better closed-loop system stability.
During this phase, the AC unit performs episodic experiments on the system and both the
critic and the actor learn the optimal value function V ∗ and policy π∗ with convergence
to nominal weight vectors wc(nom) and w
a
(nom) respectively. The completion of learning
is indicated by the TD error δ(t) converging to zero as discussed in Section 5.1.2. The
MARS regression functions in the error detection module are trained with a set of expected
reference inputs such that the fault-free error signal e(t) is minimal and lies below a cer-
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tain threshold. The training of the error detection module is discussed in details in [TDSC
paper]. Based on the assumed failure models and parametric degradations of the system
(plant, sensors, actuators and mixed-signal interfaces), a finite fault universe is created. A
Monte Carlo sampling of the system is performed over the parameter space of the assumed
fault models, thus generating a set of fault-injected systems. The sampling distribution
and granularity depends on the computational effort required to comprehensively simulate
each fault-injected system. For each of these systems, three features are observed - i) fault
model parameter set, ii) transient error signal along with the system input R(t) for a partic-
ular time duration from the instant of error detection, and iii) TD error δ(t) for the RL unit
during the same duration. Computational overhead and latency of correction procedure are
traded off with diagnosability in determining the observation window length. Observation
of the transient error signal over an elongated duration is helpful in diagnosing the proba-
ble cause of error with higher accuracy but delays the compensation procedure along with
placing higher computational burden on the accelerator module. A regression model is built
with the error and input signal samples as inputs and the fault parameter set as output such
that critical parameters can be predicted from the transient error signal. This regression
model is required only for the PNN-based scheme and is a part of the learning accelerator
module whereas the RNN-based scheme directly operates on the time-series data of the
error signal and the reference input.
The nominal AC unit for a fault-injected system generates non-zero TD signal δ(t)
indicating a sub-optimal policy and starts the self-learning procedure to adapt to new critic
and actor parameter vectors by employing the gradient learning steps of (5.13) and (5.15).
The non-zero TD error trajectory indicates the degree of sub-optimality and signifies how
far the nominal weight vectors wc(nom) and w
a
(nom) are from the new optimal values for
the altered system. Hence the Monte Carlo samples are clustered into L classes in the
fault parameter set based on the summed TD error magnitude during the learning of the
nominal AC network over the chosen time duration. The PNN is trained with the class
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Figure 5.7: Schematic work-flow of the pre-deployment training procedure for both the
PNN and the RNN-based schemes
labels for each Monte Carlo sample. For each of the L clusters, a cluster medoid is selected
to represent one particular fault injected system that best reflects the learning performance
of the nominal AC unit for all the systems in that cluster. Unlike centroids, medoids are
always members of the data set and does not represent a sample that may not be a feasible
system. Next, for each of these L cluster medoids, an optimal AC network is learned such
that the TD error δ(t) converges to zero, thus satisfying the design specifications in presence
of injected faults. Each of the cluster medoids generates a different set of actor and critic
parameter vectors wal and w
c
l ∀ l = 1 to L. The number of clusters L is an important metric
in deciding the benefits achievable through the learning acceleration. With an increase in L,
the number of fault injected systems for which an optimal AC network is learned increases.
However, the computational effort in training a new AC for each of the cluster medoids
also increases along with the memory requirement for storing the AC parameters for each
of those learned units. As the cluster count increases beyond a certain point, the achievable
latency benefits of real-time compensation by reinitializing the Ac unit from pre-stored
individual learned AC weights for each cluster center are not sustainable due to the high
memory requirements. The RNN-based accelerator scheme is proposed to represent the
other end of the spectrum of increasing cluster counts. In the RNN-based scheme, M fault-
injected systems are created by carefully sampling the fault universe. For each of these M
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systems, an optimal AC unit is trained for best control performance generating M different
actor and critic weights wai and w
c
i ∀ i = 1 to M . The RNN is trained with the time
series data of the error signal e(t) along with the input R(t) for each of the M systems
as input data and the respective actor and critic weights as output data. This enables the
RNN to learn a nonlinear mapping from the temporal signal waveform of e(t) and R(t)
such that actor and critic weights can directly be predicted from an arbitrary error signal
data of a fault-injected system without the need for any intermediate parametric diagnosis
and regression model. The schematic work-flow of the pre-deployment training is shown
in Figure 5.7.
5.3.2 Post-deployment
In the post-deployment operational phase, the nominally trained AC unit serves as an aug-
mentation to the nominal controller. In the presence of faults or anomalies, the MPCS
based error detection module generates an error signal e(t) at t = t0 above the prede-
termined threshold, indicating that an error or an unlearned event has occurred. In the
PNN-based accelerator scheme, the pre-trained regression model shown in Figure 5.7 pre-
dicts the critical system parameters from the error signal and system input recorded over a
short time duration until t = t1. During the time duration t0 → t1, the nominal AC unit has
started the reinforcement learning tasks to adapt to the new situation. The PNN categorizes
the system behavior to one of the clusters in the parameter space and the AC network is
initialized with the weight vectors corresponding to that cluster medoid at time t = t2. In
an RNN-based scheme, the RNN is invoked at t = t1 directly with the error e(t) and input
signal as time series data input to compute the actor-critic weights directly. If the TD error
δ(t) increases in magnitude after this reinitialization, it indicates that the AC unit has better
adapted from the learning experience between t0 and t2 and the reinitialization procedure
deteriorates the learning process. In such a situation, the reinitialization is not adopted and
the usual reinforcement learning is continued. However, if the TD error δ(t) magnitude
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reduces due to reinitialization, it indicates an accelerated boost to the learning process and
significantly reduces the exploratory steps needed by the reinforcement learning algorithm
for an affected system. The steps of error detection and control compensation are shown in
Figure 5.8.
Figure 5.8: Detection, Diagnosis and Repair Cycle
5.4 Fault Models
The fault models in this work consider malfunctions in sensors and actuators in addition
with altered physical environment model signifying operational anomaly. The sensor and
actuator faults are modeled [158] as parametric degradations. The nominal controller re-
lies its control computation on the tracking error derived from the sensor measurement and
applies the required action to the plant through actuator mechanism. Any corruption in
the sensor or actuator functionality degrades the system behavior due to the incapability of
the controller to exert appropriate control on the system. Similarly, the control policy is
nominally designed under the assumption of system operating in a set of plausible environ-
mental conditions as all feasible operating conditions cannot be foreseen. Under a different
environmental condition, the nominal control performance is not adequate to achieve com-
plete system functionality with the desired specifications. The fault models are shown in
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Figure and described as
i) Parametric degradations - Sensor and actuator degradations are generally not abrupt
and the performance wear-off is gradual. The mathematical model of temporal degradation
of a parameter p is expressed as:
p̃(t)|t>τp = p(t)|t<τp × αeβ(t−τp) (5.16)
where t = τp is the start of parametric degradation, p(t)|t<τp is the nominal value of param-
eter p before t = τp, p̃(t)|t>τp is the degraded parameter value and α and β denote the de-
gree and rate of degradation. This parametric perturbation model alters the sensor/actuator
parameters p1, p2, · · · , pn into a modified set p̃1, p̃2, · · · , p̃n such that the corresponding
transfer function of the entire system is changed in a way that is not well modeled by
additive disturbances alone.
ii) Operating environment change - With change of operating environment, the system
dynamics shown in Figure 5.2 is altered as,
ẋ(t) = g′(x(t), u(t)) (5.17)
where g′ is the modified system dynamics due to a change in the operating environment.
The nominal controller h(.) and the AC unit are designed and trained for the system dy-
namics g(.) and fail to provide optimal control for the altered dynamics g′(.). Instead of
arbitrarily modifying the function g(.), a different state evolution dynamics is computed to
model the operational anomaly.
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5.5 Test Case I: Inverted Pendulum System
5.5.1 System Description
Figure 5.9: Inverted pendulum system mounted on a cart
Figure 5.9 shows the same block diagram of the inverted pendulum system described
in details in the previous chapter.
5.5.2 Simulation Results
i) Pre-deployment training - The simulation experiments are conducted in Matlab on a Win-
dows PC with 3.10 GHz processor. The pendulum-cart system is simulated with param-
eter values of M = 3 kg, m = 0.2 kg, l = 0.31 m and g = 9.81 m/s2. The hybrid
controller is designed to switch from the nonlinear controller to the state feedback con-
troller for |θ| ≤ 30◦ where θ = 0◦ is the vertically upright position. The linear feedback
controller is designed to achieve 20% maximum overshoot and a 2% settling time of 2
seconds. The appropriate feedback gain K in (4.14) is determined using Ackermann’s for-
mula for pole placement. The measurement noise is modeled by a Gaussian distribution
with mean 0 and standard deviation of 0.1. The normalized Gaussian network based actor
critic method described in Section 5.1.4 is used as the RL controller. For each of the 4
dimensions [θ θ̇ x ẋ], the valid ranges are defined according to the maximum allow-
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able values as: a) θ varies between −π to +π, b) |θ̇|max is selected as 2.5π rad/s, c) the
cart movement is restricted between xmax = ±2.4 and d) the maximum cart velocity is
limited to |ẋ|max = 2. The restrictions on state values are chosen to pose the balancing
task as a constrained optimization problem. The 4-dimensional state space [θ θ̇ x ẋ]
is divided into 10 × 10 × 3 × 3 grid for the critic basis functions. Similarly, the state-
space is divided 10 × 10 × 10 × 10 grid for the actor implementation. Thus, the number
of parameters in the critic weight wc and actor weight wa are 10× 10× 3× 3 = 900 and
10 × 10 × 10 × 10 = 10000. The discount factor γ and the eligibility trace decay param-
eter λ for the value functions are both chosen as 0.5. The two learning rates ηc and ηa are
selected as 0.8. The sigmoid function s(.) implementation in (5.14) is defined from [139]





. The exploration term n(t) in (5.14) is a random perturbation of the
policy with normally distributed zero-mean white noise with standard deviation σ = 2 as
n(t) ∼ N [0, 2]. Exploration is done every fifth step instead of every step [137] to allow for
large exploratory actions while providing sufficient time to the AC controller to learn from
the exploratory actions. The reward r is defined by the function ρ̄(x) = cos θ where the
maximum reward is obtained for θ = 0◦. The actor-critic is trained along with the nominal
controller as shown in Figure 5.2 through episodic experiments. Each episode is 20 sec-
onds long and the balancing is initiated with the pendulum hanging vertically downwards.
In presence of the nominal controller, the restrictions on the states are usually not violated
and the pendulum is finally balanced in a vertical upright position. However, in occasions
a learning episode is terminated due to violation of state restrictions caused by the explo-
ration of actor policy and in such a case, the trial is rewarded with r = −1 to penalize the
corresponding action taken.
After learning the nominal AC controller, the cart-pendulum system is simulated with
100 different initial angles uniformly sampled between θ = 180◦ and θ = 10◦ over 20
seconds of simulation. The sliding temporal window length is selected as 12 samples in
order to accurately map the nonlinear dynamics [TDSC Paper]. The unified variable s(t)
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is selected as s = [y1 y2 u] where y1 and y2 are the two measurements in (4.15). The
function Fm(.) is selected as a linear function Fm(s) = y1 + y2 + u. Thus, a MARS model
with memory depth 12 is trained for implementing Fc(.) such that Fm(s) is predicted from
the past 12 observations. The detection threshold of |enom| = 0.05 is established from the
error distribution for fault-free error signal e(t).
For the pre-deployment training exercise, the fault model is defined as actuator degra-
dations and sensor data corruptions. The torque constant and the back emf constant of the
linear motor is perturbed by a uniform distribution of 35% to create the systems with in-
jected actuator faults. The sensor data in (4.15) is corrupted with a bias selected from a
uniform distribution of 10% to generate systems with sensor faults. A total of 4000 Monte
Carlo samples are created by sampling the fault universe of sensor and actuator faults. For
all these systems, the error signal e(t) is recorded along with the reference input xd(t) for
∆t = 2 seconds. The TD error δ(t) is also recorded for the same duration and the magni-
tudes are summed up to generate a single value as an evaluation of the learning performance
of the nominal AC controller for each fault-injected system. For the PNN-based scheme, a
nonlinear regression model (MARS) is trained with the error signal e(t) and reference input
xd(t) to predict the perturbed parameter set - torque constant, back emf constant and the
sensor output biases. Next, a PNN classifier is used to cluster the 4000 samples on the basis
of the TD error magnitude generated previously into 3 clusters. For each of the clusters, one
medoid sample is chosen to represent all other points in that cluster. For each of the medoid
systems, a new optimal AC controller is trained by performing episodic experiments until
the TD error δ(t) converges to zero, thus relearning how to balance the pendulum in pres-
ence of sensor and actuator errors. The weights of the 3 optimal AC controller for each
cluster center are stored in memory. For the RNN-based scheme, 20 maximally separated
samples are selected from the 4000 Monte Carlo samples such that the 4-dimensional fault
space is reasonably sampled. For each of these 20 fault-injected systems, an optimal AC
controller is learned and an RNN is trained with the time series data of e(t) and xd(t) to
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directly predict the AC weight parameters directly. As the diagnostic information is not
predicted, the RNN requires less temporal data for training to target optimal AC weights.
The clustering and the different AC controllers for the PNN-based scheme are shown in
Figure 5.10.
Figure 5.10: Classification in the parameter space by the PNN and subsequent generation
of representative optimal AC controllers for each of the cluster centers
The subfigure in the right top inset of Figure 5.10 indicates the nominal AC controller
trained for the fault-free system. The different colors demonstrate the varying control force
ua between [-3,+3] imparted in addition to the nominal control uc at different state space
locations. The original state space is 4-dimensional and for visual demonstration, this figure
is a projection of actor policy with changing θ and θ̇ on x− ẋ plane. The classification plot
in Figure 5.10 is also a projection from the 4-dimensional fault parameter space to a 2-
dimensional subspace where the x and y axes show the bias on torque constant and bias
on the sensor output y1. The three optimal actor-critic controllers depicted are relearned on
the fault-injected systems represented by the cluster medoids and they are different from
the nominal one as seen in Figure 5.10.
ii) Post-deployment experiments - For demonstration of the real-time accelerated learn-
ing procedure, fault injection experiments are performed. Firstly, the necessity of a self-
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Figure 5.11: This shows the need of a self-learning assisted controller design where a nom-
inally designed controller is unable to meet system functionality under actuator degradation
learning assisted controller design is demonstrated in Figure 5.11. Only the hybrid con-
troller is used and the augmentation ua(t) from the AC controller is disabled. In the fault-
free system, the nominal controller is able to balance the pendulum vertically at t = 10.83
seconds. An actuator fault of 20% degradation in the torque constant of the motor is grad-
ually injected from t = 0 and the maximum degradation of 20% is complete at t = 4
seconds according to (5.16) (the fault is inserted at a high rate for illustrative purposes).
The red curve shows the angle of the pendulum in presence of the fault. It is seen that the
hybrid controller fails to balance the pendulum in presence of the actuator fault and a self-
learning module is necessary to supplement the nominal controller for providing correction
capabilities.
Figure 5.12 demonstrates the learning acceleration enabled by ALERA-PNN and
ALERA-RNN in comparison to the nominal learning of the augmented controller. The
same 20% actuator degradation is injected as mentioned above. In the fault-free case,
the pendulum is vertically balanced at t = 10.83 seconds. In presence of the actuator
degradation, the pendulum is vertically balanced at t = 28.8 seconds without the
assistance of the learning accelerator module. With the PNN-based learning accelerator
enabled with 3 clusters used for the PNN training, the pendulum gets balanced at t = 13.8
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Figure 5.12: Demonstration of learning acceleration of ALERA in presence of actuator
degradations
Figure 5.13: Comparison of TD error between PNN-based learning enabled and disabled
schemes
seconds, thus accomplishing the desired functionality faster than the nominal learning.
However, the RNN-based learning scheme balances the pendulum at t = 11.05s providing
significantly low latency in adapting to the altered circumstances. The accelerated
learning performance is demonstrated in Figure 5.13. The TD error δ(t) is plotted against
time for both the nominal and accelerated learning scheme for the PNN. The TD error
deviates from zero at t = 0 due to injection of the actuator fault. The AC network with
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pre-learned weight parameters is suboptimal in presence of the fault and the TD error
starts guiding the gradient based reinforcement learning algorithm in both cases. For
the assisted learning scheme, from t = 2s to t = 4s, the MPCS based error signal e(t)
(not shown in figure) that shows non-zero values indicating the presence of errors, is
recorded. From t = 4s to t = 4.6s, the regression model maps the observed error signal
e(t) and reference input xd(t) to the parameter space and then the pre-trained PNN assigns
cluster label 2 to the predicted parameter set. At t = 4.6s, the actor and critic weights
are initialized with the stored value for cluster 2 shown in Figure 5.10 and the TD error
instantly decreases in magnitude from -31.4 to -13.8, thus emphasizing the acceleration
in discovering the optimal parameters through learning. Henceforth, the AC learning
in the acceleration-enabled scheme converges fast at t = 7.2s and manages to balance
the pendulum at t = 13.8s while the nominal AC controller completes its learning at
t = 23.7s and balances the pendulum at t = 28.8s. Defining the time to achieve the
same application level functionality through nominal and assisted schemes as tn and ta
respectively, the application level ‘learning acceleration’ ψ is defined as ψ = tn
ta
. Thus, the




= 6.05. Similarly, the learning




= 81.68. Thus, the
learning acceleration of ALERA-PNN and ALERA-RNN provides a 6.05X and 81.68X
boost for application level compensation respectively.
iii) Analysis and discussion - The learning acceleration ψ depends on how close the
optimal actor-critic weights proposed by the accelerator module are to the actual optimal
values achieved after convergence of learning. As discussed in Section 5.3.1, the cluster
medoid is a representation for all systems in that cluster for which the learning behavior
of the nominal AC is similar. With the increase in the number of clusters, the disparity
between a system close to any cluster boundary and the medoid decreases and the potential
for learning acceleration increases. The performance variation with the increase in cluster
count is depicted in Figure 5.14 along with the upper and lower bounds. 5000 different
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Figure 5.14: Comparison of learning acceleration ψ between PNN and RNN schemes with
PNN variable as number of clusters and RNN variable as number of training sampels
fault-injected systems are created by exhaustive sampling of the 4-dimensional fault space
described previously. For each of those systems, the ALERA-enabled learning acceleration
is applied with the PNN trained with different number of clusters in pre-deployment phase.
The mean acceleration ψ achieved along with the maximum and minimum for each cluster
count is plotted in Figure 5.14. It is seen that ψ increases from 3X to 70X with increase
in the cluster count from 2 to 10. However, the trend shown in Figure 5.14 illustrates that
the rate of increase of ψ is initially high and it starts tapering off after cluster count of 6
showing diminishing benefits with increasing clusters. After 10 clusters, the acceleration
of the RNN-scheme is presented. The RNN interpolates the optimal AC weights depending
on the training received. An RNN trained with 5 data samples provides a mean ψ of 32X
and the acceleration grows up to 80X for training with 50 data samples. However, due to
the interpolation by the RNN based on a few training cases the performance varies widely
with the maximum and minimum bounds gradually reducing with the increasing number
of training data samples.
The memory overhead required along with the machine time consumed for
pre-deployment training is shown in Figure 5.15. It is seen that the required memory
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Figure 5.15: Memory overhead and machine time required for pre-deployment training in
the PNN and RNN based schemes
overhead increases linearly with the number of clusters for the PNN-based scheme.
The depicted memory overhead indicates the space required to store the learned AC
parameters corresponding to each cluster center along with the trained PNN classifier
and the regression model. The RNN-based scheme requires significantly low memory
since only the trained RNN is stored without separately storing any individual AC
parameters. The memory requirement of the RNN is fixed with the number of training
data as only the trained network is stored. Though it may seem from Figure 5.14 and 5.15
that the RNN-based scheme provides high learning acceleration ψ with small memory
requirement, the pre-deployment simulation time necessary to properly train the RNN
is quite large in comparison to the PNN-based schemes. As seen in Figure 5.15, the
RNN-based scheme takes significantly longer time for pre-deployment training than that
of PNN-based scheme. For example, the RNN scheme with only 5 training data samples
takes 3.88 hours of machine time in comparison with 3.75 hours in the PNN scheme
with 10 clusters. This significant machine time requirement is due to two reasons: a) the
training data of the RNN requires the convergence of AC learning for an increased number
of systems and b) since the RNN is trained to directly predict the AC parameters (10900
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output data points) from the time-series data of the error signal e(t) and reference input
(4000 input data points), the training procedure is significantly slower than that of a PNN.
It is seen in Figure 5.15 that the machine time requirement for the RNN-scheme increases
exponentially with the increase in number of training data and quickly becomes infeasible
due to the huge volatile memory requirement during the training of the RNN. Thus, for
applications where pre-deployment simulation is expensive, an RNN-based scheme may
not be feasible despite providing better acceleration than a PNN-based clustering scheme.
Figure 5.16: Variation of learning acceleration ψ for ALERA-PNN and ALERA-RNN with
different degrees of sensor and actuator degradation
Figure 5.16 shows the variation of learning acceleration ψ for the PNN and RNN
schemes in presence of actuator and sensor degradations. It is seen that sensor faults are
more difficult to correct than actuator errors. The data shown is for the ALERA-PNN with
10 clusters and ALERA-RNN with 50 data samples for training. The left portion of Figure
5.16 represents actuator errors ranging between 5%-32% while the right portion denotes
sensor degradations with errors ranging between 1%-7%. It is seen that as the magnitude
of injected faults increases, the learning boost achieved by using ALERA’s acceleration re-
duces for both sensor and actuator errors. For test case I, ψ is shown to be zero at actuator
and sensor degradations of 32% and 10% respectively to indicate that the AC controller
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fails to balance the pendulum and functionality is never achieved with fault magnitudes
equal to or greater than that. This is explained from the fact that the AC controller is used
to augment the nominal controller by providing a supplementary action ua to the nominal
control uc. However, the combined action u = uc + ua has to satisfy the physical limita-
tion of applied control u, defined by umax. This is accomplished by choosing individual
maximum restrictions uc(max) and ua(max) for the nominal and AC controller in the design
phase. The ratio φ = ua(max)
umax
determines the extent of impact that the AC controller ex-
ercises during the reconfiguration. φ = 0 indicates that the nominal controller is solely
responsible for providing adequate control with ua = 0 whereas φ = 1 represents that the
AC controller is completely responsible with uc = 0. The linear and logarithmic variation
of ψ with φ for ALERA-PNN with 10 clusters under different actuator and sensor errors is
shown in Figures 5.17 and 5.18.
Figure 5.17: Linear variation of learning acceleration ψ with φ under different magnitude
of injected actuator errors
Figures 5.17 and 5.18 demonstrate the variation of learning potential ψ with actuator
error magnitude under 5 different values of φ - 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1. The key observations
from this plot are:
1. As φ increases from 0.2 to 1.0, the contribution of the RL controller to the total
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Figure 5.18: Logarithmic variation of learning acceleration ψ with φ under different mag-
nitude of injected actuator errors
control applied to the plant increases. This enhances the extent of self-learning capa-
bilities of the RL controller since it forms a higher portion of the applied control. As
a result, the AC controller is able to tolerate and correct higher magnitude of injected
actuator errors as seen from Figure 5.18. With φ = 0.2, the maximum actuator error
that can be corrected with restoration of system functionality is 32% whereas with
φ = 1.0, the maximum actuator error that can be corrected is 51%.
2. With the increase of φ, the learning acceleration ψ decreases. For example, with
the same 5% actuator error, the learning boost is ≈ 80x with φ = 0.2 whereas with
φ = 0.8 the learning acceleration is only 8x. This is explained from the fact that as φ
increases, the AC controller has to contribute to the bulk of the applied action and has
to perform significant learning resulting in increased time for performance recovery,
thus effectively reducing the learning acceleration achieved.
This analysis demonstrates that there is a trade-off in the choice of the ratio φ. A lower
value of φ will provide self-recovery faster but will correct less errors whereas a higher
value of φ will recover from more severe errors but the adaptation will be slow.
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5.6 Test Case II: Brake-by-Wire System
5.6.1 System Description
Figure 5.19: A brake-by-wire system for a rear-wheel drive vehicle
Figure 5.19 shows the schematic block diagram of the brake-by-wire system described
in details in the previous chapter.
Similar to the previous test case, a nominal AC controller is trained in addition to the
sliding mode controller described above with 500 fault-free episodic simulations of the
vehicle dynamics with different applied pedal forces. The AC controller is provided a
positive reward if the vehicle deceleration v̇x matches the reference input deceleration and
penalized with a negative reward proportional to the tracking error. The reward function
generates the maximum negative reward if the angular speed of any wheel is less than the
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equivalent linear velocity of the vehicle, indicating a potential wheel lock-up condition.
The range of angular speeds for each wheel is defined as 0-100 rad/s with a maximum
linear velocity of 100 mph. The 5-dimensional state space is divided into grids of 10 for
each dimension, thus creating 10×10×10×10×10 = 105 parameters for each of the actor
and critic. However, in this test case, the actor and critic parameter matrices are sparse since
the wheel speeds ωis and the vehicle speed vx are tightly coupled and it’s quite impossible
for the wheels to have completely different angular speeds. The parameter choices of the
reinforcement learning and the sigmoid function selection are the same as in the previous
test case.
5.6.2 Simulation Results










i) Pre-deployment training - The values of the different parameters for the BBW sys-
tem are shown in Table 5.1. The MARS prediction function Fc(.) in the error detection
module is trained with braking data for 1000 different initial vehicle speeds ranging be-
tween 50 mph and 100 mph with the temporal sliding window length chosen as Tp = 6
samples [TDSC paper]. The function Fm is selected to generate the sum of wheel speeds.
A Gaussian distributed measurement noise with mean 0 and standard deviation of 2 rad/s
is assumed while measuring the angular speed ωi of each wheel. For training the learning
accelerator module, the fault model is defined as perturbations in the wheel speed readings
(sensor errors) and corruption of the ECB signal (actuator errors) by altering the applied
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braking torque by 20%. A total of 1000 fault-injection experiments are created and a PNN
classification with 4 clusters is adopted, followed by training of optimal AC controller for
each cluster medoid. For the RNN-based scheme, 50 different fault-injected samples are
created and an optimal AC controller is learned for each of these systems. The RNN is
trained with the time-series data of e(t) for all such systems to directly predict the 105 AC
parameters.
Figure 5.20: Implementing an AC network as the sole controller instead of using in an
augmented setting of ALERA provides 1-2X boost in the learning speed and fails to achieve
the desired braking performance
ii) Post-deployment experiments - Figure 5.20 illustrates a braking situation with
the AC network as the sole controller instead of the augmented scheme (nominal
controller+AC network) as shown in Figure 5.2, in presence of a degraded brake shoe.
The braking is initiated at t = 1s from an initial wheel angular velocity of ω = 90
rad/s, equivalent to linear velocity of 90 mph for a wheel radius of 0.4 m. A brake shoe
degradation of 20% is injected at t = 1.2s, thus reducing the applied braking torque.
In the absence of any fault, the braking event is completed at t = 1.75s with complete
vehicle stoppage. The two different curves represent systems with and without learning
acceleration enabled. Similar to test case 1, the check error signal e(t) (not shown in
Figure) is recorded from t = 1.2s to t = 2.2s and the trained regression model in the
PNN-based scheme estimates a perturbed parameter set in the fault universe from the
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transient waveform. The AC weights are initialized from the stored data corresponding
to the cluster medoid predicted by the PNN at t = 2.5s and learning is resumed from
the new weights and the AC converges at t = 11.42s, thus partially recovering the
braking performance as seen. On the contrary, the unassisted AC controller completes its
relearning at t = 15.4s. From an application level point of view, the stoppage of vehicle
(vx = 0) is completed at 13.4s in the assisted learning scheme compared to 17.8s in the
nominal learning scheme. Since the fault-free stopping is completed at t = 1.75s, a




= 1.37 is achieved. Thus, the learning
acceleration ψ is only 1.37X along with an extra stopping distance of 216.8 ft, thus
endangering the vehicle and failing to achieve the functionality of high-speed braking.
Figure 5.21: The augmented scheme under ALERA achieves the functionality in presence
of 20% of actuator degradation with an additional stopping distance of 10 ft. The RNN-
based scheme provides a 43X acceleration while the PNN-based scheme delivers 4.12X
boost
Figure 5.21 shows the braking performance of the augmented scheme in ALERA where
the AC network is used to supplement the performance of the sliding-mode controller. As
shown in Figure 5.20, the fault-free braking is completed at t = 1.75s. After the actuator
injection, the nonzero TD error δ(t) (not shown in Figure) guides the RL learning in the
unassisted case and the learning completes at 7.2s and completing the vehicle stoppage at
8.1s. In comparison, the ALERA-PNN scheme with 4 clusters completes the learning at
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2.5s and stops the vehicle at 3.3s, thus providing a learning acceleration of ψ = 4.12. The
ALERA-RNN scheme trained with 50 pre-deployment training data completes the learning
at 1.47s and stops the vehicle at 1.9s providing a boost of 43X.
5.7 Test Case III: Self-balancing Robot
5.7.1 System Description
To demonstrate the benefits of the proposed approach, the self-balancing robot described in
the previous chapter is considered. The control algorithm along with the RL controller and
its concomitant modules are implemented on the Atmel microcontroller with the Arduino
programming environment. The actuator fault is injected as a corruption of the motor drive
signal from the two Texas Instruments DRV8838 motor drivers that modify the resulting
torque generated in the two brushed DC motors. The nominal self-balancing algorithm
is a hybrid implementation of a nonlinear swing-up controller and a PID controller. The
nonlinear swing-up controller provides PWM motor drive signals in alternate directions,
thus creating a jerking motion to bring the robot close to vertical, after which the PID
controller takes over for fine balancing around the equilibrium position of θ = 0◦. The
maximum motor speed allowable while attempting to balance the robot is 300 RPM.
5.7.2 Hardware Results
The actuator fault model involves changing the motor drive signal computed in the control
algorithm. This motor drive signal is transmitted from the microcontroller to the motor
drivers that drive the motors with appropriate current. Corrupting the motor drive signal
after the control computation alters the torque generated by the motors and affects the
system operation. The effect of 20% actuator fault is illustrated in Figure 5.22.
Figure 5.22 demonstrates that without error, the robot manages to self-balance in 3s and
stays upright with the angle θ around 0◦. With the injected 20% error, the control algorithm
attempts to swing up the robot and balance itself but fails to accomplish this task. The robot
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Figure 5.22: With 20% injected actuator error, the robot fails to stand up and balance
falls back to the lying down position with angle θ = 110◦ at 3.4s and never manages to rise
up and balance itself.
To implement ALERA in the hardware platform of the balancing robot, the nominal
controller is augmented with a reinforcement learning controller with a ratio φ = 0.33.
The motor drive signal from the nominal controller is restricted at a maximum value of
200 RPM while the RL controller’s maximum value is fixed at 100 RPM. For the check-
ing function implementation, the MARS model trained using the data from 100 balancing
experiments is utilized and a polynomial implementation of the MARS model is adopted.
This polynomial function is used as the checking function for the error detection module in
ALERA. For the RL controller implementation, the 4 states of the system (angle, angular
velocity, position, linear velocity) are discretized in 4 × 4 × 4 × 4 = 256 grid locations
resulting in 256 actor and 256 critic parameter values. 50 hardware episodic experiments
are conducted such that the RL controller learns how to supplement the nominal controller
in the balancing task. The 512 actor and critic parameter values are stored as nominal RL
controller parameters.
The sensor fault model is implemented by changing the DOF data from the accelerom-
eter and the gyroscope along with corruption of the quadrature encoder readings. As de-
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scribed previously, the actuator fault model involves changing the motor drive signals. For
practical feasibility purpose, the fault model space is restricted to data corruptions in 3
measurements - i) the z-axis data from the accelerometer (alters the angular velocity), ii)
the quadrature encoder readings signifying the rpm of the motors (alters the linear speed)
and iii) the motor drive signals (alters the applied torque to the motor). 40 different points
are sampled uniformly in this 3-dimensional space with a maximum deviation of 25% of
the nominal values. For all these 40 configurations, the robot fails to balance using the
nominal RL parameters. As described in Section 5.3.1, the error signal is recorded for
1 second and a regression model is trained in Matlab to predict the fault parameters that
represent the bias in the measurement and actuation values for the fault models described
above. A clustering is performed based on the TD error data recorded for 1s from the nom-
inal RL balancing effort. The 40 points are clustered in the fault parameter space based on
the TD error data into 5 clusters and 5 different medoid points are chosen to represent each
of the clusters. For each of these 5 fault configurations, the learning of the RL controller is
allowed such that it relearns to balance the robot in presence of the injected errors. After
the 5 RL controllers converge, the resulting AC parameter values are recorded and stored.
The regression model for predicting the parameter values and the classifier required
to cluster these points are impossible to implement in the Arduino microcontroller due to
lack of processing power and on-board memory required to implement these algorithms.
Hence, as a simplified alternative, a `2-norm based matching algorithm is adopted. The
256 parameter values for the 5 optimal AC controllers along with the error signals for
the fault sets they represent are stored in the flash memory of the microcontroller. In actual
operation, the `2-norm of the recorded error signal is compared with the stored error signals
and the AC parameters for the closest matching error signal is chosen as the bootstrapped
version of the RL controller. The balancing efforts with disabling and enabling of ALERA
are shown in Figure 5.23.
In the ALERA disabled scheme, the learning of the RL controller starts from the nomi-
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Figure 5.23: Demonstration of the accelerated learning enabled by ALERA: the robot is
balanced significantly faster than the nominal learning procedure of the RL controller by
bootstrapping the learning using the error signal
nally learned values and through repeated episodic tasks, the learning converges effectively
relearning to balance the robot as seen in Figure 5.23. In the ALERA enabled scheme, in
the first effort as the robot fails to balance itself, the error signal is recorded for 1s and the
matching algorithm bootstraps the actor-critic learning by reinitializing the parameter val-
ues from the stored repository. It is seen in Figure 5.23 that the robot gets balanced in the
2nd attempt after reinitialization of the actor-critic parameter values. The nominal fault-
free balancing is accomplished at 3s while the ALERA-disabled scheme balances it at 23.8s
after 4 episodic experiments. The ALERA-enabled scheme manages to balance the robot at





This demonstrates that a learning boost of 3.3x is achieved in the actual hardware experi-
ments using the assisted learning scheme of ALERA.
5.8 Summary
In this work, a real-time self-learning methodology for error correction and control law
adaptation in nonlinear control systems is presented. Reinforcement learning algorithm is
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proposed as an augmentation to a classical nonlinear controller to provide self-learning ca-
pabilities. The error detection methodology presented in the previous chapter is exploited
to bootstrap the learning process, thus accelerating the recovery of system performance.
Simulation results on two nonlinear test cases as well as hardware results strongly demon-
strate the effectiveness and benefits of the proposed research. The different analysis of




DETECTION, DIAGNOSIS AND MITIGATION OF SECURITY ATTACKS IN
CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
6.1 Introduction
In this work, we focus on electric power grid as an example of cyber-physical systems. A
power grid consists of four major components: i) generation produces the electric energy
from different sources such as fossil fuels, hydro-electric forces, nuclear reactions and in re-
cent times, from wind, solar and tidal forces; ii) transmission transfers the generated power
through a very high voltage infrastructure; iii) distribution delivers the power for consump-
tion; and iv) consumption uses the electrical energy for industrial, commercial and residen-
tial purposes. The smart grid integrates communication and information technologies with
the physical processes to provide better “situational awareness” for efficient and intelligent
demand handling methods, enabling a drastic cost reduction for both power generation and
consumption. However, such reliance on communication networks to transmit measure-
ments and control packets increases the possibility of adversarial attacks. Cyber-physical
security involves both information security mechanisms and system-theoretic methods. In-
formation security methods such as authentication, access control, encryption protocols
and data integrity are insufficient since these techniques do not exploit the compatibility of
system data with the underlying physical process and control architecture. For example, the
Stuxnet attack[54–56] that infected an Iranian nuclear-enrichment plant in 2010, corrupted
the centrifuges’ measurements to indicate routine operation while simultaneously modify-
ing the centrifuges’ actuation signals to enforce complete destruction. This illustrates the
necessity of a integrated procedure combining cyber and physical protection methods to
ensure cyber-physical security. In this work, we propose physical security methods from a
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control-theoretic perspective for attack detection and mitigation.
Modern smart grids are controlled by two primary mechanisms - i) a supervisory con-
trol and data acquisition (SCADA) system; and ii) an energy management system (EMS).
The SCADA system collects operational data from an extensive sensor network dispersed
over the entire power grid and performs state estimation, contingency analysis and opti-
mal power flow computation. The EMS processes the SCADA data for generation control
and scheduling applications to satisfy the power requirements of the network in an optimal
manner. The cyber-infrastructure forming the backbone of SCADA and EMS is vulnerable
from security attacks carefully designed to evade common detection schemes of such sys-
tems. For state estimation, continuous power flow measurements along network branches
are taken by remote terminal units (RTUs) and relayed back to the control center. In a power
grid, the state variables are bus voltage angles and magnitudes. The measurements include
active and reactive power flows along the branches and active and reactive power injections
at the buses. Power system state estimation (PSSE) methods previously employed static
estimation techniques such as the weighted least squares (WLS)[159–161] that rely on data
received intermittently from the RTUs (typically 2-4s interval). With the advent of phasor
measurement units (PMUs) that measure the temporal voltage and current profiles using a
common synchronization time source, dynamic state estimation techniques[162–166] have
been proposed that incorporate the PMU measurements in the WLS state estimation. How-
ever, the heavy bandwidth requirement and high initial capital cost have prevented the
pervasive deployment of PMUs with ongoing research targeting optimal PMU placements
[167, 168] and data compression techniques[169]. Typically, PSSE methods perform state
estimation from the measurements only instead of incorporating the knowledge of system
dynamics because a sufficiently accurate dynamic model of the entire network is difficult
to obtain and even if such a model exists, the required computational effort renders the
exercise infeasible. The malicious attack injections exploit these vulnerabilities and are
crafted to bypass existing detection capabilities, thus misguiding the state estimation meth-
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ods and disrupting regular system operation. Inspired from the use of encoded check states
for error detection in linear [125] and nonlinear [170] control systems, this work proposes
a comprehensive framework for low latency attack detection, diagnosis and recovery for
security attacks on these power grids instead of separate techniques for each attack type as
reported in all previous work.
Primary Contributions: The primary contributions and benefits of this research in com-
parison to prior work are:
i) Low latency detection - The proposed scheme uses encoded check states for detection
of security attacks in power grids with low latency.
ii) Resilience to counterattacks - It is demonstrated that the proposed methodology is
highly resilient to adversarial counter-attacks. The attacker needs complete knowledge of
power grid dynamics to be able to reverse-engineer the detection mechanism and a simple
scheme is mentioned to thwart any brute-force approaches. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, no other work has ever undertaken an effort to consider adversarial counter-
strategies to undermine the efficacy of any detection scheme.
iii) Low latency diagnosis and recovery - We propose check state assisted diagnosis
and recovery methodologies with significantly reduced latency in comparison to previous
works.
iv) Low complexity - The complexity of the proposed diagnosis algorithm is O(n)
where n is the number of states in the system. This is significantly smaller than O(nk)
reported in prior work, where k is the number of sensors/actuators under attack.
v) Extensive simulation - Finally, we emphasize the impact of our proposed research
with simulation of IEEE benchmark power systems and massive European high voltage
distributed power grids. Previous works have not considered how the competing schemes
scale up with the size of the power grids.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the related work
on security attacks in cyber-physical systems and highlights the primary contributions of
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this research. In section 6.3 we provide an overview of a cyber-physical system and math-
ematically formulate the problem of security attack detection, diagnosis and mitigation.
Section 6.4 discusses the preliminary ideas of state estimation in power grids. The differ-
ent security attack models considered in this work are described in Section 6.5. Sections
6.6 and 6.7 details the proposed detection and mitigation schemes. Simulation results are
presented in Section 6.8.
6.2 Prior Work
In [171], Amin et al. first define deception and denial-of-service attacks against any net-
worked control system. Deception attacks corrupt the integrity of control and measurement
packets by altering the sensor and actuator communications. Denial-of-service attacks, in-
stead, compromise the resource availability by communication jamming. Liu et al.[172]
introduce false data injection (FDI) attacks against DC state estimators for power grids in
2009. These are stealthy deception attacks in which an attacker exploits the power sys-
tem configuration to inject sensor errors that bypass traditional detection techniques. Later
on, Hug and Giampapa[173] focus on FDI attacks on AC state estimation and discuss the
attack strategies from an adversarial perspective. Recent works[174–176] have further ex-
panded the discussion on FDI attacks against AC state estimation. In [177, 178] Sinopoli
et al. discuss another type of attack known as replay attack against control systems. These
attacks are executed by repeating pre-recorded measurements while injecting exogenous
signals into the system. It is shown that these attacks can be detected by injecting random
control signal unknown to the attacker, though the feasibility of such random signal injec-
tions has not been studied in power grids. Smith described a potent form of attack known
as covert attack[179] in which the adversary is able to alter the plant behavior by a de-
coupling structure, while modifying the sensor signals to remain undetected. This requires
an omniscient attacker to know the system dynamics and measurement topology and gain
complete interception capabilities over all sensor and actuator communications that may
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not be feasible in power grids due to the sheer scale of entire system operation. In addition,
different works[180–182] have focused on other attack modes on sensor measurements that
corrupt the system states. Recently, power researchers have studied a new form of attack
known as topology attack[183, 184]. This attack targets the network topology data used
in various data processing modules in the EMS. Changes in this topology data can result
in incorrect generation control with potentially disastrous consequences. The attacker al-
ters the measurements and line status information to make it appear that the corresponding
line is not active at the control center via SCADA data. The fundamental mechanism of
all these attacks is to corrupt the system states directly (through actuation compromise) or
indirectly by state estimation inaccuracy (through sensor data alteration) while concealing
intrusion footprints.
As countermeasures, all previous research has targeted some form of secure state esti-
mation designed for specific attacks. Sastry et al.[185] first explored the problem of state
estimation in control systems over unreliable communication networks where packet trans-
mission is not trustworthy. The disturbances are however modeled as stochastic distribu-
tions that does not capture an intelligent attacker behavior. The fundamental limitations
of attack detection and diagnosis are studied by Pasqualetti et al. in [186, 187] for linear
systems and specifically for power networks. The authors propose centralized and de-
centralized filters for attack detection and identification. These filters are computationally
expensive and difficult to implement as pointed out in [188]. Bobba et al. demonstrated
in [189] that a strategically selected basic set of measurements needs to be protected to
thwart least-effort adversarial attacks. This ensures that the attacker will require consider-
able resources to launch a successful attack. Recently, sparse optimization techniques have
evolved as promising tools in secure state estimation [188, 190] where the state estimation
is posed as an `0-norm minimization problem. Though the theoretical and algorithmic as-
pects are of sound nature, the secure estimation methods are proposed without tackling the
attack detection problem. In addition, the mitigation latency of proposed techniques has not
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been mentioned. Li et al.[191] recently proposed a methodology for quickest attack detec-
tion in a centralized and distributed manner. Firstly, the authors assume that attackers have
limited information about network topology and are unable to design undetectable attack
vectors and secondly, they assume that such adversaries have limited resources to access
the sensor communications. With ever-increasing adversarial capabilities, these assump-
tions may not hold true for future intelligent attackers. Additionally, the effect of shifting
noise statistic on the detection and mitigation accuracies has not been explored properly.
The present research aims to propose a comprehensive detection, diagnosis and mitigation
mechanism without enforcing any restricting assumptions on attackers.
Mathematical Notations
Here, we define the notations used in this paper. <n defines the n-dimensional real space.
x ∈ <n indicates that x is an n-dimensional real vector [x1, x2, · · · , xn]ᵀ. ||x||0, ||x||1 and
||x||2 are the L0-norm, L1-norm and L2-norm of the vector x. Φ defines a null set. A
diagonal matrix is indicated by diag(z1, z2, · · · , zn) where the off-diagonal elements are 0
and the diagonal elements are z1, z2, · · · , zn. The support of a vector x ∈ <n is the set of
nonzero components of the vector x and denoted as supp(x) = {i ∈ {1, · · · , n}|xi 6= 0}.
6.3 Problem Description
In this section, we provide the problem definition of detection of security attacks and the
requirements of a mitigation scheme to avert catastrophic damage.
6.3.1 System Overview
We first introduce the architecture of a centralized cyberphysical system and then describe
how a distributed system such as a power grid works.
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i) Centralized System
We describe a block diagram of a cyberphysical system and then show how a power
grid is implemented as a distributed system.
Figure 6.1: Block diagram of a centralized cyberphysical system
In Figure 6.1, the physical plant represents the actual process that needs to be controlled.
The dynamics for a linear system is represented by the following state equations:
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) (6.1a)
y(t) = Hx(t) (6.1b)
where x(t) ∈ <n and u(t) ∈ <m denote the system states and the plant input, respectively.
The plant output is designated as y(t) ∈ <p. The matrices A ∈ <n×n, B ∈ <n×m and H ∈
<p×n completely define and model the linear physical plant in accordance with equations
(6.1a) and (6.1b).
The plant is driven by the actuation signal u(t) over hardware links that connect the
plant and the actuators. The output signal y(t) from the plant is measured through sensors
over similar hardware links. The sensors and actuators transmit signals over communica-
tion links to the control software. These signal transmissions are vulnerable to external
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security attacks from malicious adversaries. The corrupted measurement received by the
control software is denoted by z(t) and modeled as
z(t) = y(t) + ay(t) (6.2)
where ay(t) is the sensor attack signal. Similarly, the actuator attack signal ax(t) corrupts
the control signal as
u(t) = c(t) + ax(t) (6.3)
The primary reason of separating output signal y(t) and measurement signal z(t) as
well as actuation signal u(t) and control signal c(t) is to explicitly enforce the hardware-
software interface present in cyberphysical systems indicating that specific hardware com-
ponents are isolated from the cyber-layer and cannot be remotely hacked.
Within the control software module, the state estimator estimates the plant states from
the measurement z(t) as
x̂(t) = P (z(t)) (6.4)
where x̂(t) and P (.) denote the estimated states and the state estimation algorithm, respec-
tively. The estimated state trajectory x̂(t) ∀t and the desired set point input r(t) are used
by the control algorithm to compute the appropriate control signal as
c(t) = fc(x̂(t), r(t)) (6.5)
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where fc(.) denotes the implemented control algorithm. In addition, the control software
module also performs other encryption and data integrity functions.
ii) Distributed System
Figure 6.2: Block diagram of a distributed cyberphysical system
Figure 6.2 show the block diagram for a distributed cyberphysical system. Most often,
huge cyberphysical systems are distributed over wide geographical areas and the physical
plant as well as the sensor nodes are not restricted to a single location. The primary dif-
ference between a centralized and a distributed system is that there are Nb sensor blocks
measuring the outputs of the distributed plant instead of a single sensor block. Each of the
blocks has an independent measurement index set bi ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , p}∀ i = 1 to Nb as a
subset of the complete measurement set and indicates the outputs sensed by that particular
block. For example, a system with 8 measurements and 2 blocks with measurement in-
dex sets {1, 2, 6, 7} and {3, 4, 5, 8} indicates that block 1 senses y1, y2, y6 and y7 whereas
block 2 senses y3, y4, y5 and y8. The sensed output and transmitted measurement of block
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i are represented by y|bi(t) and z|bi(t) respectively. The central controller forms the com-





In the absence of security attacks, there is no deviation of the plant performance from
the desired trend and the state trajectory follows the intended direction. The estimated
state trajectory x̂(t) tracks the actual plant state trajectory x(t) closely. The accurate state
estimation results in the generation of accurate control signal that is imparted to the plant
through the actuators.
In the presence of security attacks, the system states start deviating from the desired
trajectory. This occurs due to two primary reasons: i) Firstly, in presence of sensor attacks,
the measurements are corrupted and hence the estimated states are different from the ac-
tual system states. The control signal is computed based on the erroneous estimated states
and hence an incorrect actuation is imparted to the plant leading to deterioration in per-
formance. ii) Secondly, in presence of actuator attacks, the plant is driven by a malicious
signal instead of the control signal generated from the controller resulting in incorrect plant
states causing eventual system damage. Practical attack strategies typically contain both
modes as discussed further in Section 6.5. The detection, diagnosis and recovery problems
in presence of security attacks are posed as:
Detection: Develop a methodology that detects any external attacks with low latency.
Diagnosis: Identify the sensor and actuator nodes under attack so that appropriate mit-
igation schemes can be applied.
Recovery: Generate the true state estimate from the compromised measurements z(t)
in presence of security attacks such that accurate control signal c(t) can be applied to the




In the control module of the power grids, the PSSE methods perform state estimation from
the received measurements. These state estimates are utilized to compute the optimal gener-
ation dispatch by solving an AC power flow model[192, 193] where both active and reactive
powers are considered. The state variables x and measurements z are related through the
nonlinear model
z = h(x) + n (6.6)
where h(x) is a nonlinear measurement function of state variable x. The term n denotes
measurement noise with well-modeled probability distribution. In large power systems,
performing optimal network flow analysis using AC power flow model at each time instant
is computationally prohibitive (due to nonlinear equation solving) and impractical in most
situations. Typically, there are incessant small load perturbations around a fixed operating
point and hence a linearized power flow model known as DC power flow model[194] is
utilized for state estimation. Employing the DC power flow model modifies (6.6) into
z = Hx + n (6.7)
where H ∈ <p×n is the measurement matrix obtained from the Jacobian of the function
h(x) for a particular operating point. With the measurement noise having a Gaussian dis-
tribution with zero mean and known non-zero variances, the maximum likelihood estima-
tor[195] is given as
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x̂ = (HᵀWH)−1HᵀWz (6.8)
where W is a diagonal matrix with the diagonal elements as reciprocals of noise variances,
W = diag(σ−21 , σ
−2
2 , · · · , σ−2p ) with σ2i as the variance of the i-th sensor measurement
noise
The error detection is typically performed by a bad data detector[194, 196] that checks
for any digression of estimated state variables away from their true values. This is com-
puted by the measurement residual defined as er = z −Hx̂. This term computes the dif-
ference between the observed measurements and the measurements corresponding to the
estimated states. The presence of bad measurements is identified by checking if ||er||2 > τ ,
where τ is a real threshold. The error coverage solely depends on the selection of τ and this
is done through statistical measures such as hypothesis test[195]. Bad data detectors are
very efficient in detecting outliers and abnormal measurements. In section 6.5, we discuss
how attack vectors can be carefully designed to remain undetected by this technique.
Figure 6.3: IEEE 9-bus system
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6.4.2 Test Cases
For this work, we conduct experiments using the IEEE benchmark test systems. The config-
uration of the systems are extracted using MATPOWER, an open-source MATLAB pack-
age for solving power flow problems[197]. As a sample test case, the IEEE 9-bus system
is shown in Figure 6.3. 3 generators are connected to buses 1, 2 and 3. Buses 5, 6, and 8
are load buses where power is withdrawn from the network. The other buses are used for
routing power through the network. The connections between the buses form the branches.
6.4.3 Example Case
In order to explain the proposed methodologies of this research, a system is
considered with 5 states as x = [x1 x2 x3 x4 x5]ᵀ and 8 measurements as
y = [y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 y8]
ᵀ. The measurement matrix H is defined in the
measurement equation as
y = Hx (6.9)
=
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6.5 Security Attack Models
Prior to defining the security attack models, we assume the following capabilities and re-
strictions of an attacker:
1. Attacker has knowledge of the measurement matrix H for one or more operating
points prior to launching attacks.
2. Attacker does not have knowledge of the power grid dynamics and cannot compute
the measurement matrix H by linearizing around any arbitrary operating point.
3. Attacker has sufficient computational resources to generate attack vectors
4. Attacker has the cyber-capability to intercept sensor and actuator communications
and inject his own attack vectors into the data transmissions.
5. Attacker doesn’t have physical access to the power grid infrastructure and is unable
to perform physical compromise (damage to generators/transformers) to the system.
A complete attack vector is modeled as a(t) = [ax(t), ay(t)] ∈ <m+p (henceforth,
we drop the time designation t unless explicitly needed) where ax and ay are actuator
and sensor attack vectors respectively. The actuator attack [ax,0]ᵀ directly affects the
system dynamics and the sensor attack [0, ay]ᵀ corrupts the measurements. Two different
attack sets Kx and Ky are defined for actuator and sensor attacks. An attack set is defined
as the index set for which the entries of the attack vector are non-zero over time. For
example, if the sensor attack set is Ky = {4, p − 1}, then the attack signal is defined as
ay = [0, 0, 0, a4, 0, · · · , 0, ap−1, 0], i.e. only the 4th and (p−1)th sensors are compromised.
We describe the cardinality of an attack set as |K| that defines the number of nodes under
attack. This redefines the diagnosis problem posed before as:




We define two attack types that are particular instances of the general framework intro-
duced: i) stealth attacks where only sensors are affected, and ii) replay attacks where both
sensors and actuators are affected. There is no viable attack scheme where only actuators
are compromised since without sensor attacks the footprints of actuator attacks are detected
in the measurements.
1) Stealth Attack: A stealth attack is a form of sensor attack in which the attacker
modifies some or all sensor measurements by gaining access to the communication chan-
nels. This is modeled by the attack vector a = [0, ay]ᵀ with attack sets Kx = Φ and
Ky ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , p} (only the measurements are compromised). The sensor nodes under
attack are identified by the non-zero indexes of the attack set. Stealth attacks have two
important features. First, they can be designed with the knowledge of the measurement
topology only without any information about the system dynamics and second, they are
undetectable by bad data detector[194, 196] described previously.
2) Replay Attack: A replay attack is a combined sensor and actuator attack scheme
characterized by three primary actions of the attacker: i) the attacker records the system
outputs and inputs corresponding to a nominal state of operation, ii) next, the attacker
waits to observe similar actuator inputs and corrupts them to disrupt the system dynamics,
and iii) finally, the sensor measurements are altered to replicate previously recorded mea-
surements corresponding to nominal operating conditions. Replay attacks are modeled as
a = [ax,−H(xa) + H(x)]ᵀ where xa and x are compromised system states under attack
and nominal states without attack, respectively. Replay attacks can be carried out without
any knowledge of system dynamics, similar to stealth attacks, but this requires the attacker
to gain access to actuators in addition to all sensor nodes.
The security attacks are depicted as block diagram models in Figure 6.4. We next
discuss the generation strategies of these attacks.
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Figure 6.4: Schematic Diagram of the different attack models: Blocks in red denote at-
tacker actions
6.5.2 Attack Generation Strategies
1) Stealth Attack: The basic principle of stealth attack, also known as false data injection
attack[172], is to inject an attack vector that lies in the column space of the measurement
matrixH , thus ensuring that the additional error stays in the null space of the residual based
error detection scheme and is undetectable.
Let z be the attack-free measurement with the correct estimated state as x̂. In absence
of attacks, the residual er = ||z−Hx̂||2 ≤ τ , where τ is the detection threshold. Suppose,
with the injection of an attack a, the corrupted measurement is za = z + a that results
in the erroneous state estimate x̂a = x̂ + c where c reflects the state estimation error. It
can be shown[172] that if the attack vector a is generated to lie in the column space of H
as a = Hc with c as any arbitrary non-zero vector, it is undetectable by residual based
detectors. This can be proved in computing the measurement residual as
||za −Hx̂a||2 = ||z + a−H(x̂ + c)||2
= ||(z−Hx̂) + (a−Hc)||2
= ||z−Hx̂||2 ≤ τ (6.11)
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Hence, the corrupted measurement za will be undetectable through the bad data detector.
From practical perspective, the attacker rarely has access to all sensor nodes and can only
compromise a subset of the sensor nodes defined by the attack setKy. The generation of the
stealth attacks has been described in details in [172] and briefly summarized in Algorithm
6 described in Appendix C.
2) Replay Attack - For replay attack, an attacker collects measurement data before
launching an attack. Suppose the attacker has recorded measurement data for Tr time
samples from a previous arbitrary time instant t = tp along with the historical load demand
data. Let the pre-recorded measurement data be zp(t) for t = tp, tp + 1, · · · , tp + Tr − 1.
A replay attack is launched by the attacker when the present load pattern resembles the
pre-recorded load pattern such that the attack injection does not trigger any watchdog
mechanism designed to identify abnormal power flow variations. At the moment of at-
tack injection, say at time t = t0, the attacker replaces the actual sensor measurement data
with the pre-recorded data as z(t = t0) = zp(t = tp). Simultaneously, the attacker injects
malicious signals in the actuation data and these can be chosen as any arbitrary signal as
ax(t = t0) = f(t) where f(t) can be any chosen vector function. The substitution of the
measurements with pre-recorded sensor data ensures that the state estimation techniques
don’t detect any irregularity in system operation while the disruptive effect of actuator at-
tack is underway. The attack injection continues with the adversary continually replacing
the sensor data with pre-recorded measurements while corrupting actuation signals.
6.6 Proposed Attack Detection Methodology
The primary objective of an attack detection scheme is to generate a non-zero error signal
in presence of external security intrusions. First, we propose a methodology for detection
of security attacks in a centralized system of Figure 6.1 and then present a hierarchical
architecture for distributed systems of Figure 6.2.
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6.6.1 Centralized Detection
Figure 6.5: Proposed error detection methodology for security attacks
Figure 6.5 demonstrates the block diagram of proposed error detection methodology
for security attacks. The key feature of this scheme is to perform a state estimation from
the measurement y(t) in close proximity to the actual physical system and generate an
encoded check state that is transmitted back to the supervisory control module. This lo-
cal implementation of state estimator and encoder is designed such that the inputs for this
module can be tapped from the actual sensors. The local block is implemented on a secure
hardware platform or a software module in a highly secure environment to ensure that ex-
ternal security attacks cannot affect the operation of this module. The local state estimation
is performed as
x̂l(t) = Pl(y(t)) (6.12)
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where x̂l(t) is the local estimated state and Pl(.) is the local implementation of the state
estimator. For example, in the DC state estimation of power grids, Pl(.) implements the
maximum likelihood estimator in (6.8). In a generic cyber-physical system, Pl(.) imple-
ments Kalman filter or similar state estimators. A local encoder computes a check state
from the local estimated states x̂l(t) as
el(t) = fl(x̂l(t)) (6.13)
where el(t) is the local check state and fl(.) is the local encoding function. el(t) is a single
encoded check state generated from the n estimated states. In addition to the sensor signals,
this local check state el(t) is also transmitted to the control software over communication
links. The control software estimates the states from z(t) in accordance with (6.4) as x̂(t)
that are redefined here as x̂d(t) to indicate the distant estimated states (in contrast with
local estimated states x̂l(t)). The central controller computes a separate encoded state from
x̂d(t), known as the distant check state as,
ed(t) = fd(x̂d(t)) (6.14)
where ed(t) is the distant check state and fd(.) is the implemented encoding. The central-
ized error detection block compares the received local check state el(t) and the generated
distant check state ed(t) to form the error signal e(t) defined as
e(t) , ed(t)− el(t) (6.15)
Under nominal operating conditions without any external attacks, the output signal y(t)
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is the same as the measured signal z(t). If noise sources have well-modeled probability
distributions, the local estimated state x̂l(t) and the distant estimated state x̂d(t) are also
equal. Enforcing proper selection of fl(.) and fd(.) leads to the same check states generated
both locally and distantly. Hence the error signal e(t) is zero. From a practical perspective,
the nominal error signal lies within a small threshold due to noise. Under security attacks,
the local and distant estimated states are different since these are computed from unattacked
and attacked measurement signals. Hence, the local check state el(t) and the distant check
state ed(t) are dissimilar due to difference in estimated states x̂d(t) and x̂l(t), resulting in
non-zero error signal e(t).
The simplest choice of encoding function fl(.) in (6.13) is a row vector
α = [α1, α2, · · · , αn] with linear weights αi ∈ <. Similarly, the distant
encoder also implements the function fd(.) with a separate row vector
β = [β1, β2, · · · , βn] with βi ∈ <. With α = β, the error signal e(t) in (6.22) is zero
in the absence of any attacks, since both the local and distant estimated states are also same.
Example: For the system mentioned in 6.4.3, the local state estimator predicts the state
vector x̂l from the measurements y as
x̂l = [x̂1(l) x̂2(l) x̂3(l) x̂4(l) x̂5(l)]
ᵀ (6.16)
= Pl(y) = (H
ᵀWlH)
−1HᵀWly (6.17)
where Wl is the noise covariance matrix of y(t). The local check state el(t) is computed
using the coding vector α = [α1 α2 α3 α4 α5] as
el = α1x̂1(l) + α2x̂2(l) + α3x̂3(l) + α4x̂4(l) + α5x̂5(l) (6.18)
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In presence of sensor attacks, the central controller receives the corrupt signal z(t) =
y(t) + ay(t). The predicted state by the estimator in the central controller is given as,
x̂d = [x̂1(d) x̂2(d) x̂3(d) x̂4(d) x̂5(d)]
ᵀ (6.19)
= Pd(z) = (H
ᵀWdH)
−1HᵀWdz (6.20)
where Wd is the noise covariance matrix of z(t).
The distant check state ed(t) computed by the central controller using the linear coding
vector β = [β1 β2 β3 β4 β5] is given as
ed = β1x̂1(d) + β2x̂2(d) + β3x̂3(d) + β4x̂4(d) + β5x̂5(d) (6.21)
The central error detection module generates the error signal e(t) as
e(t) , ed(t)− el(t) (6.22)
Without any external attacks, y(t) = z(t) and hence x̂l(t) = x̂d(t). If α = β, then the
two check states el(t) and ed(t) are equal and hence e = 0. If y(t) 6= z(t), then the two
check states are unequal and e(t) 6= 0.
6.6.2 Distributed Detection
For a distributed cyberphysical system, the local state estimator and encoder in Figure
6.5 needs to be located in close proximity to the individual sensor measurement blocks
of Figure 6.2. In this work, we refer “area” as a region small enough such that a single
control center is sufficient to manage the operation. In systems of enormous size, such as
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Figure 6.6: Distributed Architecture for detection of security attacks in a single area
the Eastern Interconnection Grid spanning several states in USA, the entire cyber-physical
system is divided into different areas, each with its own control center. The areas exchange
information between neighboring areas and control the entire operation in a distributed
manner. First, we propose error detection in a single area architecture as illustrated in
Figure 6.6 and next we extend the concept to a multi-area setting.
In figure 6.6, the sensors access the distributed plant in different blocks separated from
each other. Each of the Nb blocks has two sets associated with it: i) measurement index
set bi previously described in Section 6.3.1 and ii) state index set si ∀i = 1 to Nb. The
measurement index set bi determines the outputs that are sensed in each block and the
state index set determines the subset of the system states x that can be estimated in each
block. Due to the geographical spread, the measurement matrix H is typically sparse and
individual measurements of the output vector y depend on a small subset of the state vector
x. The number of sensors grouped in each block depends on the actual physical plant
installation and the sensor locations.
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For i = 1 to Nb, the i-th local block takes as input, the measurements of the i-th block
y|bi. From the measurements, the ith local block estimates a subset of the system states as
x̂l|si and the encoder computes the local check state as,
el(i) = fl(i)(x̂l|si) (6.23)
where el(i) is the check state generated by the i-th local block, fl(i) is the encoding mech-
anism of the i-th local block and x̂l|si are the local estimation of states indexed by si. All
the local blocks transmit their respective check states el(i)s to the central control center.
The central controller has complete knowledge of the measurement index sets bis and state
index sets sis for all the blocks. After receiving all the measurements y|bi ∀i = 1 to Nb,
the controller estimates the entire system state x̂d and computes the distant check state in
the usual fashion as ed = fd(x̂d). The error signal is finally computed as,
e(t) = ed(t)− fe(el(1)(t), el(2)(t), · · · , el(Nb)(t)) (6.24)
where fe(.) is an appropriate transformation that determines the weights assigned to each
local check state el(i)s.
The functions fl(i)(.) ∀i = 1 to Nb, fd(.) and fe(.) are carefully chosen such that under
nominal conditions without attack, the error signal defined in (6.24) lies close to zero. The
distributed detection methodology is presented in Algorithm 3 where the sparsity of the
measurement matrix H is exploited to determine the state index sets thus indicating the
states that can be estimated in each block. The execution of the algorithm is provided in a
following example.
For the single-area distributed detection, the state index set si ∀i = 1 to Nb is defined
as an n-length vector si = [si1, si2, · · · , sin] where the j-th entry sij is 1 if state xj can be
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Algorithm 3 Distributed Detection
1: procedure DIST DETECT
2: Nb ← number of blocks
3: for do i = 1 to Nb
4: bi ← measurement set of block i
5: fl(i) ← local encoding of block i
6: Hi ← rows of H indexed by bi
7: Hi ← zero columns removed from Hi
8: si ← column indexes of Hi from H’s indexing
9: x̂l|si ← local state estimate indexed by si
10: el(i) = fl(i)(x̂l|si)
11: fd ← distant encoding
12: x̂d ← distant state estimate
13: ed = fd(x̂d)
14: e = ed − fe(el(1), el(2), · · · , el(Nb))
estimated in the i-th block or 0 otherwise. The local encoders fl(i) in (6.23) are defined by
separate row vectors κ1,κ2, · · · ,κNb with κi ∈ <n ∀i = 1 to Nb. Let the function fe(.) be
also chosen as a linear weighting vector w = [w1, w2, · · · , wNb ] with wi ∈ < as the weight





where (∗) is the Schur product or entry-wise product between two vectors. The block
weighting vector w is important to accommodate altered noise statistics. If the noise
statistics of the ith block changes from the modeled distribution, the noise power of the
estimated states indexed by si increases. By reducing the i-th block weight wi, the noise
power in the error signal can be decreased, thus making it difficult for an attacker to
conceal an attack signature under evolving noise statistics.
Example: Let the 8 measurements in the system described in Section 6.4.3 be divided
into 2 measurement blocks B1 and B2. Each of the two blocks is indexed by the measure-
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ment sets b1 and b2 as b1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and b2 = {6, 7, 8}. This implies that B1 senses
y1, y2, y3, y4 and y5 whereas B2 senses y6, y7 and y8. To find out the state index set of B1
and B2, DIST DETECT is used. Let H1 be the matrix with rows of H indexed by b1. Thus
H1 is given as
H1 =

1 3 0 0 0
−2 0 0 4 0
0 1 0 1 0
−1 1 0 1 0
2 −1 0 3 0

(6.26)










s1 is the index set of H1’s columns according to the original column indexing of H . Thus
s1 = [1 1 0 1 0] as the 1st, 2nd and 4th columns of H are contained in H1. Thus
the estimated states in B1 are x̂l|s1 = [x̂1(l), x̂2(l), x̂4(l)]
ᵀ. Similarly, s2 is computed as
s2 = [0 1 1 0 1] and x̂l|s2 = [x̂2(l), x̂3(l), x̂5(l)]
ᵀ. This implies that the local es-
timator of block B1 predicts x1, x2 and x4 whereas the estimator of block B2 predicts
x2, x3 and x5. Now the local check state el(1) is computed with the linear coding vector
κ1 = [κ11 κ12 κ13 κ14 κ15] as
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el(1) = [κ1(∗)s1].x̂l (6.28)
= κ11x̂1(l) + κ12x̂2(l) + κ14x̂4(l) (6.29)
where (∗) is the Schur product or entry-wise product between two vectors.
Similarly the check state of block B2 is expressed as el(2) = [κ2(∗)s2].x̂l where
κ2 = [κ21 κ22 κ23 κ24 κ25] is the coding vector of block 2. The two check states
el(1) and el(2) are transmitted back to the central controller which has knowledge of
the complete measurement matrix H and estimates x̂d from z. The central controller
computes the check state ed = fd(x̂d). Let the weight of the two check states is determined
by a linear weighting vector w = [w1 w2]. Then the final error is defined as,
e = ed − (w1el(1) + w2el(2)) (6.30)





For multi-area architecture, the error detection scheme operates in a distributed fashion
over multiple control centers as illustrated in Figure 6.7. Let, the entire cyber-physical
system be divided into Na areas with each area monitored by its own control center. The
control center in each area implements error detection scheme as shown in Figure 6.6.
For i = 1 to Na, let the measurement index set and state index set be defined as Bi and
Si, where Bi and Si determine the measurements and estimated states from the i-th area.
The i-th control center receives the estimated states from all other areas to compute the
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Figure 6.7: Distributed Architecture over multiple areas where each area has its own control
center. The different areas share state estimation and error signals among each other.
appropriate actuation signals in the i-th area. The i-th area observes the measurements
indexed by set Bi to compute state values indexed by set Si. From these state estimates, the
i-th control center computes the single area error signal Ei(t) defined by equation (6.24).
In addition to receiving state estimates from adjacent areas, the i-th control center also
receives the error signals from all other areas. If the ith area shares a non-zero error signal,
the other areas stop trusting the received state estimates from that area and take appropriate
preventive measures.
6.6.3 Resilience of Proposed Scheme
The transmission of local check states over vulnerable communication links makes it possi-
ble for an attacker to observe the check signals and attempt to reverse-engineer the encoding
scheme so that he can exactly compensate the effect of an injected attack, thus rendering
the detection futile. For example, in a stealth attack described in Section 6.5.2, the attacker
injects the attack vector such that the corruption in the measurement falls in the null space
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of the residual error signal. In the proposed methodology, the two estimated states x̂l(t)
and x̂d(t) are unequal and hence the check states el(t) and ed(t) do not match up, thus
triggering the attack detection. If the attacker figures out the change in local check state
due to the injected attack, el(t) can be adjusted by that exact amount such that the central
controller generates an error signal e(t) = 0, thus masking the security attack. Injection
of an arbitrary signal in the check state generates a non-zero error signal as el(t) and ed(t)
are unequal, thus failing to conceal the injected attack. The execution of an adversarial
counterattack is difficult due to two primary reasons:
1. It is noteworthy that the check state is a linear encoding of the system states and not
the measurements. If the attacker had knowledge of the exact system states, reverse-
engineering the linear encoding would be easy for the attacker. As mentioned in
Section 6.5, the attacker does not have knowledge of the power grid dynamics and
the load changes in the different load buses of the network. Without this information,
it is impossible for the attacker to know the exact system states at all times and
compromise the local check state transmission.
2. From the attacker’s perspective, the brute-force approach requires a black-box mod-
eling with the measurements as inputs and the check state as output. In the absence
of knowledge about load changes, it is practically impossible to generate a reverse-
engineered model as demonstrated next.
We conduct experiments where we use 2 different tools - a regression method called
MARS (Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines) and a Levenberg-Marquardt based arti-
ficial neural network (ANN) to build a model from the measurements to the local checksum
signal. The model accuracy of any machine learning tool depends on the diversity of train-
ing data.
In figure 6.8, we illustrate the accuracy of the trained MARS model for the 9-bus system
shown in Figure 6.3. The model has been built on measurement data for single load changes
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Figure 6.8: MARS model accuracy for single load changes
on bus 5 and 6. It is seen that the trained model accurately predicts the checksum signal for
different load changes for those buses but fails to model the same for a load change in bus
8. In order to successfully compromise the detection scheme, the attacker needs to build
a model for all combinations of load changes, including simultaneous load perturbations
across multiple buses. This is infeasible due to two reasons: firstly, the total number of
load perturbations increases exponentially with the increase in number of buses due to the
myriad possible combinations and secondly, the different load demands don’t occur serially
over time for the attacker to collect all the training data required for successful model
creation. Even if it can be argued that an attacker has snooped on the transmissions for an
elongated period of time to gather a historical set of training data, it becomes prohibitively
difficult to build a model due to the sheer amount of data needed. For example, in the
1951-bus system there are 1010 load buses and the number of possible multi-load changes
is in the order of 10302. Figure 6.9 illustrates the time needed for successfully building a
model using the two different tools.
From Figure 6.9, it is seen that it takes a long time for successful model building in
systems with high number of buses (≈ 20 days and ≈ 16 hours for 1951-bus and 300-bus
networks respectively). We divided up the total data into disparate sets to enable handling
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Figure 6.9: Execution time for model building with neural network and MARS
of extremely large data sets during training.
Hence, we propose that the model building attack can be thwarted by periodically alter-
ing both the local and remote coding vectors such that an attacker can never collect all the
data for one particular encoding function. The period of changing the encoding function
parameters depends on the scale of the network.
6.6.4 Effects of Noise
All real cyber-physical systems operate in noisy environments and it is imperative to study
the effects of noise on the efficacy of proposed methodologies. If the system is too noisy
or the stochastic distribution parameters are not well modeled, the error signal e(t) from
the detection module is noisy. Under such circumstances, it is possible for an intelligent
attacker to inject attacks in a way such that the intrusion footprints stay below the noise
floor of the error signal resulting in a detection failure. To study the effects of noise on the
detection accuracy, we define two different noise sources - i) measurement noise - this refers
to the observational noise inherently present in the sensing equipments and ii) transmission
noise - this refers to the noise added during transmission through wired/wireless links. The
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measurement noise n in (6.7) is redefined as nm(t) and the transmission noise is introduced
as nt(t). The output signal y(t) is corrupted by the measurement noise nm(t) only while
the measurement signal z(t) is additionally corrupted by the transmission noise nt(t). Now,
we make the following proposition:
Proposition I: The detection accuracy depends only on the transmission noise nt(t) and
is not affected by the measurement noise nm(t).




time interval of T . The noise power of a zero-mean Gaussian distributed noise n(t) with
variance σ2n is Pn = σ
2




systems, let the noisy output signal that is transmitted be ỹ(t) = y(t) + nm(t). Similarly,
the received measurement signal without transmission noise is z(t) = ỹ(t). Both the local
checksum el(t) and the remote checksum ed(t) are generated from the same noisy data
ỹ(t), thus producing a final error signal of e(t) = 0. Operating under attacks, the received
measurement signal is z(t) = ỹ(t) + ay(t). This generates non-zero error signal e(t) with
the signal power Ps proportional to the mismatch between local and distant checksum codes
due to the attack as Ps ∝ ay and with noise power Pn = 0.
In the presence of transmission noise, the received measurement of an unattacked sys-
tem is z̃(t) = ỹ(t) + nt(t). Hence, the local and distant checksum codes do not exactly
match resulting in non-zero error signal e(t) with Pn ∼ σ2nt . For attacked systems, the error
signal e(t) is non-zero due to i) the injected attack and ii) transmission noise resulting in
Ps ∝ ay and Pn ∼ σ2nt . Thus the SNR of the error signal is defined as






(6.32) clearly demonstrates that an attacker’s capability to camouflage his attack de-
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pends on the SNR of the error signal that, in turn, depends on the transmission noise statis-
tic and not affected by the measurement noise nm(t). From an intuitive perspective, the
measurement noise variances are utilized in both the local and distant state estimate. The
error signal, being constructed as difference between the local and distant state encodings,
cancels out the effect of measurement noise and depends solely on the transmission noise.
In Section 6.8.4, we illustrate the effects of transmission noise statistic on the error detec-
tion accuracy.
6.7 Proposed Diagnosis and Mitigation Methodology
As described in Section 6.3.2, the objective of the diagnosis algorithm is to identify the
sensor and/or actuator attack sets that determines the compromised sensor and/or actuator
nodes. The recovery mechanism ignores the measurements from the attacked sensor nodes
while performing state estimation in the central controller. Preventive measures are adopted
to thwart the attack process and isolate the compromised sensor and/or actuator nodes.
6.7.1 Baseline Scheme
We first present the state-of-the-art diagnosis and correction algorithm[188] as the baseline
scheme to compare our proposed technique. Though the system dynamics is described
by the continuous state space equation in (6.1), the control center operates on sampled
digital measurements. To present the diagnosis and the correction scheme, we first form
the discrete form[198] of the linear dynamical equations provided in (6.1) as
x[t+ 1] = Adx[t] +Bdu[t] (6.33a)
y[t] = Hx[t] (6.33b)
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B are the discretized forms of the system
matrices with Ts as the sampling time.
For ease of explanation, u(t) is dropped from the initial analysis and is included in a
detailed discussion later. Under this assumption, the measurement equation is analogous to
the system
y[t] = HAtdx[0] (6.34)
with x[0] as the initial state. The following analysis is valid for the affine system (6.33a).
Considering only sensor attacks, the core objective of the diagnosis problem is to observe
the measurements z[t] = y[t] + ay[t] and determine the attack set Ky that provides the
indexes of the compromised sensors. The diagnosis algorithm is triggered when the error
detection modules discussed in Section 6.6 identifies the presence of an external attack.
This instant is chosen as time t = 0 for the diagnosis and correction algorithm. The
objective of the recovery scheme is to reconstruct the correct state estimates utilizing the
knowledge of diagnosed sensor nodes, last known attack-free state and the system model
described in (6.33a).
The diagnosis and mitigation is performed by an optimization algorithm which searches
for the smallest attack set Ky ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , p} (where p is the total number of measure-
ments) that explains the received measurements over a chosen time horizon of Th steps.










for t ∈ {0, 1, · · · , Th − 1}.
(6.35)
190
Equation (6.35) shows that the minimization of attack set cardinality is an `0-norm op-
timization problem and it has been shown in [188, 199, 200] that such an optimization
is NP-hard. However, replacing the `0-norm optimization by `1-norm optimization trans-
forms the problem into a convex problem that can be solved efficiently [200]. Hence, the
baseline detection and correction algorithm is given in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Baseline Detection and Mitigation
1: procedure BASELINE SCHEME
2: Th ← time horizon to observe
3: Linear map Φ(Th) : x→ [Hx |HAdx | · · · |HATh−1d x]









where Mi is the i-th row of M .
Incorporating u(t) in the analysis along with the assumption of unattacked actuators,
the linear map Φ(Th) in Algorithm 4 gets transformed to Φ(Th) : x → [Hx | H(Adx +




d Bdu[0]+· · ·+Bdu[Th−1])].
The optimization algorithm collects data until t = Th. After that, the algorithm takes some
time to converge to the correct state estimate x[0]. Then the subsequent states till the present
instant are computed using (6.33a) and the current updated state is utilized to compute the
required control after a total of Tu time steps from t = Th. Hence, the mitigation latency
for the baseline scheme is defined as Tb = Th + Tu.
In presence of actuator attacks, the u(t) is unknown and the diagnosis and correction
algorithm aims to estimate both the sensor and actuator attack sets Ky and Kx as well as
reconstruct the sequence of states x̂[0], x̂[1], · · · , x̂[Th − 1]. In this case, the optimization
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problem (6.35) is reformulated to:
minimize |K̂y|+ |K̂x|
subject to supp(ây[t]) ⊆ K̂y, supp(âx[t]) ⊆ K̂x
z[t] = Hx̂[t] + ây[t]
x̂[t+ 1] = Adx̂[t] +Bd(u[t] + âx[t])
for t ∈ {0, 1, · · · , Th − 1}.
(6.36)
As previously discussed, the `0-norm optimization problem is NP-hard and replaced by
an `1-norm. This relaxation leads to a tractable optimization problem[188] that can be
solved using convex optimization routines. It must be noted that in the previous case only
the initial state x[0] needs to be reconstructed since the known actuator inputs along with
the dynamical equations are used to generate all the subsequent states and compute the
corrective action. For actuator attacks, the aim is to reconstruct the entire sequence of states.
Compensatory action is difficult to apply in presence of actuator attacks and preventive
measures such as isolation of attacked nodes, identification of communication breach or
temporary shutdown are undertaken. A schematic flow of the baseline scheme is shown in
Figure 6.10.
6.7.2 Check-assisted mitigation
The check-assisted scheme is proposed to reduce the latency of attack diagnosis and cor-
rection compared to the baseline scheme. The basic premise of the proposed scheme is to
reduce the search space of the attack sets in the convex optimization algorithm by isolating
the sensor and actuator node blocks under attack. This is achieved by executing fast binary
search algorithms on the error signal computation in (6.24). At the instant of attack detec-
tion, redefined as time t = 0, the algorithm executing on the central control module, divides











+ 1 to Nb. At time t = 1, the
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Figure 6.10: Flowchart of the baseline scheme presented in Algorithm 4
































If sensors or actuators in one of the Nb blocks are under attack, then one of the error
signals e1 and e2 is zero while the other is non-zero. The non-zero error signal localizes
the attack within half of the total blocks. In the next time instant, the group containing the
compromised block is again divided into 2 different sub-blocks and the algorithm proceeds
until the attacked block is identified. This significantly reduces the potential attack set size
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from the entire p sensor nodes to |bi| nodes, assuming that the i-th block is under attack
(where bi is the measurement set of the ith block as described in Section 6.6.2. However,
non-zero values of both e1 and e2 at time t = 1 indicate that sensors and actuators from
multiple blocks are under attack. In such a situation, at time t = 2, two concurrent binary
search algorithms are executed on both the groups for further attack localization. The
flowchart for the check-assisted mitigation scheme is shown in Figure 6.11 and the binary
search algorithm for isolating the attacked blocks is provided in Algorithm 5.
Figure 6.11: Flowchart of the check-assisted diagnosis scheme presented in Algorithm 5
From the concept of strong observability in linear systems[201, 202], it has been proved






. If the number of attacked measurements is higher than that,
the optimization algorithm may not be able to correctly estimate the system states even
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Algorithm 5 Check-assisted diagnosis
1: procedure BINARY SEARCH
2: Nb ← number of blocks
3: xd ← distant state estimate
4: el(j) ← local j-th block error





6: t = 1
7: while nd ≥ 1 do
8: n1 = ns + nd − 1
9: if (ne − ns + 1) mod 2 = 0 then
10: n2 = ne − nd + 1
11: else















15: if e1 = 0, e2 6= 0 then
16: ns = ns + nd
17: else if e1 6= 0, e2 = 0 then
18: if (ne − ns + 1) mod 2 = 0 then
19: ne = ne − nd
20: else
21: ne = ne − nd − 1
22: else if e1 6= 0, e2 6= 0 then






25: t = t+ 1
26: Attacked block← ns
if the time horizon Th is increased to include more measurements. The optimal choice
of Th depends on the number of attacked sensor and actuator nodes with the maximum
value of Th(max) = n. With the increase in number of attacked nodes, more measure-
ments are required to successfully recover the system states. Algorithm 5 significantly
reduces the possible attack set size in Td = log2Nb time steps. This reduces the num-
ber of measurements Th needed by the optimization algorithm to converge. Suppose,
the reduced time horizon is Thr. The binary search execution time Td << Thr because
Td = log2Nb < Nb << n and Thr ∼ O(n). The reduction in search space for the op-
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timization program reduces its convergence time from Tu to Tur. Hence, the mitigation
latency of the proposed checksum-assisted methodology is Tp = Thr + Tur. The reduction
in mitigation latency of the checksum-assisted method from that of the baseline scheme is
illustrated in Figure 6.12.
Figure 6.12: Temporal events after error detection for baseline and proposed schemes
6.7.3 Implementation and Overhead
The implementation of the proposed scheme requires local and secure estimation of states
enabled by hardware links to the actual grid. This can be achieved by 2 ways:
1. Secure Hardware - A secure hardware implementation consists of FPGA modules
that perform state estimation based on the received data along with appropriate com-
munication interfaces for data transmission and reception. Prior works have demon-
strated FPGA implementation of Kalman filters[203, 204] and extended Kalman fil-
ters[205, 206]. The additional state encoding functions are also implemented on the
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same FPGA modules.
2. Secure Software - The local state estimation can also be performed by software in
a highly secure environment close to the grid sensors such that external attacks are
unable to penetrate such defenses. The central software module is still remotely
located for coordinating the control of the entire grid.
Our detection algorithm computes a single checksum from n state-estimates with com-
plexityO(n). The checksum assisted diagnosis method in Algorithm 5 assumes the knowl-
edge of Nb and converges in logNb time steps with O(log2Nb). The number of blocks
Nb < n and hence the total complexity of our method is estimated as O(n). This is signif-
icantly lower than O(nk) as reported in [186] where k is the attack set cardinality.
6.8 Simulation Results
We conduct experiments on the IEEE 5-bus, 9-bus, 14-bus, 30-bus, 118-bus and the 300-
bus networks. For simulation of large distributed systems, we use the 1354-bus system from
the Pan European Grid Advanced Simulation and State Estimation (PEGASE) project[207,
208] and the 1951-bus very high voltage system of the French Transmission Network[207].
The MATPOWER package is used to extract the network configuration and for solving the
optimal DC power flow problems. For each test system, the state variables are the voltage
angles at all the buses except one that is chosen as the reference bus with angle of 0◦. Thus,
for an n−bus network the number of state variables is (n− 1). The measurements include
real power flows in all branches and real power injections at each bus (withdrawn load
power is represented as negative power injection). The attacks are simulated by adding the
attack vector to the measurement vector.
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6.8.1 Attack Generation
From Section 6.5.2, it is clear that the replay attack is more potent due to its ability of di-
rectly disrupting the system dynamics through actuator injections. However, stealth attacks
are more common because an adversary can indirectly affect normal system operation by
compromising a small subset of the sensors. Hence, we analyze the difficulty in generation
of stealth attacks from an adversarial perspective. We quantify the ease of attack by the
metric success probability[172]. For generating the data, we vary the number of attacked
nodes, say l from 1 to number of sensors (for example, this ranges between 1 to 711 for
300-bus system). For each choice of l, we randomly choose l sensors to compromise and
execute Algorithm 6 to check if a valid attack exists. We perform this experiment 10000




The success probability is plotted against the compromised sensor percentage in Figure
6.13 where it is seen that the success probability of attack generation increases with the
proportion of attacked sensors.
Figure 6.13: Plot of attack generation probability vs proportion of sensor nodes to attack
across different IEEE benchmark test systems
From Figure 6.13, we emphasize on three points. Firstly, there exists a certain thresh-
old percentage of total sensors that need to be compromised for successfully generating a
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stealth attack. If an attacker manages to attack fewer sensors than this threshold, a stealth
attack vector doesn’t exist. Secondly, it can be noticed that this threshold reduces with the
increase in number of buses evident from the shift of the curves towards left. This inter-
esting observation is explained by the fact that the number of measurements increases with
the number of buses and the absolute number of sensors that need to be compromised also
increases despite the reduction in the threshold percentage. Finally, this analysis demon-
strates that if a certain percentage of sensors are protected with additional security methods,
stealth attacks cannot be generated by an attacker easily.
6.8.2 Centralized Attack Detection
For centralized error detection, we perform injection experiments for the two attack models
on all the IEEE bus systems. Changes in load demands across the load buses are simulated.
At the chosen instant of attack injection, the measurement vector y(t) is replaced with
y(t)+ay(t), with ay(t) being the sensor attack vector. In case of covert attack, the actuator
attack vector ax(t) is also added to the control signal.
Figure 6.14 illustrates stealth attack in 30-bus system. Three load changes are intro-
duced in load buses 7, 21 and 30 at t = 2.5s, 13s and 25.5s (indicated by black arrow-
heads). The top subfigure plots the actual voltage angle of bus 16 and its remote estimate
from the measurements under attack. The unattacked state is also plotted in blue dashes as
comparative reference. Gaussian noise is added to the measurements (measurement noise)
and the local checksum (transmission noise) with 30 dB SNR. The attack injection occurs
between t = 5s (indicated by red arrowhead) and t = 30s. From Section 6.5.2, it is clear
that the stealth attack adds a fixed offset to the measurements, that is compatible with the
output matrix H . The remote estimate starts deviating from the actual state trajectory at
the attack injection instant. This causes incorrect control signals (power injections) to be
applied to the system that further deteriorates the state trajectory. It is seen in the figure that
with time, the actual system state is significantly corrupted compared to unattacked case.
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Figure 6.14: (Top) Nominal and corrupt state(voltage angle) along with remote estimate
for bus 16 under stealth attack, (Bottom) Error values from the bad data detector and the
proposed checksum technique
The remote estimate is different from the actual system state due to the continuous stealth
attack injection. On withdrawal of the attack injection at the end of attack period, the con-
troller swiftly brings back the system state to nominal trajectory as seen in the inset. The
remote estimate also starts tracking the actual system state. A finite attack period is shown
to illustrate the controller response after withdrawal of intrusion, though practically an at-
tacker, after gaining access to communication channel is unlikely to discontinue the attack.
The bottom subfigure plots the error signals implemented using a bad-data detector and
the proposed checksum methodology. The bad data detector fails to detect any intrusion
during the attack injection period whereas the checksum error shows a distinct signature
indicating security attacks.
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Figure 6.15: (Top) Nominal and corrupt state (voltage angle) along with remote estimate
for bus 9 under replay attack, (Bottom) Error values from the bad data detector and the
checksum methodology
Figure 6.15 demonstrates a replay attack scenario in the IEEE 30-bus system. At t = 5s,
the sensor and actuator attack vectors are injected. The sensor attack is a recorded mea-
surement vector of a previous nominal operation that is replaced instead of the actual mea-
surement y(t). The attack vector can be any arbitrary signal with the objective of causing
system damage. We choose ramp signals in the power injections of the generator buses
1, 2, 13, 22, 23 and 27 to demonstrate actuator attack. After attack injection, the actual
system states start deviating from unattacked trajectory while the remote estimates are un-
able to track because of the corrupted sensor measurements. The top subfigure illustrates
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the voltage angle drift of bus 9 to unstable values while the inset shows the remote esti-
mate generating incorrect values from the modified measurements. The bottom subfigure
demonstrates the error signal from the bad data detector and the checksum methodology.
Since the local checksum tracks the compromised state and the error is generated as a dif-
ference between the local and remote checksum, the attack is instantly detected. In the
30-bus system, the measurement vector has a length of p = 71. The first three components
of the pre-recorded measurement vector injected as the sensor attack is shown in Figure
6.16 to illustrate a replay attack vector.
Figure 6.16: First three components of the replaced measurement vector in replay attack
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6.8.3 Distributed Attack Detection
We demonstrate distributed attack detection on the 1354-bus system of the PEGASE project
[207]. This high voltage European transmission network has 1354 buses, 260 generators,
1991 branches and 3344 measurements (1991 branch power flow measurements + 1353 bus
power injections), with bus number 640 defined as the reference bus. 673 of the 1354 buses
are load buses. We divide up the 3344 measurements into Nb = 15 blocks with 14 of the
blocks containing 223 measurements and the other containing 222 measurements (since the
power injection of the reference bus is known). The indexes and the number of measure-
ments to be included are practically determined by the physical topology and geographical
location of the grid infrastructure. In our experiments, we choose equal number of mea-
surements in each of the blocks since the effectiveness of the distributed checksum scheme
is not dependent on the block arrangements. Each of the 15 blocks receives a subset of the
3344 measurements and estimates a subset of the 1353 state variables. For example, block
2 estimates 184 states from 223 measurements. Each block computes its own checksum
and transmits it back to the central control module. We choose linear encoding resulting in
15 different coding vectors for each of the 15 blocks. The distant encoding function fd(.) is
determined from (6.31) with equal weight vector w = [1, 1, · · · , 1] for function fe(.). For
demonstration, we simulate load changes in 3 of the 673 buses introduced at t = 1.5s, 3.8s
and 7.5s. At each sampling instant, the network variables are solved using the DC optimal
power analysis of MATPOWER package. The 15 local checksum encodings are illustrated
in Figure 6.17.
It is seen that most of the checksum codes have fixed magnitude while a few have
transient profiles. Since we simulated load changes in only 3 of the load buses, most of the
system states are constant and voltage angles of a few buses change as load demands are
altered. Under unattacked situation, the distant checksum code matches the sum of the local
checksum codes (since the weight vector w is chosen to be all 1s). However, the final error
signal is not exactly zero due to the injection of transmission noise with 30 dB SNR. For
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Figure 6.17: Local checksum codes from the Nb = 15 blocks for the 1354-bus system
attack demonstration, we introduce a stealth attack between t = 1.5s and t = 7.8s where
sensors in block 4 are compromised. This results in the corruption of the distant estimate
and subsequently the distant checksum code. After attack injection, the signal power of the
error e(t) rises higher than the noise floor and generates a clearly discernible signature as
shown in Figure 6.18.
Figure 6.18: Error signal e(t) with and without attacks for the 1354-bus system
6.8.4 Effects of Measurement Noise
To explore the effects of measurement noise on the detection accuracy, we vary both the
measurement and transmission noise in our simulation of the IEEE benchmark systems.
204
As discussed in Section 6.8.4, the detection performance is not affected by measurement
noise and depends on transmission noise only. In Figure 6.19, we demonstrate a situation
where an attacker is able to conceal his intrusion because the attack signature stays below
the noise floor of the error signal.
Figure 6.19: Error signal with variation in transmission noise statistic with 10 dB and 30
dB SNR clearly shows how an attack can go undetected with high noise floor
We simulate a stealth attack scenario in the IEEE 57-bus network. We inject an attack
vector by compromising 69 of the 137 sensors. We inject Gaussian distributed measure-
ment noise and transmission noise, both with mean 0 and variance 0.001, resulting in 30
dB SNR. The inset of Figure 6.19 illustrates the attack detection through prominent error
signature. Next, retaining all choices, we increase the transmission noise variance to 0.05
such that the SNR is reduced to 10 dB. We notice that the higher noise floor of the error
e(t) completely subsumes the attack signature causing detection failure. So, we conduct
1500 simulations of the IEEE 57-bus system to compute attack coverage variation with
error SNR. We execute 100 simulations for 15 different noise variances as shown in Fig-
ure 6.20. The threshold of attack detection varies with the noise floor of the error signal.
We define an attack to be successfully detected if the absolute value of error lies above




. The variation of ac with error SNR is shown in Figure 6.20.
From Figure 6.20 it is seen that the attack detection coverage drops to 0 for SNR < 10
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Figure 6.20: Variation of attack detection coverage with SNR of error signal
dB. From (6.32) we know that 10 dB indicates equal signal and noise power that prevents
isolation of any attack signature above the noise floor in the error signal. A possible solu-
tion to increased noise statistic involves modifying the local and distant checksum codes to
generate higher signal power, thus recovering the SNR of error signal. However, a struc-
tured algorithm to sense the noise statistic and tune these encodings has not been pursued
in this work and will be studied in future research.
6.8.5 Attack Mitigation
For attack mitigation experiments, we solve the optimization problems using CVX[209]
- an open-source MATLAB tool for disciplined convex programming. We demonstrate
the attack mitigation procedure on the 1951-bus very high voltage French transmission
network. This network has 1951 buses, 366 generators, 1010 load buses, 2596 branches and
4547 measurements. The sensor measurements are divided up into 20 blocks - 19 blocks
with 227 measurements and 1 block having 234 measurements. Similar to the distributed
detection scenario, the measurement assignment to the blocks depends on the geographical
location of the sensors in reality and without this data, we allocate equal number of sensor
measurements to each block. Both the measurement and the transmission noise variances
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are set at 0.001 resulting in 38 dB and 32 dB SNR for the measurement and the error
signals. First, we generate a stealth vector with 450 sensors (≈ 10%) under attack. We
inject the attack into the measurement vector at t = 5s. Load perturbations are introduced
in 5 of the 1010 load buses at t = 1s, 11s, 16s, 20s and 31s for illustrative purpose. The
voltage angle profile of bus 29 is illustrated in Figure 6.21.
Figure 6.21: Voltage angle profile of bus 29 clearly shows the fast mitigation achieved in
the proposed scheme in comparison with the baseline method
In our simulation, the sampling duration is fixed at δt = 0.01s. At t = 5s, the remote
estimate x̂d(t) reduces sharply due to the injected attack, thus misguiding the generator
injections and corrupting the system state x(t) that starts rising. Upon detection of error,
Algorithm 5 is invoked and it isolates the plausible attack set to 3 blocks of 681 sensors
(≈ 15% of total sensors) at t = 5.05s. The original time horizon is fixed at Th = 1950 time
steps. The reduced attack set cardinality allows us to decrease the required time horizon
to 1950 × 0.15 = 292 time steps. Thus our proposed scheme collects transient data till
t = 5 + 2.92 = 7.92s. Next, the optimization algorithm converges at t = 11.98s. Upon
attack set diagnosis, the remote estimate is exactly able to start tracking the system state
from t = 11.98s onwards and the power injections are able to restore the bus angle to
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unattacked trajectory at t = 12.56s. In comparison, the baseline scheme collects data till
t = 5 + 19.5 = 24.5s and the baseline algorithm operates on the entire search space of
4547 sensors for diagnosis. The baseline scheme converges at t = 65.88s and restores the
system performance at t = 66.48s. The x-axis is shown discontinued for demonstration of
all transient events.
For quantifying the benefits of the proposed methodology compared to the baseline
scheme, we introduce a metric named Optimization Convergence Rate (OCR) that is de-
fined as OCR =
Tb
Tp
, where Tb and Tp are defined in Section 6.7 as the mitigation latencies
of the baseline and proposed scheme respectively. For example, in the above simulation,
the baseline scheme takes Tb = 6648−500 = 6148 time steps for optimization convergence
and the proposed scheme achieves the same in Tp = 1256 − 500 = 756 time steps, then
this is quantified by OCR =
6148
756
= 8.13. This implies that the proposed methodology is
8.13X as fast as the baseline scheme. Thus the OCR provides a metric for envisioning the
quantitative benefits of our work. The OCR indicates how fast a system is able to recover
its nominal performance under ongoing attacks.
Figure 6.22 depicts the OCR data from our simulation results. We perform attack in-
jections on 6 different systems - 30-bus, 57-bus, 114-bus, 300-bus, 1354-bus and 1951-bus
networks. For each system, we divide the entire measurement into Nb = 15 different
blocks with equal number of measurements (last block containing unequal number of mea-
surements). For each system, we perform 250 simulations with 5 different sets of attacked
sensors - 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50% - 50 simulations with each set. In each simulation,
we choose the attacked sensors and the load perturbations randomly. After the error signal
e(t) rises above the pre-defined detection threshold, both the baseline and our proposed
scheme are deployed. As the proportion of attacked sensors is not known beforehand, the
baseline scheme collects the transient data for the maximum time period of Th = n steps,
where n is the number of states in the system. In our scheme, Algorithm 5 is invoked
on error detection to isolate the group of attacked sensors. After Algorithm 5 restricts the
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Figure 6.22: Optimization convergence rate for variations of attacked sensors in 6 different
systems
possible attack set to selected sensors, the time horizon Th is reduced to Thr depending on
the possible number of corrupt measurements as explained in the previous example. After
the collection of measurement data over the selected horizon, the optimization is started in
both the schemes for exact diagnosis of attack sets and obtain correct state estimates. In our
scheme, the search space of the optimization algorithm is reduced to the diagnosed attack
set from Algorithm 5. The final convergence times Tb and Tp of the baseline scheme and
the proposed technique are recorded and used for OCR computation.
Figure 6.22 plots the mean OCR for all the experiments along with the standard de-
viations as the error bars. It is seen from the chart that OCR substantially grows with
the number of buses. As the number of buses increases, the number of sensors grows
rapidly that necessitates a high time horizon. On restricting the plausible attack set to a
few measurements, our algorithm provides significant time savings in performing real-time
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diagnosis. Another noticeable aspect is that the OCR decreases as the attack set cardinality
increases. For example, in the 1951-bus system our scheme is 10.4X as fast as the baseline
method with 10% attacked sensors while it drops to 2.13X for 50% of the attack sets. This
is because under 50% of sensors under attack, the time horizon reduction from Th to Thr is
absent and the only benefit we gain is from the reduced search space of the optimization al-
gorithm. These data conclusively demonstrate the comprehensive benefits of our proposed
work in detection, diagnosis and compensation of a power grid under security attacks.
6.9 Summary
In this work, we propose a hierarchical checksum based methodology for fast detection
and diagnosis of attacks in cyber-physical systems. This scheme enables us to quickly
recover the system performance in the presence of attacks and achieve minimum disruption.
The extensive simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed research in
comparison to competing methods. In addition, we discuss the effects of different noise
sources on our implementation, thus providing valuable insights into future efforts. Further,
we investigate possible countermeasures from an attacker’s perspective to jeopardize the
efficacy of our proposed scheme.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, a framework for real-time detection and correction of errors in linear
and nonlinear systems is presented. The state-space encoding based checking methodology
efficiently detects system errors due to component malfunctions in control systems as well
as security attacks in cyber-physical systems.
Chapter 2 provided the theoretical basis of the state-space encoding and defined how a
checksum is constructed that is capable of detecting abnormalities in system operation. The
feedback of the constructed checksum error to the erroneous state was shown to accurately
compensate the effects of faults on the system performance in real-time.
Chapter 3 demonstrated that state-space based encoding scheme can be used to cancel
out transient noise signals. Two real-time learning approaches were proposed to detect the
affected state for feedback of the checksum signal. Simulation results and hardware exper-
iments on a Butterworth filter corroborated the compensating capabilities of the proposed
scheme. In addition, a linear predictive coding based approach was presented for detection
of transient soft errors in nonlinear Volterra filter operation.
Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated how state-space encoding can be used to detect errors
and recover system performance in real-time. For a general class of nonlinear control
systems operating under arbitrary failure mechanisms, machine learning based checking
methodologies were proposed and shown to detect errors across the different abstraction
layers. Bit-flips in an ARM core implemented on FPGA demonstrated that actual soft
errors in the digital processor are also detected through this scheme. Reinforcement learn-
ing based control was used as an augmentation to the nominal controller and real-time
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self-learning was performed to recover system performance. The predictive check based
error signal was intelligently exploited to bootstrap the learning process, thus reducing the
latency of learning. Simulation results on two test cases and hardware experiments on
an actual self-balancing robot showcased the benefits and effectiveness of the proposed
schemes.
Chapter 6 presented a modified form of state-space encoding for attack resilience in
distributed cyber-physical systems. The resilience of the proposed methodology to adver-
sarial conuter-attacks was discussed along with the effects of noise on the attack coverage.
Simulation results on the IEEE benchmark power systems and two European high voltage
grids comprehensively illustrated the benefits and capabilities of the mitigation scheme.
7.2 Future Work
The future endeavors from this research can be summarized as:
1. The prediction functions (implemented by machine learning algorithms) for error
checking in nonlinear control systems depend on the pre-deployment training with
the expected system inputs during nominal operation. The training space for all
possible inputs can be huge in a practical application and hence makes the pre-
deployment training procedure almost infeasible. To circumvent this requirement, a
real-time learning methodology needs to be adopted that learns these checking func-
tions during the initial phase of nominal system operation after deployment. Such
a scheme will relearn the checking functions after an error has been corrected such
that future faults can be detected once again.
2. The real-time adaptation of the reinforcement learning parameters can jeopardize
the safe operation of a system due to the episodic experiments that are needed. An
important focus of future research need to concentrate on self-learning capabilities in
safety-critical systems where it is imperative that the system is brought to a safe and
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secure mode of operation before attempting to adapt in real-time. Efforts in this area
will pave the way for the development of future self-healing autonomous systems.
3. The resilience of the cyber-physical system to external security attacks need to be ex-
tended to thwart malicious attacks on AC power flow analysis and system topology.
Developing a comprehensive security framework for smart grids also need to con-
sider malware based attacks on the control software present in the SCADA modules
and propose low cost algorithm based checking and error recovery. Present work
[210] have started focusing on real-time monitoring of control algorithms to check






The optimal value function V ∗ for the optimal policy µ∗ is defined as









According to the optimality principle, the integral in (A.1) is divided into two parts
[t, t+ ∆t] and [t+ ∆t,∞) and then solve the subsequent optimization problem as,








τ V ∗(x(t+ ∆t))
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(A.2)
For a small ∆t, the first term is approximated as,
ρ(x(t),u(t))∆t+ o(∆t), and the second term is Taylor expanded as




Substituting these into (A.2) and collecting V ∗(x(t)) on the left-hand side, the optimal-
ity condition for [t, t+ ∆t] is expressed as,
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Dividing both sides by ∆t and taking ∆t to zero, the condition of the optimal value













Thus, the optimal policy is given by the action that maximizes the right-hand side of
the HJB equation:












In the early 1960s, Rudolph Kalman introduced the notions of controllability and observ-
ability as fundamental properties of linear systems. In this work, we extend the concept
of observability/detectability to provide a metric of system vulnerability that is an inher-
ent property of a system. We introduce a vulnerability index for both linear and nonlinear
systems and provide the significance of such a metric later.
B.1 Linear Systems
A dynamic model for a linear, time-invariant system is represented as,
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) (B.1)
y(t) = Cx(t) (B.2)
where x ∈ <n, u ∈ <m and y ∈ <p are the system state, control input to the system and
output/measurement variables, respectively. The notion of observability stems from the
question whether an initial condition can be uniquely determined within a finite time from














If the np x n observability matrix has full rank implying rank(O) = n, then an initial state
x0 in an unforced system (u = 0) can be uniquely determined by the univalent mapping
x0 = (O
ᵀO)−1Oᵀỹ, where ỹ = [y, ẏ, · · · ,y(n−1)]. The full rank condition establishes
complete system observability. A rank(O) < n indicates the existence of non-observable
modes in the system. Let us assume rank(O) = k < n. This implies that the dimension of
the null-space of the observability matrix is (n− k). One can find (n− k) basis vectors to
span N (O) ⊂ <n, the unobservable subspace of the system space. This implies that there
exists a diagonalizing transformation T such that with change of variables x̄ = Tx, the (n−
k) unobservable modes can be determined as x̄1, · · · , x̄n−k. Hence, if an attacker manages
to inject a malicious attack in the unobservable modes of the system, a state observer is
unable to uniquely estimate the system state (since multiple solutions exist) resulting in
incorrect control input and system trajectory deviation. In other words, unobservability in
a system renders itself vulnerable to security attacks.





where σmin and σmax are minimum and maximum singular values of OᵀO respectively.
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δv = 1 (all singular values are equal) indicates full observability and least vulnerability
whereas δv = 0 (presence of zero singular value implying non-zero null space) indicates
no observability and most vulnerability. It is noteworthy that a value of 0 < δv < 1 still
indicates full observability but strength of observability of all states are unequal. This
implies that in presence of measurement noise, the confidence in estimating some states is
higher than that of others. The system modes with low singular values of OᵀO suffer from
higher vulnerability and are potential targets for attackers.
B.2 Nonlinear Systems
Unlike linear systems, the nonlinear observability mapping is not constant and evolves
over the state trajectory. Hence, the vulnerability index is a function of the phase space
trajectory. An unforced nonlinear system (u = 0) is represented as,
ẋ = f(x) (B.5)
y = h(x) (B.6)
Assuming that h(.) is a sufficiently smooth scalar field on <n and taking consecutive
















.f(x) := Ln−1f h(x)
Having formally defined the Lie derivatives, the differential embedding map φ : < →
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Similar to linear systems, we again define a phase-trajectory dependent vulnerability
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Unlike linear systems, the observability of a nonlinear system is not constant in the
entire state-space over which it operates. The system is more vulnerable in a certain sub-
space V ⊂ <n where V = N (OᵀO) that is dependent on the phase trajectory. Hence, an
attacker can track the system state and monitor the vulnerability index to inject an attack
only when the phase trajectory passes through an unobservable subspace that renders itself
more difficult to detect from the measurements.
B.3 Significance
The significance of a vulnerability index in systems is two-fold: i) firstly, it provides an
evaluation of vulnerability in a system and creates an attack awareness for the system de-
signers, and ii) secondly, it indicates the amount of resilience needed to thwart malicious
attacks. This analysis is important for assessing the security aspect of any system and de-
sign appropriate counter-measures such as implementing additional state observations and





Algorithm 6 provides the mechanism to generate stealth attacks with a particular choice of
attack set Ky.
Algorithm 6 Stealth Attack Generation
1: procedure STEALTH ATTACK
2: H ← measurement matrix
3: p← number of sensors
4: l← number of attacked sensor nodes
5: Start with l = 1
6: Kx = {k1, k2, · · · , kl} ← attack set
7: a = (0, · · · , 0, ak1 , 0, · · · , 0, ak2 , 0, · · · , akl , · · · , 0)ᵀ
8: P ← H(HᵀH)−1Hᵀ
9: B ← P − Ip with Ip: p× p identity matrix
10: Let B = (b1,b2, · · · ,bp) with bi as ith column
11: a′ = (ak1 , ak2 , · · · , akl)ᵀ
12: B′ ← (bk1 ,bk2 , · · · ,bkl)
13: if rank(B′) = l then
14: Non-zero attack vector does not exist
15: Choose different Kx or increase l and execute
16: else if rank(B′) < l then
17: B† ← pseudo-inverse of B′
18: d← Non-zero l-length vector
19: a′ ← (Il −B†B′)d
20: Generate complete attack a from a′
C.2 Covert Attack
Covert attack is the most potent form of attack where the attacker modifies the system
measurements in such a way that the effect of its attack on the system dynamics is exactly
canceled out as shown in Figure C.1. The model of a covert attack is a = [ax,−H(x̃)]ᵀ,
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Figure C.1: Attack model of covert attack
where x̃ is the change in system states due to the injected attack. Covert attacks require the
attacker to know the measurement topology, system dynamics and to have access to both
sensor and actuator nodes, rendering this attack strategy to be the most potent among the
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